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Abstract
Lack of trust is the main barrier preventing more widespread data sharing. The lack of transparent and
reliable infrastructure for data sharing prevents many data owners from sharing their data. Data trust is
a paradigm that facilitates data sharing by forcing data controllers to be transparent about the process of
sharing and reusing data.
Blockchain technology has the potential to present the essential properties for creating a practical and
secure data trust framework by transforming current auditing practices and automatic enforcement of smart
contracts logic without relying on intermediaries to establish trust. Blockchain holds an enormous poten-
tial to remove the barriers of traditional centralized applications and propose a distributed and transparent
administration by employing the involved parties to maintain consensus on the ledger. Furthermore, smart
contracts are a programmable component that provides blockchain with more flexible and powerful capa-
bilities. Recent advances in blockchain platforms toward smart contracts’ development have revealed the
possibility of implementing blockchain-based applications in various domains, such as health care, supply
chain and digital identity.
This dissertation investigates the blockchain’s potential to present a framework for data trust. It starts
with a comprehensive study of smart contracts as the main component of blockchain for developing decentral-
ized data trust. Interrelated, three decentralized applications that address data sharing and access control
problems in various fields, including healthcare data sharing, business process, and physical access control
system, have been developed and examined.
In addition, a general-purpose application based on an attribute-based access control model is proposed
that can provide trusted auditability required for data sharing and access control systems and, ultimately, a
data trust framework. Besides auditing, the system presents a transparency level that both access requesters
(data users) and resource owners (data controllers) can benefit from. The proposed solutions have been
validated through a use case of independent digital libraries. It also provides a detailed performance analysis
of the system implementation. The performance results have been compared based on different consensus
mechanisms and databases, indicating the system’s high throughput and low latency.
Finally, this dissertation presents an end-to-end data trust framework based on blockchain technology.
The proposed framework promotes data trustworthiness by assessing input datasets, effectively managing
access control, and presenting data provenance and activity monitoring. A trust assessment model that
examines the trustworthiness of input data sets and calculates the trust value is presented. The number of
transaction validators is defined adaptively with the trust value. This research provides solutions for both
data owners and data users’ by ensuring the trustworthiness and quality of the data at origin and transparent
and secure usage of the data at the end. A comprehensive experimental study indicates the presented system
effectively handles a large number of transactions with low latency.
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1 Introduction
Trust is still the main obstacle preventing more widespread data sharing. There is a lack of transparent
infrastructure to demonstrate how the data will be re-used and for what purposes. This prevents many
data owners from sharing their data. Data trust is a new paradigm to improve trust in data stewardship by
providing a transparent, reliable, structured and trustworthy framework.
Data trust helps with engaging users to participate in data sharing by increasing the level of trust and
decreasing the level of associated risks and uncertainties. Data trust motivates data owners to share their
data by pushing data controllers to be transparent about the process of sharing and using data [164, 182].
Data trust addresses the trust issue for not only data providers but also data consumers and data subjects.
Data owners require to trust that data users will not misuse their data. Likewise, data consumers need to
trust that the data they get access to is trustworthy and sound provenance in order to undertake the delivery
of accurate analysis and testify the obtained results [124]. Besides, data consumers need to trust other parties
when they share their trained model or analysis results with the data owners or other potential customers
eventually.
Sharing personal data might not only put the interests of data subjects at risk but also introduce a new
risk to the organization by providing an advantage for its competitors. It is expected to mitigate some of the
perceived risks of data sharing and establish trust with a transparent and structured data trust framework.
Kieron O’Hara [124] demonstrates the necessary functions of data trust. He sets out eight technical
properties that are essential for trustworthy data sharing: (1) discovery, (2) provenance, (3) access controls,
(4) access, (5) identity management, (6) auditing of use, (7) accountability, (8) impact. Many of these
essential properties, such as provenance and auditing, are provided by blockchain and its unique inherent
features. Some other desirable properties for data trust, such as access control regulations and data impact
calculations, can also be programmed into blockchain as smart contracts.
Blockchain is a particular type of distributed ledger technology. The data is recorded on the blockchain
as a group of transactions called blocks. Each block has a hash value, and it links to the previous block
by referencing the hash value of the previous block. So, the data manipulation is not possible in blockchain
because any change leads to an inconsistency that can easily be recognized by the network. In order to attach
a valid block to the blockchain, a consensus mechanism applies. There are several consensus mechanisms
with a trade-off between performance and security.
Smart contracts are logics encoded in blockchain to create more flexible transactions. They are also able to
enforce their conditions automatically using the distributed nature of the blockchain. Before the development
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of smart contracts, blockchain applications were limited to creating cryptocurrencies and simple monetary
transactions. However, with the development of smart contracts, a new era for blockchain systems began by
providing an infrastructure for creating more diverse blockchain-based applications.
Access control refers to any action to prevent data and resources from unauthorized access, disclosure or
modification. In traditional databases, an authorization is defined by the triple of < O,S, P >, where the
subject s is authorized to execute privilege p on object o [34]. There are three main access control policies:
1) Discretionary Access Control (DAC) or authorization-based, 2) Mandatory Access Control (MAC), 3)
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [148].
In addition, there is another access control model called Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC). ABAC
is an access control model that regulates access permissions, based on the characteristics—in this context
called attributes—of subjects, resources, and context (or environment). Access decisions are made by eval-
uating these attributes based on predefined policies. ABAC is a flexible and fine-grained mechanism that is
also capable of enforcing the other three methods.
Blockchain characteristics such as immutability, durability, auditability, and reliability lead to considering
blockchain as a supplementary solution for access control systems. Immutability implies that any data on
the blockchain can never be changed. Durability means that the data recorded on blockchain can never be
lost. Auditibality means that users can trace every transaction, and a tamper-proof audit trail is available.
Reliability comes from the decentralized nature of blockchain. Since there is no single point of failure, and the
data is stored on many peers, the data can be retrieved at any time with high availability. Also, blockchain
applies a consensus mechanism to validate transactions and control malicious behaviours.
Figure 1.1: Research path.
Figure 1.1 presents the research path followed in this research to study distributed data trust from various
angles.
The journey started from preliminary studies related to blockchain and smart contracts. Data trust was
investigated in the context of three particular domain-specific applications, healthcare data stewardship [142],
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business process management [135], and physical access control systems [145].
Since access control was identified as a critical element in data trust and data sharing applications,
the research continued by presenting a distributed ABAC system based on permissioned blockchains. This
solution can be employed as an access control system for a variety of applications. The presented solution
has been validated through a multi-stakeholder use case of independent digital libraries.
In the end, by utilizing all experience gained from previous studies, this research introduces a distributed
and adaptive data trust framework using blockchain technology. This study addresses the concerns of both
data owners and data users. Data owners will be equipped with a secure and reliable data-sharing platform
with full control over their data access management. Data users also are able to assess the trustworthiness
of the data that have been shared with them.
1.1 Motivation
Blockchain is one of the distributed ledger technologies that has fired extensive interest from both academia
and industry. Bitcoin [117], as the first application of blockchain, is a cryptocurrency platform. Bitcoin offers
a limited scripting language that enables little beyond financial transactions, and its application is limited
to simple cryptocurrency transactions.
Smart contracts are programming codes containing arbitrary logic. Smart contracts, as a trusted dis-
tributed application, obtain their security from the blockchain and the underlying consensus mechanism. By
using smart contracts, it is possible to program more flexible and complex applications and execute them on
the blockchain.
Many studies have considered blockchain technology to improve existing services due to its characteristics,
such as audibility, immutability, immortality, availability, and smart contracts’ functionality. Blockchain has
been extensively investigated for digital identity management, access control, data provenance. All these
items are essential components for data trust.
This dissertation studies the essential components for data sharing and presents an end to end framework
for data trust by utilizing blockchain. It starts by exploring the smallest processing unit of blockchain [143],
transactions, and then it examines smart contracts to present an access control system. Ultimately, the
presented studies are in the direction of proposing a blockchain-based data trust framework.
I have examined smart contracts design, implementation and limitations. A systematic review of all the
topics related to smart contracts, including programming languages, supporting platforms, security aspects,
performance aspects, and decentralized applications [140] are presented. Although these applications are
studying various fields such as healthcare, IoT, supply chain, digital identity, voting and more, their primary
purpose is similar as they aim to control the access over specific data. However, the data domain is their
main difference; for example, the application’s data could be patients’ healthcare data or data generated by
Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Therefore, the big picture is utilizing blockchain for access management.
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Blockchain has promising features that make it a suitable alternative for access control systems. The
distributed nature of blockchain solves many problems of centralized systems. It eliminates third parties, so
we do not need to be concerned about privacy leakage from their side. Moreover, we can access a trustable and
unmodifiable history log of access requests and access responses for auditing purposes. Consensus mechanisms
are applied, so only valid transactions are recorded on the blockchain. Furthermore, we can employ smart
contracts to monitor and enforce access permissions flexibly and dynamically.
Although many studies have investigated blockchain for data sharing applications, those are not complete
solutions as they focus on a particular aspect such as privacy, or decentralization [201] or they consider a
specific domain such as IoT [102] or healthcare [184]. The lack of a complete solution for data trust has
motivated me to present an end-to-end data trust framework levering blockchain technology.
1.2 Research questions
The research questions addressed in this thesis center around three main categories based on blockchain
technology: data trust, smart contracts and data access control. In the following, the research questions
related to these categories are presented.
1.2.1 Smart contracts
Decentralized applications based on blockchain center around smart contract design and implementation. It is
important to be familiar with smart contracts’ potentials and challenges before developing a new decentralized
application using blockchain. In [140], a literature review on smart contracts topic is presented to answer the
following questions:
 What are the existing languages and available platform for smart contracts?
 What are the common security problems in smart contracts and what solutions exist to address them?
 How can we improve the performance of smart contracts execution and what tools we have to measure
the performance of smart contracts?
 What are the design patterns of smart contracts based on different applications categories?
1.2.2 Access control systems
Access control is one of the essential properties for implementing a system for data trust. Previous research
has shown that the primary concern of many represented applications based on blockchain in different domains
such as healthcare, IoT, and supply chain is providing an efficient and secure access control mechanism. I
have studied the state of the art and challenges of blockchain-based access control systems [144]. This study
presents answers to the following research questions.
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 What are the problems with current access control systems?
 How blockchain can help to solve these problems?
 What are the challenges for implementing an access control system based on blockchain?
 What are the features of implemented prototype systems?
Understanding the challenges, features, and design patterns of smart contracts, particularly in access
control and data sharing applications, has helped me present three access control systems. Two of them
target a particular domain, sharing medical ( presented in chapter 4) data and physical access control systems
(presented in chapter 5), and the last one is a general-purpose ABAC access control system (presented in
chapter 6).
1.2.3 Blockchain and data trust
Key characteristics of blockchain such as immutability, security, consensus, and auditing make blockchain an
eligible infrastructure for implementing data trust and use it as a platform for sharing data. This dissertation
addresses the following questions:
 Why blockchain is a suitable infrastructure for implementing data trust?
 How can we implement data trust’s required properties using blockchain?
 How can we develop an end-to-end solution for data trust using blockchain?
1.3 Contribution
The main contributions of this dissertation include the following:
1. I comprehensively and systematically reviewed smart contracts topics from various angles. I reviewed
their implementation aspects, security enhancement approaches, performance improvement studies and
decentralized application based on smart contracts. The smart contract design, structure, features, and
implementation are investigated in those studies. The result of this literature review is published in
[140] as a peer-reviewed journal paper.
2. I investigated the problems of centralized and traditional access control systems and discussed how
we could address them with blockchain technology. I reviewed the access control studies based on
blockchain by presenting the state of the art and future direction. The result of this review paper is
published in [144] IEEE/WIC/ACM/ conference.
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3. I studied data trust in an untrusted business process management, where multiple untrusted business
parties can collaborate for a common purpose in a trusted environment. I investigated the appli-
cability of the order processing execution as a real-word untrusted business process on the permis-
sioned blockchain. I implemented a proof of concept based on Hyperledger Composer to demonstrate
blockchain technology’s effectiveness for the presented purpose. The result of this study is published
in [135] as an IEEE conference paper.
4. I presented a patient-centric system for access management and medical data sharing. The system
utilizes blockchain’s smart contract to manage access permissions under the control of patients. I
implemented a proof of concept to evaluate the proposed solution. This study is one of the earliest
implementations of blockchain interactions with off-chain data storage. The result of this study is
published in [142] as an IEEE conference paper.
5. I proposed a novel application for employing blockchain in physical access control systems. It is the
first study that investigated blockchain effectiveness in improving the security and reliability of software
layers in physical access control systems by managing access permissions through smart contracts and
audit access requests from the tamper-proof ledger. I implemented the system using Hyperledger
Composer and evaluated the performance of the system Using Hyperledger Caliper. The result of this
study is published in [145] as an IEEE conference paper.
6. I presented a decentralized attribute-based access control system based on Hyperledger Fabric. This
study is the result of my internship with the Linux Foundation, Hyperledger Project. I evaluated the
system through a case study of digital libraries. I conducted a comprehensive performance analysis,
which indicated that the system could carry out hundreds of access decisions with an average latency
of 0.54 seconds. I evaluated the presented system based on two different orderer (consensus) services,
Raft and Kafka, two databases, CouchDB and GoLevelDB, and various network configurations. The
evaluation results indicate that the proposed system effectively handles a throughput of hundreds of
access decisions transactions per second, with an average latency of 0.54 seconds per transaction.
7. Relying on the foundation built from previous studies, I introduced an end-to-end data trust frame-
work with adaptive transaction validations. This study presents a trust model based on three factors:
confidence, endorsement, and reputation. I present an access control and consent management service
for data owners to share their data assets and a data provenance service for monitor and audit access
requests and permissions. I implemented the system using Hyperledger Fabric permissioned blockchain.
The evaluation result shows that the blockchain-based system can effectively calculate trust value for
2502 data assets in 500 seconds with an average latency of 0.37 seconds.
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1.4 Summary of chapters
 Chapter 1 (Introduction): This chapter includes motivations of the dissertation, problem statement
and research questions that are answered in this dissertation, and contribution of presented studies.
 Chapter 2 (Background and related works): This chapter introduces the background of blockchain
systems, smart contracts, access control systems, and data trust. It also reviews the related work
regarding blockchain-based access control systems, decentralized applications based on smart contracts,
and data trust systems.
 Chapter 3 (Establish trust in business process management): This chapter discusses permissioned
blockchain advantages for executing an untrusted business process. The implementation of the order
processing scenario on permissioned blockchain is discussed and evaluated.
 Chapter 4 (Sharing medical data using blockchain): This chapter presents an architecture and imple-
mentation of a patient-centric medical data management system. The system is developed based on
permissioned blockchain to control medical data access and off-chain data storage.
 Chapter 5 (Physical access control system): This chapter introduces blockchain applicability for the
software management layer in physical access control systems. The system architecture, implementation
and evaluation are discussed.
 Chapter 6 (Decentralized attribute-based access control system): This chapter discusses the system
model, architecture, and implementation of the ABAC model on Hyperledger Fabric. The system
evaluation and performance analysis results are included in this chapter.
 Chapter 7 ( Data trust framework): This chapter presents an end-to-end data trust framework. The
framework includes data asset trustworthy assessment and trust evaluation, as well as access control
and consent management. The system implementation details and performance evaluation results are
presented at the end of this chapter.
 Chapter 8 (Conclusion and future direction): This chapter includes a summary of the dissertation,
main contributions and future directions.
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2 Background and Related works
This chapter reviews the research studies in the areas of smart contracts, decentralized access control
systems based on smart contracts and blockchain, and data trust initial concepts and related studies.
The results of these studies are published in two separate review papers. In the first study, I conducted a
comprehensive review of smart contracts [140]. And in the later study, I reviewed the topic of decentralized
access control systems based on blockchain and smart contracts [144] with presenting state of the art and
the current solutions’ research gaps. I present these studies in the following sections.
2.1 Blockchain
Blockchain is a class of distributed ledger technology. The data is recorded on the blockchain as a group of
transactions called blocks. Each block has a hash value, and it links recursively to the previous blocks all the
way to the first block by referencing the hash value of the previous block in the header of the current block.
As a result, data manipulation is not possible in the blockchain, as any change leads to an inconsistency
between hashes, which can be easily recognized by the network. In addition to blockchain, there are other
data structures in distributed ledger technology, such as directed acyclic graphs (DAG) presented by Tangle
[134].
Blockchain applies a consensus mechanism to attach a valid block to the blockchain. There are several
consensus mechanisms with a trade-off between performance and scalability [175].
Before developing smart contracts, blockchain applications were limited to generating cryptocurrencies
and simple transactions for transferring cryptocurrencies. Smart contracts evolution has provided the foun-
dation for developing more diverse blockchain-based decentralized applications. Smart contracts are logics
encoded in blockchain to implement programmable transactions, and they can enforce their conditions auto-
matically.
There are numerous blockchain platforms, which are different in several features. System developers
can select a specific platform based on their system requirements, such as the type of network (public or
permissioned), supporting language for smart contracts, development complexity, performance, and cost.
Currently, blockchain platforms work independently; however, a new generation of blockchain systems is
progressing to provide interoperability between multiple blockchain platforms to extend the decentralized
applications [18].
Blockchain networks divide into two main categories: public and permissioned. Public blockchains are
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open to the world, where everyone can join the blockchain with an anonymous identity, submit a transaction,
and participate in consensus. Public blockchains require a heavy computation consensus mechanism to
maintain a distributed ledger at a large scale. Permissioned blockchains include an additional membership
layer, so only authenticated users can join, and each user can have different access levels. They are more
appropriate for enterprise sectors, and they can employ lighter consensus mechanisms because of initial
filtering and semi-trusted members.
2.1.1 Blockchain transactions
A transaction is a logical unit of sequential operations, which leads to the state change in database systems.
Database systems are classified into two groups based on their transactions’ properties: ACID and BASE.
ACID databases guarantee four properties for their transactions, Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, and
Durability.
 Atomicity means that either all of the transaction’s operations must be completed or not at all.
 Consistency means that the system’s integrity must be maintained, and the transactions must change
the current valid state of the database to another valid state.
 Isolation means that if transactions execute concurrently, they must produce the same result as they
execute sequentially.
 Durability guarantees that committed transactions will remain permanently.
BASE is mainly designed for NoSQL databases and distributed systems, and it is softer than the ACID
model. BASE includes three principles, Basic Availability, Soft state, and Eventual consistency.
 Basic Availability means that the system provides essential availability of data in case of partial failure
of nodes.
 Soft state refers to the system’s state that can be changed during the time, even without data input or
update.
 Eventual consistency implies that the BASE systems do not guarantee a specific time for consistency, but
eventually, they will reach consistency, unlike ACID systems, which emphasize immediate consistency.
Blockchain transactional properties do not exactly match with neither the ACID nor the BASE mod-
els. Tai et al. [169] present a new transaction perspective for blockchains called “SALT”, which includes
four characteristics, Sequential, Agreed, Ledgered, and Tamper-resistant. Sequential states that blockchain
processes transactions sequentially. Agreed refers to the consensus mechanism applied in the blockchain for
validating the transactions. In the blockchain, the majority of the nodes must accept a transaction in order
to be committed to the system. Ledgered refers to the durability characteristic of the blockchain. Once
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a transaction is committed to the blockchain, no one can revoke it. However, as the paper mentions, the
blockchain’s ledger property is slightly weaker than the durability property of the ACID systems because
of the possibility of the fork. Tamper-resident indicates the tamper-proof characteristic of transactions in
blockchain, which means that once a transaction is committed to the blockchain, it is impossible to alter it.
2.1.2 Public and permissioned blockchain
Public blockchains are introduced by Bitcoin, which the nodes are untrusted. In addition to public blockchains,
there are also permissioned or private blockchains.
Public or permissionless blockchains are open to the world. Everybody with anonymous identity can
join the public blockchain, input transactions, and participate in the consensus process. The computational
power in public blockchains significantly increases as the number of blocks and the total size of data grows.
Currently, most public blockchains use a category of PoW consensus mechanism, which is explained in the
next subsection.
Permissioned or private blockchains work similar to the public blockchains, but there is a membership
layer on top to authenticate users before joining blockchain. In permissioned blockchains, users could have
different access levels for submitting the transactions, reading the transactions, or participating in the con-
sensus mechanism. Because of the initial user filtering, permissioned blockchains can use lighter consensus
mechanisms (semi-centralized consensus methods [176]), so they process transactions faster. Hyperledger
Fabric [13] is a well-known example of the permissioned blockchains.
2.1.3 Blockchain platforms
Bitcoin 1 is the first application utilized the blockchain. It has mainly developed to manage and transfer
Bitcoin (its cryptocurrency). After Bitcoin, developing smart contracts by Ethereum 2 led to a new generation
of blockchain systems along with various applications.
Today many blockchain platforms are geared toward implementing smart contracts and decentralized
applications. Blockchain platforms are emerging and are nearly indistinguishable in some cases from core
blockchain technology. However, they are different in various aspects, such as the type of the network(public
or permissioned), support for built-in cryptocurrency, transaction workflow, performance, privacy, cost and,
most importantly, maturity. Some blockchain platforms such as Ethereum, Hyperledger Fabric, Corda, and
Quorum have mature tools, while others offer very little support for their users and developers.
The following overviews the leading blockchain platforms that support smart contracts. Table 2.1 com-
pares these platforms based on different features, including consensus approach, network type, smart contracts
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After investigating the Ethereum platform and experimenting performance of Ethereum transactions in
my first study [143]. I have used Hyperledger Fabric platform for implementing the research conducted in
this dissertation. I chose Hyperledger Fabric as the most mature permissioned blockchain, and it was an
excellent fit for my proposed applications. In the following, the initial concepts regarding these two platforms
are explained.
Ethereum
Ethereum has been designed to be adaptable and flexible with Turing complete built-in scripting language for
smart contracts called Solidity. Application developers can develop decentralized applications using smart
contracts that are run by the blockchain network. This platform’s goal is to facilitate transactions between
individuals who would have no means to trust one another.
Ethereum’s basic unit is account. Everyone who wants to submit transactions to the blockchain requires
an account. Ethereum includes two types of accounts: Externally Owned accounts (EOA) and Contract Ac-
counts. With EOA users send transactions directly, Contract Accounts compose the address and information
of smart contracts stored on the blockchain, and smart contracts regulate them.
Every account is defined by a pair of keys, a private key, and a public key. Each account’s address comes
from the last 20 bytes of the public key, and it is the necessary part of each transaction.
It is essential to understand the difference between transactions and internal transactions. The sender
of the transaction uses EOA’s private key to sign the transaction, and after confirmation, a hash value
returns and using this hash value, it is possible to track it. However, there is no signature field for internal
transactions. Different sources may use the terms of call or message for internal transactions.
In Ethereum, the transaction is a single instruction code that sends a message from an Externally Owned
Account. The ledger launches with a genesis block, and then new transactions process and create new blocks
and new states. Any change in the blockchain state starts with a transaction that is sent by EOA. This
transaction either directly transfers Ether (Ethereum digital currency) to another account, or it could trigger
a smart contract execution. Every transaction includes several fields, and the miner in the network prioritizes
the transactions based on the GasPrice field. If multiple transactions have been sent from the same account,
the miner calculates them by nonce value. The nonce field in the transaction is equal to the number of the













Therefore, the transactions sent from the same account with the same gas price will be executed, respectively
[181]. Figure 2.1 illustrates the diagram of transaction processing in Ethereum platform.
Figure 2.1: Ethereum transaction processing diagram [143].
We can consider Ethereum as a transaction-based state machine. Ethereum runs a state transition
function to ensure that the current state’s transition would lead to a new valid state. Formula 2.1 shows the
formal explanation of a valid state transition based on Ethereum Yellow paper [181]. γ is the Ethereum state
transition function, and T represents the transaction.
σt+1 = γ(σt, T ) (2.1)
Ethereum and many other blockchain platforms such as Tendermint and Quorum follow the order-execute
architecture for processing transactions. There are several drawbacks to this approach [13] as following.
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 Consensus is hard-coded within the platform, so it is impossible to change the consensus method without
high expenses.
 The consensus protocol determines the transaction’s trust model; therefore, it cannot be adapted based
on smart contract implementation.
 Smart contracts must be written in a domain-specific language, and using generic programming lan-
guages for smart contracts cause problems because they cannot ensure deterministic results.
 Transactions must be deterministic.
 Every smart contract runs on all peers, which can raise issue and prohibits the dissemination of contract
code and state to a subset of peers.
 Most importantly, transactions execute consecutively, which affects performance drastically.
Hyperledger Fabric
Hyperledger Fabric [13] is a permissioned blockchain hosted by the Linux Foundation. Hyperledger Fabric
has a modular structure that allows component pluggability, such as consensus, membership, and database.
The membership layer can authenticate users and grant users access based on their access level and system
policy.
Hyperledger Fabric is very mature in terms of being permissioned as we can configure its network so that
users have different and granular access levels. For example, we can configure a network that only a subset
of users could participate in consensus, submit a transaction, run a particular smart contract, and read the
ledger’s state.
Hyperledger Fabric smart contracts and chaincode
Hyperledger Fabric introduces the terms of chaincode, a program code that implements the application logic
and runs during the execution phase. In Hyperledger Fabric, the terms smart contract and chaincode are used
interchangeably. However, a smart contract indeed represents the transaction logic and then it is packaged
as a chaincode to be deployed to the Fabric blockchain network. A chaincode could include one or multiple
smart contracts, and the underlying of each smart contract is a set of transaction definitions. When we
deploy a chaincode to the network, all smart contracts within it are made available to applications. Figure
2.2 illustrates an example of access control chaincode.
Supporting general-purpose programming languages such as Java, Go, and JavaScript for writing smart
contracts (chaincodes) in Hyperledger Fabric indulges many blockchain developers and researchers. There
are two types of chaincode in Hyperledger Fabric. The first is similar to typical smart contracts written
by untrusted developers, and they can write their own logic and execute it on the blockchain. The second
chaincode type is called system chaincodes. They manage the blockchain system and maintain parameters.
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Figure 2.2: Hyperledger Fabric chaincode example.
Figure 2.3: Hyperldger Fabric execute-order-validate architecture.
Hyperledger Fabric transaction processing
Hyperledger Fabric introduces a new architecture for transaction flow called execute-order-validate archi-
tecture that separates transaction execution from consensus and enables policy-based endorsement. This
novel architecture is designed to address the issues mentioned in the previous section regarding order-execute
architecture. In the execution phase, the executing peers execute transactions, check them against correct-
ness, create read-write sets. In the order phase, read-write sets are ordered via consensus protocol or called
orderer unit. Finally, in the validation phase, transactions are checked based on endorsement policy, and the
endorsing peer will validate read-write sets again. Endorser peers evaluate all transactions within the block
in parallel.
After the validation phase, Each peer appends the block of ordered transactions to the Fabric’s chain, and
the write sets are committed to the current state database for every valid transaction. Figure 2.3 illustrates
the execute-order-validate architecture.
Hyperledger Fabric transaction validation and endorsement
There is an endorsement policy with every deployed chaincode that determines which organizations in a
blockchain network must sign a transaction generated by a given smart contract included in the current
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chaincode. The transaction is indicated as valid if all required organizations specified in the endorsement
policy sign the transaction. The endorsement unit is responsible for collecting the signatures needed for each
transaction and validating transactions. Fabric introduces a syntax for specifying customizable endorsement
policies. Endorsement policies are expressed in terms of identities matched to a role.
Endorsement policies are what make Hyperledger Fabric different from other blockchain platforms such as
Ethereum or Bitcoin. In these systems, any node in the network can submit valid transactions. Hyperledger
Fabric more realistically models the real world; trusted organizations in a network must validate transactions.
The Hyperledger Fabric has also introduced a key-level or state-based endorsement policy, which can
specify more granular policies at the level of the keys stored on the ledger. It means for every key-value
entity; we can specify a distinct endorsement policy.
In addition to collecting signatures from all required organizations specified in the endorsement policy, the
endorsing peer nodes must check the transaction to ensure that the world state’s current value matches the
transaction’s read set and then sign it. This step is specified to make sure that there has been no intermediate
update. If a transaction passes both these checks, then it is marked as a valid transaction.
Hyperledger Fabric membership service
Hyperledger Fabric is a permissioned blockchain. In Fabric, every participant or actor requires an identity
encapsulated in an X.509 digital certificate. The actor could be a peer, orderer, client application, or system
administrator. This identity includes attributes indicating the actor’s permission level to access the different
information and components in the Fabric network.
Fabric CA14 is a certificate authority that issues identities by generating a public and private key, which
forms a key-pair that can be used to authenticate identity. Fabric Membership Service Provider (MSP)
verifies the identities issued by Fabric CA without revealing the actor’s private key by maintaining a list
of permissioned identities. It also determines the identities’ roles. In Fabric, every actor has particular
privileges by specifying their roles. There are various roles in Hyperledger Fabric, such as admin, peer, client,
and orderer.
2.1.4 Consensus mechanisms
The consensus mechanism concludes the validating process of transactions in blocks and reaching an agree-
ment between all peers. Numerous consensus mechanisms are available, which are different in computation
power, performance, scalability, and tolerating disruptive behaviours. Wang et al. [176] studied blockchain
consensus algorithms focusing on both distributed consensus system design and incentive mechanism design
for public blockchains. Nguyen and Kim also [120] conducted a survey on consensus algorithms. They classify
the consensus mechanisms into two categories: proof-based and voting-based. In the proof-based method, one
14https://hyperledger-fabric-ca.readthedocs.io/
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leader (or multiple leaders) is selected, and the leader is responsible for validating and attaching blocks to the
ledger. Their primary difference is how they can choose the leader. In the voting-based approach, multiple
nodes vote for every block validation and based on consensus policy, minimum positive votes are required
for block validation. In the following, the consensus mechanisms, which mainly applied by the blockchain
platforms mentioned in table 2.1 are introduced.
Proof of Work (PoW) [61] is a consensus mechanism proposed by S. Nakamoto for Bitcoin and then
later applied by Ethereum. Proof of work is an incentive-based method that miner nodes must solve a
complicated mathematical puzzle in order to gain rewards. The process is like constantly guessing until they
solve the puzzle and find a value called the nonce. The first miner that unlocks the puzzle is the winner of
the current block. Then the block is announced to other nodes for verification. The verification process is
not a complicated task like the original puzzle. Then nodes check the proposed block against cheatings, and
then the collection of ordered transactions will be committed as a new block to the blockchain. PoW is very
resilient against tampering, but it requires very high computation and energy power.
Proof of stake (PoS) originally introduced by Peercoin 15 to reduce the cost of PoW. PoS is based on the
proof of ownership of cryptocurrency. In every round, the network chose a miner based on the nodes’ stake
amounts. As much as a node is wealthier, the chance to be selected is more. The miner gets rewarded by
proposing a correct block after validating it by other nodes. PoS reduces the amount of computation, but
there is a possible problem that the rich nodes get richer every time. It means wealthier nodes would have a
better opportunity to get selected each time.
Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) [153] is similar to PoS, but only a subset of nodes (witness) can par-
ticipate in the block generation process. Stakeholders select the block generator members. Simply any node
that holds any amount of token is considered as a stakeholder. Because the number of validator nodes is less,
DPoS is faster and more efficient.
Proof of Importance (PoI) has been introduced by the NEM blockchain platform [3]. The network
assigns a rating to each account according to its importance using graph theory methods. Accounts with
higher importance have a higher chance to append a new block to the ledger. As much as an account uses
blockchain and transfers coins, its importance rate increases. PoI doesn’t require high power.
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant (PBFT) [35] is based on the Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus.
First, nodes select a leader. The leader is not constant, and the nodes replace the leader frequently. Each
round includes three phases: pre-prepared, prepared, and commit for adding a new block to the blockchain.
In the pre-prepared phase, the leader orders the transactions and proposes a new block as a proposal to the
remaining nodes. In the preparation phase, the other nodes announce their votes to the leader and other
nodes. Eventually, if only two-thirds of the nodes accept the proposal, a new block will be accepted and
committed to the blockchain. Figure 2.4 shows the three phases in PBFT. PBFT can tolerate less than 33




Figure 2.4: PBFT three handshaking phases [35].
Raft [125] is a Crash Fault Tolerant (CFT) consensus mechanism used by Quorum, R3 Corda, and
Hyperledger Fabric platforms. Raft is a leader-follower method. There are three states in Raft: follower,
candidate, and leader. The procedure starts from the follower state. After that exact times out, if a follower
does not receive a response from the leader, it shifts to the candidate state. In the candidate state, nodes
vote for the next leader. The candidate that receives maximum votes will be selected as the next leader;
otherwise, it remains in the election state or reverts to the follower state. If the leader discovers a server with
a higher term in the leader state, the leader leaves the leader state and reverts to the follower state.
Istanbul Byzantine Fault Tolerant (IBFT) [2] is stimulated by PBFT [35] with some modifications. Similar
to PBFT, IBFT is a three-phase approach, pre-prepared, prepare, and commit. The system can tolerate F
faulty nodes if we have N validators where N= 3F+1. IBFT is a final protocol. It means a fork is not possible
in IBFT. In IBFT, there is no client to send the proposed block, and every validator can offer a suggesting
block. Other validators select one validator in each round, and the elected validator broadcasts a new block
(pre-prepared message). Then validators that received pre-prepare message broadcast prepare message. If
validators receive 2F+1 prepare messages, they enter the preparation phase and then if they accept the
proposed block, they announce the commit message. If validators receive 2F+1 commit messages and they
begin the commit phase, the block will be attached to the blockchain. Istanbul BFT has been employed by
Quorum blockchain.
2.1.5 Trust model of blockchain platforms
In general, a network of mutually untrusting peers maintains the blockchain ledger. Transactions are validated
through a consensus protocol, and any changes apply in all the ledger’s copies. In this way, we reach
distributed trust among a set of untrusted peers, and we can execute trusted distributed applications on top
of the blockchain.
However, the level of the untrustworthiness of peers is different in public and permissioned blockchains.
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In public blockchains, all participants are entirely untrusted, and for security and maintaining trust in the
network, complex and high computational consensus mechanisms, such as PoW, are required. In contrast, in
permissioned blockchains, the parties do not fully trust each other. However, because of the initial filtering,
the involved nodes are semi-trusted, so that a lighter consensus protocol, such as traditional Byzantine-Fault
Tolerant (BFT), is enough to achieve security and trust.
Most of the permissioned blockchain platforms still use a fixed trust model because they rely on asyn-
chronous BFT replication mechanisms to establish consensus [173]. Such protocols operate based on a security
assumption that among n > 3f peers, up to f are tolerated to misbehave, which are called Byzantine faults.
However, in permissioned blockchains, it is possible to separate the trust model of transaction validation from
the consensus protocol. The trust model can be adapted to the smart contract requirements so that trust as-
sumptions based on the application requirements can be customized. Hyperledger Fabric implemented these
flexible trust assumptions as a part of the transaction endorsement policy. Based on the required trust level
in a smart contract and involving parties, the number of peers required to endorse (confirm) transactions can
be tailored [13].
2.2 Smart contracts
Smart contracts are programs that execute on the blockchain. With the development of blockchain platforms
that support Turing-complete language for smart developing smart contracts, we now have more flexibility
to develop various transactions with the more complex procedure and utilize them for multiple application
domains. The blockchain can automatically enforce smart contracts’ terms and conditions. Each smart
contract can include one or multiple transactions. A smart contract can be deployed using a transaction that
consists of the code for a set of functions and the smart contract’s initial state.
This section reviews the smart contracts related studies from multiple angles. It starts with discussing
smart contracts’ implementation in terms of available programming languages for writing smart contracts and
the code location design in different blockchain platforms. Then it reviews the studies that aim to improve
the security and performance of smart contacts. Finally, it presents multiple decentralized applications based
on blockchain and smart contracts.
This section provide answer to the following questions:
 What are the existing languages and available platform for smart contracts?
 What are the common security problems in smart contracts and what solutions exist to address them?
 How can we improve the performance of smart contracts execution and what tools we have to measure
the performance of smart contracts?
 What are the design patterns of smart contracts based on different applications categories?
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Table 2.2: Smart contracts programming languages.
Platform Script language Turing complete Computation level Virtualization
Bitcoin Script No Low-level (Virtual Machine) No
Ethereum EVM bytecode Yes




Nxt - No High-level (JavaScript) No




2.2.1 Smart contracts programming language
Some blockchain platforms such as Hyperledger Fabric, Neo, EoS, and Tendermint support general program-
ming languages such as Java, C++, NodeJS, Python, and Go for smart contracts, and some other platforms,
such as Ethereum, presented languages particularly for writing smart contracts, such as Solidity. In this
section, we overview the programming languages designed mainly for developing smart contracts. Table 2.1
specifies the supporting platforms for these smart contracts languages. In general, there are two main trends
for developing a new programming language for smart contracts. First, using logic and specifics to make
smart contracts more straightforward to understand and more similar to traditional contracts. The second
studies aim to develop a programming language to improve the security of smart contracts.
Seijas et al. [154] also review the scripting languages used in three blockchain systems: Bitcoin, Ethereum
and Nxt. Table 2.2 shows the summary and the specification of designated smart contracts scripting languages
in addition to Hyperledger Fabric that we added for completion. In the following, I present the list of
programming languages mainly designed for writing smart contracts.
Solidity
Solidity [49] is the most popular programming language particularly developed for writing smart contracts.
Solidity is an object-oriented, Turing complete language, and it runs on Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM).
Ethereum is not the only blockchain platform that supports Solidity; Quorum, Hyperledger Burrow, and
Hyperledger Besu also use Solidity. Even platforms such as Hyperldger Fabric, which is designed to promote
general programming languages (Node, Java, and Go) for writing smart contracts, has also integrated Solidity
smart contracts [207]. Solidity is the most well-known and mature contract-oriented language. However, it
is vulnerable against security attacks [27]. Therefore, many researchers propose improvements in Solidity
smart contracts’ security by introducing mid-level languages or smart contracts analyzing tools.
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Logic-based smart contracts
Idelberger et al. [83] suggested logic-based or declarative language as a replacement of procedural languages
to make smart contracts more related to traditional contracts. They state the advantages of logic-based
smart contracts as follow:
 They are more reasonable for contract parties.
 The logic-based smart contracts can embed contract parties’ negotiations easier.
 They can be validated easier.
 In terms of storage, logic-based contracts are lighter.
 They can ease the interoperability between contracts by utilizing rule interchange languages.
 The process of contract alteration is easier.
First, the paper explored a Pseudo-code of the contractual licensing clauses as an instance of a typical
contract. Then it represented the formal contract logic implemented by defeasible logic engine SPINdle
[96]. This study proposes two possible solutions for implementing logic-based smart contracts, off-chain
and on-chain implementation. There is a centralized system at the top of the blockchain in the off-chain
implementation, and a centralized server executes smart contracts. In the on-chain option, smart contracts
can form and negotiate off-chain or on-chain, including the following steps: contract storage, enforcement and
monitoring, and regulations, which should be executed on-chain and stored on the blockchain. The authors
identified obvious challenges resulting from the implementation of logic-based smart contracts, asking further
studies to implement a more efficient and cheaper logic-based algorithm.
SPESC (a specification language for smart contracts)
SPESC is a specification language for defining the specs of smart contracts [74]. SPESC creates an abstraction
contract at the top of the smart contract written by another programming language. The developers designed
SPESC to make smart contracts understandable for diverse collaboratives required in smart contracts design,
such as business experts and lawyers, like logic-based smart contracts [83]. It presents smart contracts in a
similar way as real-world contracts by providing the specifications that describe each party, a set of contract
terms, commitments and rights of the parties, and the contract circumstances. SPESC smart contracts
include four elements: contract parties, properties, terms (include obligations and rights as subclasses), and
data type definitions (include the primitive type and complex type as subclasses). SPESC supports multiple
expressions to define term conditions. Figure 2.5 shows SPESC supported expressions and transactions. The
paper also explores the understandability of SPESC by running an experiment according to questionnaire
results of over fifteen participants from computer science and law departments. The results demonstrate that
SPESC is more understandable than Solidity smart contracts; however, the paper nor translate SPESC to
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Solidity or any other smart contract programs nighter deploy it on a real blockchain platform to investigate
possible challenges.
Figure 2.5: SPESC supported expressions and transactions.
Bamboo
To solve the problem of reentrancy (it is explained in section 2.2.3) in Solidity smart contracts, Yoichi Hirai
introduced a programming language to create polymorphic contracts for Ethereum called Bamboo [77]. It
forces the state-machine method to programmers. Hirai inspired Bamboo’s syntax from Erlang. The following
code shows three contracts written in Bamboo that they deploy together. Contract A can become C or abort,
and contract C can become D, and the program forces their orders.
Contract A( ) {
case ( bool A’ ) {
// Do something
Return ( t rue ) then become A( ) ;
}
case ( bool A’ ’ ( ) ) {
i f ( something )
re turn ( t rue ) then become
C( ) ;





case ( void C’ ( ) ) {
i f ( something )
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//Do something
e l s e







SCILLA [155] is an intermediate-level language for smart contracts that use formal methods to verify the
smart contract written in higher-level languages such as Solidity. They structure smart contracts as com-
municating automata to examine smart contracts’ semantics, security, and consistency properties. SCILLA
achieves expressivity and traceability by presenting smart contracts in communicating automata and sep-
arating programming concepts. SCILLA implies a separation between computation and communication,
separation between effectual and pure computation, and separation between invocation and continuation.
Flint
Flint [151] is a domain-specific statically-typed programming language for smart contracts, which addresses
security. Flint includes caller capabilities blocks to check the access permission of Ethereum accounts and
contract functions. Flint introduces protection blocks to add a security layer to limit smart contract execution
and protect smart contracts from unauthorized calls. Flint does not permit the creation, duplication, and
destruction of assets, but they can be split, merged or transferred. Flint also categorizes smart contracts’
functions into two groups: mutating function, which changes the contract state and non-mutating functions.
In Flint, invoking the mutating functions by non-mutating functions is restricted, and it is not possible.
BitML (Bitcoin Modelling Language)
BitML [16] is a high-level programming language for Bitcoin smart contracts to define the terms of trading
Bitcoins. It generates smart contracts in symbolic expressions (symbolic model) and then compiles these
expressions to Bitcoin scripts. Symbolic expressions can be interpreted easier by using formal methods. Also,
they argue that any violation at the computation level is also identifiable at the symbolic level. BitML can
implement many Bitcoin smart contract-based services such as escrow services, timed commitments, lotteries,
and gambling games. However, it does not support express contingent payments (smart contracts that enable
selling solutions for a class of NP problems).
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2.2.2 Smart contracts code location
Smart contracts are programs that execute logic, and like transactions, they can change the ledger’s state.
They can automatically execute and enforce their terms without the intervention of trusted authorities.
Smart contract codes are written in a high-level programming language. The smart contract code’s location
is dependent on the platform. For example, they can store on the ledger like transactions or install on network
peers.
In the Ethereum platform, smart contracts are in the Solidity language, and Solidity codes compile into
an Ethereum binary format called EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine) bytecode. Any smart contract resides
at a specific address in EVM bytecode. Any referral to the smart contract is through invoking the address
of the smart contract. It means smart contracts’ bytecode is a part of the ledger in Ethereum platform.
Hyperledger Fabric introduces a new term for smart contracts called chaincode. A chaincode is a package
of related smart contracts; however, it could include only one smart contract, so chaincode and smart contract
terms are used interchangeably. In Hyperledger Fabric, one peer installs it’s proposed chaincode. The
system administrators instantiates the chaincode to its channel (the channel is a private blockchain overlay in
Hyperledger Fabric which allows private communication between multiple organizations, the Fabric network
includes at least one channel) to make chaincode available for all peers belong to the same channel and make
sure that all peers use the same version of the chaincode. Every peer that wants to submit a transaction or
query data through chaincode must also install the chaincode. The program calls chaincodes in Hyperledger
Fabric through their names and versions.
2.2.3 Smart contracts security
Smart contracts might handle a large sum of money, digital assets, stocks, or data. Considering smart con-
tracts’ security is essential considering even a small bug can lead to critical problems, such as a significant
amount of money loss or privacy leakage. For example, Ethereum well-known crowdfunding smart contract,
DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization), was attacked in June 2016 because of a bug in its code and
resulted in 60 million USD loss [29]. The attacker exploited the reentrancy vulnerability. The vulnerable
program recursively called the split DAO function to transfer Ether (Ethereum cryptocurrency) to the at-
tacker account, and the calls stopped before updating the new balance of the calling contract (the attacker
contract). Writing secure and bug-free smart contracts is a difficult task [52] as previous studies show that
a high percentage of smart contacts that already are deployed on the Ethereum blockchain are vulnerable.
Luu et al. investigate 19,366 Ethereum Smart contracts using their represented tool called OYENTE, and
their report determines that more than 45 percent of them are buggy [104].
This section outlines represented methods and tools to address the security issues in smart contracts.
Table 2.3 shows a summary of described strategies, which address smart contracts’ security.
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Table 2.3: Smart contracts security methods.
Represented Methods References
Formal verification
F* [20][168], Isabelle/HOL [10],
KEVM [131][76], solidity* & EVM* [20]
Smart contracts code analyzer tools
OYENTE [104], EthIR [7], GasTap [8]
SmartInspect [23], SECURIFY [172],
MAIAN [121], Vandal [25], Smartcheck [171],
GASPER [38]
Effective callback [64]
Using control flow [60]
New consensus method [177]
Securely connect blockchain to off-chain Town Crier [196], Smart Cast [94]
Privacy Hawk [93], Enigma [208]
Secure programming language SCILLA [156], Flint [152]
Classification of security problems
Luu et al. [104] proposed classes of security problems in Ethereum smart contracts, and they offer methods to
refine the operational semantic of Ethereum to enhance the security of smart contracts. They also developed
OYENTE as a symbolic execution tool, which can identify relevant bugs in Ethereum smart contracts. The
smart contracts vulnerabilities are as follow:
Transaction Ordering Dependence (TOD): In the Ethereum blockchain, the order of transaction
execution is up to miners, and clients do not control them. This problem happens when the same contract
invokes more than one transaction, and the order of the transactions can affect the new state of the blockchain.
The authors recommend guard condition as a solution. The idea is that the transaction confirmation becomes
dependent on the guard condition satisfaction; otherwise, the transaction is declined.
Timestamp Dependence: This problem is relevant to smart contracts, which include conditions that
trigger by block timestamp. Block timestamps are set by miners based on their local system time, and so
it can be manipulated by an adversary. The authors suggest using block index instead of block timestamp
because it is incremental and protected from manipulation.
Mishandled Exceptions: This problem targets the smart contracts that call another smart contract. If
any exception occurs in a called contract, it terminates and returns false, but it may not inform the caller of a
smart contract. The paper suggestion for this problem is adding explicit throw and catch EVM instructions.
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Reentrancy Vulnerability: This problem is related to DAO vulnerability (it was explained at the be-
ginning of section 2.2.3). When a contract calls another contract, the current contract execution waits until
the called contract termination. It provides an opportunity for the adversary to exploit the caller contract
intermediary state and call its methods numerous times.
Smart contracts security analysis tools
OYENTE: OYENTE 16 is a tool to analyze Ethereum smart contracts code based on symbolic execution
[104]. OYENTE takes two inputs: Ethereum smart contract bytecode and Ethereum global state. It checks
smart contracts against four previously declared problems in the previous section. There are four main
elements in OYENTE: CGFBuilder, Explorer, CoreAnalysis, and Validator. CGFBuilder is responsible for
creating a Control Flow Graph of the contract. Explorer symbolically executes contracts. The output of
Explorer sends to CoreAnalysis to check the existence of four main problems. Validator removes false positives
to make sure OYENTE reports detailed problems to the user. OYENTE’s report declares that more than
45 percent of the Ethereum contracts include at least one of the four indicated problems based on analyzing
19,366 contracts.
EthIR: EthIR is an extension of OYENTE. EthIR analyzes the Ethereum Bytecodes instead of the
source code of smart contracts. Therefore, it is helpful in analyzing smart contracts that their source code
is not available. It acts as a decompiler that modified CFGs provided by OYENTE to create a rule-based
representation (RBR) of the bytecodes that fit high-level analyses [7].
SmartInspect: Once the developer deploys the smart contract, it is hard to inspect the given contract
attributes because of smart contracts data’s encoded nature. Bragagnolo et al. addressed verifying deployed
smart contracts [23]. SmartInspect is a tool for analyzing deployed smart contracts using decompilation
techniques, and mirror-based [22] reflection for remotely deployed on a reflection-less system [130] without
redeploying the contact (getter method) or using an API to accumulate raw data (ad-hoc decoding method).
SmartInspect first parses contract codes to generate AST (Abstract Syntax Tree). Then by interpreting
the structured representation of AST, it produces the mirror. The next step uses the mirror to extract
contracts data, then data is given into four different formats: 1) REST 2) Pharo widget user interface 3)
JSON 4) HTML. The authors evaluate the represented tool by comparing SmartInspect with getter and
ad-hoc decoder methods in nine different features include four characteristics represented in [130]: interac-
tiveness, distribution, security, and instrumentations in addition to important blockchain features: privacy,
pluggability, consistency, reusability, and unrestricted types. Table 2.4 shows the evaluation results.
SECURIFY: Ttsankov et al. developed SECURIFY [172], another smart contract security platform.
SECURIFY first decompiles the EVM bytecode of the smart contract and derives semantic facts that are data
and control flow dependencies. Finally, it checks the security pattern, which is represented in domain-specific
language. SECURIFY patterns include a set of compliance and violation—one out of the three labels of
16https://github.com/melonproject/oyente
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Table 2.4: SmartInspect evaluation result [23].
Characteristic SmartInspect Getter Decoder
Interactiveness Yes Partial Partial
Distribution Yes No No
Security Yes Yes Yes
Instrumentation No No No
Privacy Yes No Yes
Pluggability Yes No Yes
Consistency Yes Yes Yes
Reusability Yes No No
Unrestricted Types Yes No Yes
Compliance, Violence, and Warning mark smart contracts unsafe behaviours. If the semantic fact matches
the compliance pattern, it considers compliance; else, it is considered violence if it fits violence. If it matches
neither of those patterns, it is recognized as a warning behaviour.
MAIAN: MAIAN is an analysis tool represented by Nikolic et al. [121] to detect greedy, prodigal, or
suicidal behaviour of Ethereum smart contracts based on a trace of vulnerabilities. Greedy smart contracts
refer to smart contracts that stay alive but lock Ether endlessly. Prodigal smart contracts do not provide any
backup solution in case of attacks, and they can leak Ether to an arbitrary address. Suicidal smart contracts
are those, which can be destroyed by any arbitrary account by forcing the smart contract to commit suicide.
Their analysis on 970,898 smart contracts detected 34,200 (2.365 distinct) vulnerable contracts.
Figure 2.6: Vandal’s pipeline [25].
Vandal: Brent et al. introduced Vandal as a static security analysis framework for smart contracts
[25]. Vandal uses an analysis pipeline to translate smart contracts bytecodes to logic relations, reflecting
the smart contracts’ program semantics. The analysis pipeline includes a bytecode scraper, a disassembler,
a decompiler, and an extractor. Figure 2.6 shows Vandal pipeline. Also, the authors employed Souffle’
[85], a declarative language, as a datalog engine to express security vulnerabilities. This study denotes five
vulnerabilities: Unchecked send, Reentrancy, Unsecured Balance, Destroyable contract, and Use of Origin.
SmartCheck: Tikhomirov et al. classified common Solidity code issues into four classes: Security,
Functional, Operational, and Development [171]. They deployed SmartCheck that translates smart contracts’
source code (Solidity code) to the XML format, and it looks for problematic patterns using XPath queries.
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Table 2.5: SmartCheck smart contract code issue classification [171].
Security issue Functional issue Operational issue Development issue
Balance equality Integer division Byte array Token API violation
Unchecked external call Locked money Costly loop Compiler version not
fixed
DoS by external con-
tract
Unchecked math Private modifier
Send instead of transfer Timestamp dependence Redundant fallback
function
Reentrancy Unsafe type inference Style guide violation
Malicious libraries Implicit visibility level
Using tx.origin
Table 2.5 presents the SmartCheck code issues classification.
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Table 2.6: Under optimized patterns [38].
Category Under-optimized Pattern
Useless code related
1. Dead Code: Existing bytecodes in smart contracts, which is never executed
2. Opaque Predicates: The presence of the statement operations in
smart contracts, which their results are same.
Loop Related
3. Expensive Operations: Moving expensive operation
outside of the loop can lead to saving a significant amount of gas.
4. Constant Outcome: If the result of the loop outcome is always constant that loop
can be removed.
5. Loop Fusion: Combining several loops into one loop.
6. Repeated computations: Loops can have constant result in each iteration.
This pattern saves gas by computing the outcome once and then reusing it.
7. Comparison with the unilateral outcome: Comparisons that always result the
same value in the loop. They do not recognize in compilation such as pattern two.
GASPER: Gas is a unit introduced by the Ethereum blockchain used for the execution fee that the
transactions’ sender or smart contracts should pay for every operation. In other words, gas is the fee to reward
miners for executing the program. Gas can be exchanged with Ether, which is Ethereum cryptocurrency [28].
Chen et al. [38] explain a security vulnerability in smart contracts that leads to unnecessary gas consumption.
They propose seven under-optimized patterns in smart contracts classified into two groups: useless-code
related and loop-related. Table 2.6 shows the seven under-optimized smart contracts patterns based on
Solidity programming language. They also developed a tool called GASPER for identifying overcharged three
out of seven representative patterns automatically: dead code, opaque predicates, and expensive operations
in a loop. The result of scanning 4,240 smart contracts shows that at least 80% of contracts involved in one
of these three patterns and at least 73.2% of smart contracts suffer from two out of three patterns, and 71.7%
of smart contracts suffer from all three patterns.
Formal verification
Formal verification is one of the most precise methods to verify the system’s accuracy. It is also utilized
to verify the behaviour of smart contracts. This section reviews the studies that identify and solve smart
contracts’ security vulnerabilities using formal methods.
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Bhargavan et al. [20] introduce a framework to analyze and verify smart contracts written in Solidity
programming. The authors used F* [168], a functional programming language for program verification. They
introduce two tools: Solidity*, a tool that translates Solidity programs to F* codes for verifying the source
level functional accuracy and EVM*, a tool which is a decompiler for EVM bytecodes to perform a stack
analysis and generates equivalent F* programs for verifying low-level properties. The tool verifies that both
outputs are equivalent. The output of Solidity* indicates the dangerous patterns to detect send() function
failure exception and reentrancy. The output of EVM* checks the limit of gas consumption in smart contracts
methods.
Amani et al. [10] similarly use the decompilation technique to verify Ethereum smart contracts at the
bytecode level by employing logical framework Isabelle/HOL. They define the smart contracts’ correctness
features by relying on the Ethereum termination guarantee gas concept. They separate smart contracts
bytecode into the basic blocks and formulate a sound program logic for verification.
Park et al. [131] present another formal verification tool to verify EVM bytecodes by adopting KEVM
[76], which is a comprehensive executable formal semantics of the EVM. They denote a group of challenges,
including Byte-Manipulation Operations, Arithmetic Overflow, Gas Limit, and Hash Collision, to verify EVM
bytecodes and propose some techniques to address them.
Detection of effective callback free objects
Grossman et al. [64] discuss a safety notion called ECF (Effectively Callback Free) and specifically DECF
(Dynamically ECF) for executions and SECF (Statically ECF) for objects. Based on the represented defini-
tion “an execution of an object is DECF when there exists an equivalent execution of the contract without
callbacks, which starts in the same state and reaches the same final state. An object is considered SECF
when all its possible executions are dynamically ECF”. ECF is a bug detection factor. It shows that DAO
and other buggy contracts are not ECF. Besides, we can use ECF to enable modular reasoning about objects
with an encapsulated state. The study presents an online polynomial time and space algorithm to check
the execution of smart contracts based on ECF factor and have integrated it into EVM (Ethereum Virtual
Machine) [181] with low runtime overhead. This algorithm detects conflict memory accesses and investigates
cumulatively of operations to check the accuracy of conditions. The evaluation result indicates that most
non-ECF executions are responsible for vulnerable executions, and there are few bugless non-ECF smart
contracts.
Control flow
Fröwis et al. [60] expose the mutability problem in smart contracts control flow in Ethereum blockchain.
The paper argues that smart contracts control flow is not immutable and has the potential to modify. This
study initially discusses how the call graph is generated from Ethereum smart contracts to solve this problem.
Then it introduces a clean-up strategy based on a call graph to prevent biases arising from attacks against
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Ethereum. Eventually, it measures the trustless smart contracts.
Here are the presented steps to obtain the required content to analyze call relationships in Ethereum
smart contracts and create a call graph:
 First, they extracted Ethereum smart contracts bytecode through JSON RPC API17.
 Second, to extract the smart contract’s code, they iterated all transactions again and selected those
with no recipient. This technique is limited to smart contracts created by user accounts, not those
generated by code accounts.
 Third, they used tracing mode in parity client18 to reach internal transactions.
 Fourth, they stored the bytecode, creation block number, and destruction block number of all extracted
smart contracts into MongoDB.
 Fifth, they used evmdis19 to disassemble the EVM bytecodes and achieve reaching definition to identify
the source of call addresses.
 At the end, the call graph has been generated from extracted calls. The study considers a smart
contract trustless “if and only if all calls in its dependency tree have hardcoded addresses, hence all
code that a smart contract can execute is fixed upon deployment of smart contract”. They measured
trustless smart contracts before and after smart contracts clean-up affected by widespread attacks DAO
and DOS (Denial of Service). The results show that 54 percent of active smart contracts were trustless
before clean-up based on the represented definition. After clean-up, the ratio increases to 62 percent,
which means that two out of five smart contracts deployed on Ethereum need trust in at least one
third-party.
Secure consensus method
Watanabe et al. [177] suggest a new consensus method to secure blockchain applied to smart contracts. This
study directs the problem of the collapse of coins in proof of stake consensus mechanism. The represented
method is based on the collapse of credibility. Credibility is a metric to determine trustable smart contract
owners. The credibility of the contract owner is relevant to how many smart contracts the user owns. If a
smart contract owner attacks blockchain, it loses trust in the whole society. However, using only the credibility
factor increases the chance for fake credibility score and 51% attack. Using hybrid blockchain based on both
proof of stack and credibility factor is recommended to solve both problems. Figure2.7 displays using the
hybrid method in block mining. Based on the hybrid approach, the two consecutive blocks should not use





Figure 2.7: Using the hybrid method based on both PoS and credibility score [177].
Connecting smart contracts and off-chain
Town Crier [196] is one of the earliest studies that examine connecting smart contracts to an external resource
(off-chain) to request the concise pieces of data called datagrams. Town Crier is an authenticated data feed
system that acts as a bridge between Ethereum smart contracts and HTTPS-enabled data sources combined
with a trusted hardware backend. The trusted and secure architecture model includes the Town Crier
contract, Enclave, and Relay. The Town Crier contract acts as a frontend for the system. It provides an
API for the contract that uses the Town Crier service. The Enclave is an instance of the TC core program
running in the Trusted Execution Environment, such as SGX enclave and queries data from an HTTPS data
source. The Relay is a typical user-space application, and it has provided to relay network traffic between
smart contract, Enclave, and HTTPS data source. Figure 2.8 shows TC architecture. The User contract
requests a datagram from TC Contract. Relay unit relays the Enclave and Data Source request and finally
sends the user contract’s response through TC Contract.
Figure 2.8: Town Crier architecture [196].
Kothapalli et al. [94] represent SmartCast, an incentive-compatible consensus protocol that has adapted
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the work of Clement [44] to smart contracts. The main idea is to employ smart contracts to provide incentive
compatibility for off-chain consensus protocol. The system financially rewards unbiased parties for consensus
and direct participation. The protocol decreases communication with the Ethereum blockchain, so the
transaction cost also gets minimized. Since communication is the major cost, the paper outlines this as
incentive-compatibility. The smart contract model’s essential two components are: 1) a smart contract
program, which receives information from nodes about each other’s behaviour and recognizes lazy nodes
based on that payout reward to each party, 2) local program for each of the parties to execute, which
includes interaction with smart contracts and an off-chain consensus process.
Molina-Jimenez et al. [114] propose requirements for obtaining an effective hybrid method of off-chain and
on-blockchain solutions. The hybrid model unites decentralized smart contracts and trusted centralized third
parties to address the performance and scalability issues in pure blockchain approaches. In the following, I
present the practical cases based on the integration of the centralized and decentralized approach:
1. Indelible blockchain-based log: the blockchain part can record passive logs that are worth keeping and
duplicating in the blockchain.
2. Cryptocurrency-based payment channel: Using public blockchain, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, for
payment process for a notable amount of money transformation, thus the transaction fee is negligible.
3. Off-blockchain execution of operations: To increase the application’s performance and prevent trans-
action throughput limitation, the study recommended executing primary operations off-chain.
Privacy
This section outlines the studies that approach privacy issues in smart contracts data or related applications.
Hawk [93] is a framework for generating privacy-preserving smart contracts. Hawk gets a smart contract,
and it’s compiler automatically generates the cryptographic protocol. A Hawk contract includes two parts:
private and public. The private part includes parties’ input data and currency units. The private parts are
cryptographically invisible from the public view. The rest of the codes, which are not private, are presumed
public. Hawk divides programs into three pieces, and three separated entities execute each one of them.
First, the piece that all consensus nodes execute, second, the piece that users execute, and third, the piece
the manager executes, which is a minimally trusted party and can see users’ private data. Hawk guarantees
privacy as long as the manager does not reveal the private portion. Figure 2.9 shows the general overview
of the Hawk framework. The paper also provides a formal UC-based (Universal Composability) model of
cryptography to examine the represented protocol’s security and can be adopted by other decentralized
protocols.
Enigma [208] is a decentralized computation network based on Ethereum that provides privacy and
computation to allow different parties to store and share secret data. They have developed a Turing-complete
scripting language to build private smart contracts that support private data. The Enigma off-chain platform
manages private data blockchain and executes the public parts. The system comprises three distributed
33
Figure 2.9: Hawk platform architecture [93].
databases. 1) a blockchain to control the system, manage access control, and as a tamper-proof database of
events, 2) a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) for recording off-chain private data, 3) a Multi-Party Computation
(MPC) to break data into meaningless chunks and spread it between different nodes without replication.
Ekiden [41] also utilizes TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) to achieve privacy and confidentiality for
sensitive data associated with smart contracts besides high-performance execution. Ekiden presents a proof
of publication method to ensure that the SGX enclaves have been synchronized with the blockchain’s latest
state.
2.2.4 Smart contracts performance
The performance of executing transactions and smart contracts is a severe challenge in blockchain-based
systems, which prevents them from competing with current applications on a large scale. Researchers aim
to promote the performance of running smart contracts by presenting methods to running non-conflicting
smart contracts transactions concurrently [14, 53, 191].
Concurrent execution
Dickerson et al. [53] introduced a technique based on transactional boosting methodology [75] that allows
miners to execute non-conflicting smart contracts in parallel and then capture the parallel execution schedule
for validators to reach deterministic results. This approach aims to improve throughput (the number of
transactions per second) for block minders and transaction validators by executing irrelevant smart contracts
concurrently. The paper recommends that miners execute smart contracts code as speculative actions to avoid
shared data storage problems. If data conflicts are detected during the runtime, it can resolve by scheduling
and delaying or rolling-back. Miners record the locking schedule of parallel execution in the corresponding
block. It creates a happens-before graph of transactions for validators. Validators transform this schedule into
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a deterministic parallel for-join program to validate the block concurrently. They made various benchmarks
with smart contracts samples with different transactions and degrees of conflict to evaluate their approach.
Testing based on three concurrent threads shows that the mining and validation processes can be accelerated
up to 1.33x and 1.69x.
To introduce the three smart contracts execution model, Yu et al. [191] suggested breaking down the
system states into three hierarchical states: account state, local state, and federal state, where the account
state is the smallest state unit. Any changes in account state lead to the change in the local state, and any
change in the local state ends with the change in the federal state. It improves performance by separating
the execution of smart contracts from state management and offers a pipeline model to validate and create
blocks in parallel.
1. Sequential execution of smart contracts: This is based on smart contracts execution in Ethereum. It
is beneficial for the smart contracts that their execution time is quick, as this model has the longest time for
block validation.
2. Parallel execution of smart contracts: If a transaction is recognized as a smart contract, all the nodes
execute the smart contract simultaneously so that the local state will update concurrently. Nodes verify the
local condition by comparing it with the block state.
3. Non-blocking execution of smart contracts: By separating execution of smart contracts from building
blocks processes, expedite the block building and validating process. In this model, nodes do not wait for the
current smart contract to finish the execution, and they accept the next transactions immediately. Besides,
this study suggests decoupling block building from state maintenance in blockchain design. It introduces a
new blockchain called SBC (State Blockchain) to handle state maintenance, including state synchronization
and storage.
Anjana et al. [14] proposed using Software Transactional Memory (STM) [160] systems to execute smart
contracts’ non-conflicting transactions concurrently. There are two kinds of miners in the presented system:
serial miner and concurrent miner. Both types of miners have access to the equivalent set of transactions.
Serial miner executes transactions serially, whereas the concurrent miner executes the transactions concur-
rently. The concurrent miner must only choose non-conflicting transactions for executing concurrently. If two
transactions access the shared data object and at least one of them performs the write operation on it, they
would conflict with each other. The concurrent miners recognize conflict transactions with the help of an
optimistic STM system. The validation of transactions can also be executed concurrently. There is a chance
that validators re-execute suggested transactions from miners with different orders and get the different re-
sults that lead to the block rejection. To avoid this, the authors suggest concurrent miners provide a conflict
graph. The conflict graph comprises all the dependencies between conflict transactions in the form of an
adjacency list. Briefly, every concurrent miner presents a conflict graph and the set of proposed transactions,
the hash of the previous block, and each shared object’s final state.
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Figure 2.10: BLOCKBENCH abstractions layers and correlated workloads [55].
Performance analysing frameworks
BLOCKBENCH: BLOCKBENCH [55] is a framework for performance analysis of private blockchains.
Any private blockchain can be integrated into BLOCKBENCH; however, the paper evaluated three blockchain
platforms: Ethereum Geth (Go-version), Hyperledger Fabric, and Ethereum Parity. The study presents four
main abstraction layers for blockchain and then accordingly designed four workloads for blockchain. Figure
2.10 explains blockchain abstractions layers and correlated workloads. To evaluate represented platforms,
they implemented the smart contracts related to each workload in two versions of Solidity for Ethereum and
Parity and Golang for Hyperledger. Table 2.7 shows the implemented smart contracts in BLOCKBENCH.
BLOCKBENCH measured throughput, latency, and scalability for analyzing the performance of private
blockchains as following:
 Throughput: The number of successful transactions per second.
 Latency: Response time for each transaction.
 Scalability: Measuring the changes in throughput and latency when the number of nodes and the
number of concurrent loads raises.
The evaluation results indicate that Hyperledger Fabric performed better in terms of performance metrics
compared with Ethereum Geth (Go-version) and Ethereum Parity. Still, Hyperledger Fabric failed to scale
up to more than 16 peers.
Real time monitoring: Zheng et al. [202] discuss why Gas is not a suitable metric because it is biased and
inaccurate. They present two groups for the blockchain systems’ performance metrics: overall performance
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for the users and detailed performance for the developers. Table 2.8. presents the subcategories of each
group.
Table 2.8: Performance metrics based on [203].
Overall Performance Metrics Detailed Performance Metrics
Transaction Per Second Peer Discovery Rate
Average Response Delay RPC Response Rate
Transaction per CPU Transaction Propagating Rate
Transaction per Memory Second Contract Execution Time
Transaction per Disk I/O State Updating Time
Transaction per Network Data Consensus-cost Time
They also offer a real-time performance monitoring framework to monitor blockchain systems’ perfor-
mance, which is scalable and carries a lower overhead. Here is a concise explanation of every part of the
framework.
 Validating Peer is the primary underlying part of the blockchain to verify and execute transactions and
smart contracts. The framework concentrates on its performance to calculate the performance of the
entire blockchain.
 Log Parser/Analyzer is a terminal corresponding to each validating peer. This part collects the log
data regarding the validating peer and hardware consumption.
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 Synchronize Peer helps collect the rest of the data that validating peer did not catch without making
extra overhead.
 Data Collector/Calculator collects data from a log analyzer and synchronizes peers and determines the
performance metrics.
 Web Frontier is the user interface to visualize the collected performance parameters.
Finally, they monitored the performance of 1000 smart contracts on four different blockchain platforms,
Ethereum, Parity, Hyperledger Fabric and CITA, based on mentioned performance metrics and the proposed
framework metrics. Table 2.9 shows overall performance of all platforms.
Table 2.9: Performance of different platforms based on real-time monitoring [202].
Blockchain Tps TPC TPMS TPDIO TPND
Ethereum 5.55578 0.00195 0.01060 0.26573 0.22206
Parity-pow 3.95500 0.00140 0.06814 0.00264 0.07167
Fabric 600.611 2.65340 4.28265 0.13816 0.10122
CITA 256.636 1.33393 0.43244 0.59888 0.16208
Besides, other studies have presented a tool or framework to measure and analyze the performance
of smart contracts [55, 202]. Blockbench [55] is a framework for measuring the performance of private
blockchains. They state that any private blockchain can be integrated into BLOCKBENCH. They evaluated
three blockchain platforms: Ethereum Geth (Go-version), Hyperledger Fabric, and Parity.
Zheng et al. [202] presented a real-time performance monitoring framework to monitor the performance
of blockchain systems. The implemented tool is scalable as we can easily extend it to monitor new peers or
blockchain systems. Also, the framework has an insignificant performance impact on the running blockchain
systems, and thus it has low overhead, and it is suitable for real-time monitoring.
2.2.5 Decentralized applications based on smart contracts
The evolution of smart contracts has provided the required infrastructure for non-monetary blockchain-based
applications in various domains. Blockchain desirable features, such as distributed operation, immutable audit
trail, data provenance, security, and privacy, have made it a suitable alternative for traditional centralized
applications, and the evolution of smart contracts has made it possible. This section reviews the main
application domains that use blockchain and smart contracts. They are categorized in different groups,
such as IoT presented in table 2.10, healthcare presented in table 2.11, Supply Chain presented in table
2.12, Business process management presented in table 2.13, record-keeping presented in table 2.14, voting
presented in table 2.15, and identity management presented in table 2.16.
38
Table 2.10: IoT decentralized application.
Reference Application Feature
Ouaddah et al. [126]
FairAccess is a framework for access control and authorization mechanism based on
ethereum smart contracts for IoT systems.
Ouaddah et al. [127]
Pseudonymous and privacy-preserving authorization and access control management
framework for IoT systems.
Xu et al. [185]
BlendCAC, federated capability-bases Access control mechanism for IoT systems based on
smart contracts.
Cha et al. [36]
Privacy preserved connected gateway for IoT devices. Using smart contract for
managing the IoT device data and defining privacy policies.
Huh et al. [82]
Using Ethereum smart contract to store the data produces by IoT device, and then
configure and define the behavior of the IoT devices.
Ruta et al. [147]
A service-oriented architecture based on semantic blockchain and implementing
smart contracts for registration, resource discovery, resource selection, and payment.
Lombardi et al. [100]
Blockchain-based infrastructure to create a reliable and low-cost transactive energy.
Energy trade and energy auction handle by smart contracts.
Table 2.11: Healthcare decentralized application.
Reference Application feature
Azaria et al. [15]
Patient-centric medical data access control and sharing system (Medrec) based on Ethereum
platform. It presents a method to provide anonymous data as an award for miners.
Xia et al [183] Big Medical data sharing, provenance and audit trail on a cloud platform (Medshare).
Xia et al. [184]
Using permissioned blockchain and integrating identity management service
to access to the shared EHR data.
Rouhani et al. [142]
DAC
Hyperledger fabric permissioned blockchain (MediChainTM).
Mikula and Jacobsen [113]
A prototype based on Hyperledger fabric and ChainCodes, which represents identity and
access management in healthcare domain.
Yue et al. [194] Patient-centric mobile application to share medical data based on Indicator-Centric Schema.
Peterson et al. [132]
Securely sharing medical data exchange and presenting Proof of Interoperability
consensus method by considering FHIR [55]
Theodouli et al. [170] Proposing a blockchain-based architecture design for sharing medical data.
Nugent et al. [123]
Using smart contract to solve data manipulation issue in clinical trials and
proving a trusted immutable record of data.
Shae and Tsai [157]
Presenting a blockchain platform and architecture for clinical trial and precision
medicine. Include four main components: 1) blockchain-based parallel computing,
2) blockchain application data management component, 3) identity management
component, 4) trusted data sharing management component.
Zhang et al. [197]
FHIRChain,a blockchain-based architecture design based on ONC (Office of the
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology) requirements and FHIR 20
standard.
Zhang et al. [198]






Table 2.12: Supply chain decentralized application.
Reference Application feature
Chen et al. [37]
utilizing smart contract and blockchain for quality management in supply chain. The
real-time quality management, process the quality, and the product quality are monitored
by smart contracts and unqualified products automatically reject by the smart contract.
Bocek et al. [21]
Using smart contract and IoT sensors to assert data immutability temperature records
in pharmaceutical supply-chain and reducing the cost.
Korpela et al., [91]
Investigates using smart contracts for documentation collection trade and automation of
transactions, or in general, digital supply chain integration based on DBE framework [92].
Ruta et al. [146] A semantic-enhanced blockchain platform that supports ontology-based object discovery.
Kim and Laskowski [88]
Analyze a traceability ontology and translate it to a smart contract to achieve supply chain
provenance trace and enforce traceability constraints using Ethereum platform.
Figorilli et al. [59]
Tracing electronic records from standing tree to the whole chain of steps using RFID
sensors and Azure blockchain workbench and two main smart contracts, timber marking
and cutting trees.
Table 2.13: BPM (Business Process Management) decentralized application.
Reference Application feature
Weber et al. [178]
Converting the BPMN model to a factory contract and then implementing a factory
contract and running its instances as a smart contract on the blockchain to address the
trust issue in the collaborative business process.
Garćıa-Bañuelos et al. [62]
Presents an approach to convert a business process model into a Petri-net model and then
compile it to a minimized solidity smart contract that encodes the preconditions for
executing each task of the process using the space-optimized data structure.
Pouheidari et al. [135]
Investigating a case study of Execution of Untrusted Business Process on Hyperledger
Composer [79] and Hyperledger Fabric [6] as a permissioned blockchain and investigate the
advantages of using permissioned blockchain for the collaborative business process.
Mendlin et al. [111] A survey paper that investigates challenges and opportunities of blockchain for BPM.
López-Pintado et al. [101]
A blockchain-based Business Process Management System. It uses solidity smart contracts
to encode the state of the business process instance and execute workflow routing.
Ribma et al. [138]
Comparing the cost of computation and storage of business process execution on blockchain
and cloud platforms. They represent a cost model based on the cost of deploying smart
contracts and executing process coordination.
Table 2.14: Record keeping decentralized application.
Reference Application feature
DÁngelo et al. [48]
Using blockchain-based logging system to log and record the interactions and employing smart contract
as an arbitrator to verify the stored events, detecting (Service Level Agreements) SLA violations
and calculating compensations.
Lemieux [98]
A theoretic framework to evaluate the potential of the blockchain and smart contract as a decentralized
trusted record keeping system.
Lemieux [98]
Creating and updating records on blockchain using smart contracts by encoding procedures that
run on a multi-stakeholder network.
Guo et al. [67]
Using blockchain as an event recording system for autonomous vehicles. A “proof of Event” mechanism
with Dynamic Federation consensus records is suggested to resolve accidents disputes.
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Table 2.15: Voting decentralized application.
Reference Application feature
McCorry et al. [110]
Completely untrusted protocol based on smart contract for boardroom voting that guarantees
voters privacy. The smart contracts handle the voting protocol, monitor the election process,
create and verify the zero-knowledge proofs [19].
Shah [158]
A blockchain-based voting system that uses smart contract codes for verifying and adding a record of
votes to the blockchain.
Chen et al. [40]
Using smart contract to solve the problem of the bid price leakage before the specified deadline.
The smart contract includes the auctioneer’s address, start time, deadline, address of the current winner
and current highest offer.
Table 2.16: Digital identity decentralized application.
References Application Feature
Yasin and Liu [190]
A framework for online identity that uses smart contracts to calculate personal online
ratings based on the aggregated data from all the digital identities of the user.
Al-Bassam [5]
Using web-of-trust and smart contract to manage identities and their attributes that stored
on the blockchain and create a decentralized PKI and identity system.
DeCusatis and Sager [50]
Investigating a prototype that implements an end-to-end user identity management system
using Hyperledger Fabric. Suggesting identity-based network segmentation and traffic
separation to increase the security and network tolerance against DDoS attack.
Grüner et al. [65]
First, it discusses the decision of using blockchain based digital identity system. Second, it
analyzes uPort[103] Sovrin[137], and ShoCard[162]. The analysis result indicates uPort can
be best fit with blockchain technology. Strict trust framework of Sovrin may not work with
blockchain and decentalized nature.
Mühle et al. [115]
Discussing the main components, architecture and actors of a self-sovereign identity
management system based on blockchain and smart contracts as well as authentication and
storage solutions.
Although researchers considered blockchain and smart contracts for various applications, access control
management, sharing data and resources, and tamper-proof record-keeping are the primary focus of decen-
tralized applications, mainly in healthcare and IoT. So despite the variety in the applications, their focus is
narrowed down to these three aspects.
2.3 Access control
Access control [150] is a security technique that controls access requests toward protected resources in a
system. These resources could be physical or logical. Physical resources are like buildings, rooms and physical
IT assets. Which can be protected using hardware equipment along with software controls. Logical resources
are like data and computer networks. When a request comes to the system and asks for access to a resource,
the access control component decides to accept or deny the request based on the implemented access control
mechanism or the user or component who has sent the access request. There are two main parts involved in
access control implementation. First, who has access to which resources, under what circumstances and what
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types of access are allowed? This part is implemented as a policy, and it is called the access control policy.
The second part is access control enforcement, which enforces the system only to accept access requests
matched with access control policy [165].
This section presents answers to the following research questions.
 What are the problems with current access control systems?
 How blockchain can help to solve these problems?
 What are the challenges for implementing an access control system based on blockchain?
 What are the features of implemented prototype systems?
2.3.1 Access control models
Access control policies are commonly grouped into four models that are also referred to as access control mod-
els. System designers choose an access control model based on the resources’ sensitivity and implementation
cost.
 Discretionary Access Control (DAC): It controls access based on the requestor’s identity and access
rules. In DAC, access to a resource is at the discretion of the resource owner, granting access to
another entity to access the resource. Anyone who creates the resource is the owner of the resource.
 Mandatory Access Control (MAC): Unless DAC, in MAC, the resource owner is not the one who creates
the resource, the organization or the company are the resource owners and decide on whom to share
resources. MAC is implemented by security labels and controls access based comparing them. These
labels indicate the sensitivity level of the resources as well as some information regarding the category
of the data. Access propagation is not possible in MAC.
 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC): RBAC controls access based on the users’ role in the system or
organization. RBAC is implemented by defining rules that define the access rights of each role.
 Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC): ABAC controls access based on the attributes of the user,
resource and environment. ABAC is implemented by specifying policies that define the access to the
resources based on these attributes. ABAC is discussed with more details in chapter 6.
2.3.2 Implementing access control
Access Control Matrix (ACM) is a matrix [165] that stores each subject’s rights with respect to every object
in the system. Rows in the matrix are the users or subjects, and the columns correspond to the resources
or objects. The entries in the matrix determine access rights to the corresponding subject and object. It
is a large and sparse matrix, and many of the entries are null. There are two methods to represent ACM
efficiently: Access Control List (ACL) and Capability-based [149].
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ACL
ACL is an implementation of ACM that focuses on the columns or resources. For every resource or object,
ACL stores a list of users who have access to the resource and their access rights on a file. In ACL system,
it is the service provider’s responsibility to check if the user is authorized.
Capability-based
Capability-based [70] or capability list is an implementation of ACM that focuses on the rows or objects. A
capability can be considered a pair (x, r) where x is the name of a subject, and r is a set of subjects’ rights.
Capability-based is implemented by issuing unique access tokens to the subjects with capabilities. The access
token references the subject along with an associated set of access rights. In the implementation of Capability-
based access control, anyone who presents the capability can access the resource. It is not important who
presents it. Therefore capabilities must be unforgeable tokens to avoid invalid access permissions. This
implementation eliminates the need for authentication and makes it a potential solution for access control
for dynamic systems such as IoT, in which a centralized authorization server can cause performance issues.
Unlike ACL, that service provider has to check the user’s authorization; in capability-based systems, the user
must present its capability (access token) to be authorized. Due to flexibility and more manageable features
in capability-based access control, it is widely used in the blockchain field for IoT applications [99, 118, 185].
2.4 Data trust based on blockchain
2.4.1 Data trust definition and architecture
Trust is a multidisciplinary and multifaceted concept that has been defined in various disciplines, such as
sociology, economics, psychology, computation, information and computer science, to model different types of
relationships. Trust’s definition can be challenging since it embraces the facets of ethics, emotions, values, and
it combines various disciplines. Fundamentally, trust is a relationship between trustor and trustee in which
the trustor relies on the trustee based on a given criterion. Cho et al. [42] summarizes the trust definition
after studying trust across multiple disciplines, as: “Trust is the willingness of the trustor (evaluator) to take
a risk-based on a subjective belief that a trustee (evaluatee) will exhibit reliable behaviour to maximize the
trustor’s interest under uncertainty (e.g., ambiguity due to conflicting evidence and/or ignorance caused by
complete lack of evidence) of a given situation based on the cognitive assessment of past experience with the
trustee”. Typically, digital trust is considered a computational value established from a relationship between
trustor and trustee, and measured by trust parameters and evaluated by a defined mechanism [188].
Since the development of big data and data science, many technologies have advanced rapidly. However,
the process of collaborative data sharing, reusing data, and data privacy protection is still facing serious
problems. Data trust is a mechanism to address these problems by providing a structured and solid framework
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for data stewardship and facilitating the process of access to data.
The basic idea is to have a well structured, transparent and trustable framework for data stewardship.
Sharing data might not only compromise the interests of data subjects at risk of exposing their personal
information, but it could also lead to the loss and fine for the organization and consequently reputational
damage. We expect to mitigate some of the perceived risks of data sharing with data trust. Moreover, the
framework must be designed to respond to data owners’ concerns and data subjects by providing ethical
principles underlined in the data trust framework and ensuring the data users regarding the trustworthiness
and quality of the data. Data owner refers to an individual or an organization that owns and controls the
data. Data subjects are individuals that the data is related directly or indirectly to their personal information.
Data users or data consumers are individuals or organizations that consume the data for data scientists and
analyzing purposes.
Although data trust could be a law arrangement or contractual agreement, it is possible to be programmed
into the architecture that satisfies specified requirements. It is essential to understand the interaction between
different actors and components and establish mutual trust. O’Hara proposes eight essential properties that
underlie data trust architecture [124], (1) discovery, (2) provenance, (3) access controls, (4) access, (5) identity
management, (6) auditing of use, (7) accountability, (8) impact. He proposed the Web Observatory as a
candidate technology to carry out a data trust operation.
 Discovery refers to the process of discovering the quality and properties of data by data users in the
first place
 Provenance refers to the ability of data users to access the historical record and metadata about the
data
 Access control refers to the ability of data owners to control and manage access permissions toward
their data
 Access refers to the mechanism that provides access for data users
 Identity management refers to the ability of data owners to identify and authenticate data users
 Auditing of use refers to providing a transparent history of data usage
 Accountability refers to achieving accountability by access control and auditing of use
 Impact refers to assessing the value, usage and misuse of data through recorded information in the data
trust
Figure 2.11 illustrates O’Hara’s architecture for data trust called Data Trust Portal (DTP) for sketching
out the above features inspired by web observatory infrastructure. The data does not store in DTP, data
owners hold the data, and they are responsible for their data protection and the implemented interface method
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Figure 2.11: Data Trust Portal (DTP) architecture by O’Hara [124].
to provide access. DTP is a platform for implementing secure discovery and sharing protocol using metadata
about data properties and their provenance. Alsaad et al. [9] also proposed institutional repositories, which
is a mature platform and open framework, as an alternative technology for data trust infrastructure.
Stalla-Bourdillon et al. [164] introduces a workflow that addresses data protection by design approach
to achieve efficient data usage, sharing, and reusing. The study emphasizes a design with well-defined data
governance roles and processes. They represent data trust through three core layers as expressed in figure
2.12 : (1) the data layer (2) the access layer (3) the process layer.
In the data layer, interested parties sketch out the steps of creating data pools by making sure that
everyone is aware of the legal obligations for data protection by design, specifying the authorized individuals
to decide and act on the pooled data, and preparing data for sharing by employing technical procedures
to remove personal identifiers, such as de-identification and anonymization [119]. In the access layer, the
data become discoverable for eligible parties by specifying standardized access through centralized or peer
to peer technical solutions complemented by monitoring and auditing processes. In the process layer, data
trust approves the pooled data for re-usage. This layer is responsible for controlling data usage through
standardized risk assessments and ensuring that data are tailored to queries.
2.4.2 Blockchain as a infrastructure for data trust
We can utilize blockchain as a data trust interface between data controllers, data subjects and data users.
The distributed, secure and reliable nature of the blockchain can reinforce the data trust framework’s trust-
worthiness.
As I mentioned in the previous section, O’Hara [124] introduces eight properties that system architectures
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should consider for data trust architecture, including (1) discovery, (2) provenance, (3) access controls,
(4) access, (5) identity management, (6) auditing of use, (7) accountability, (8) impact. Some of these
properties, such as provenance, auditing of use, and accountability, already exist in the blockchain since
blockchain provides a secure, tamper-proof, immutable record of transactions. All blocks are linked together
through their hash values. Some other properties, such as discovery, access control, access, and impact, could
be implemented through smart contracts and executed on permissioned blockchain. Identity management
can be implemented through membership service in permissioned blockchains. Ultimately, accountability can
reach because multiple peers verify transactions through consensus mechanisms, and the ledger is maintained
precisely through cryptographic methods. Moreover, every peer has a copy of the ledger, and the network
can easily recognize any inconsistency.
2.5 Decentralized access control systems
Access control systems have been created to protect system resources from unauthorized access. Studies
[47, 57, 107, 175] have shown that current access control systems face numerous problems, such as difficulty
in interoperability between multiple organizations, lack of privacy, inefficiency and trust distribution, and
inefficiency. The majority of these problems stem from the centralized nature of current access control systems
and third parties’ presence.
Blockchain salient features, including decentralization, immutability, durability, security, and distributed
ledger, show great potential to address these problems.
In this section, the studies that present a blockchain-based solution for access control systems are reviewed.
The access control systems follow one of the available access control models based on the system policies,
security procedures within the organization, and the level of the resources’ sensitivity. These studies are
categorized based on the applied access control model, the domain of the application.
Many studies on blockchain technology have focused on presenting an access control system either in the
context of specific applications, such as healthcare [15, 47, 136, 142, 183, 199], IoT [54, 56, 105, 122, 126,
133, 200], and cloud federation [6, 58] or they have introduced a general access control system, which can
Figure 2.12: The workflow of data protection by design approach [164].
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Figure 2.13: Blockchain as a infrastructure for data trust.
be employed for different applications. In my previous study [144], the state of the art of access control
systems based on blockchain has been investigated. This section overviews similar studies, which present
an attribute-based access control based on blockchain. As illustrated in table 2.17, many studies use the
attributed-based method for their access control system because of the granularity, flexibility, and dynamic
features that ABAC provides.
Guo et al. [66] proposed a hybrid architecture for access control over Electronic Health Record (EHR)
data using blockchain and edge nodes. The blockchain acts as a tamper-resistance verification component
to verify identities and access control policies. The edge nodes record the EHR data off-chain and enforce
the access control policies. The smart contracts include the address of EHR data on the edge nodes by
using one-time self-destructing URLs 21. Based on experiments of performance results against unauthorized
retrieval for the average transaction processing time was 40 ms, and the average response time was 30 ms.
Also, to test their system’s scalability, they test the system with five patients to 320 patients. The result did
not influence the response time, indicating the scalability of the system.
Zyskind et al. [210] considered the blockchain technology as an access control moderator, complemented
by off-chain storage. Blockchain clients represent users who contribute their data to a service provider and
are the owners of their data. Based on that assumption, this solution is intended to empower users, giving
them information about which data is collected by third parties and how their data is used. To reach this
goal, each data owner can issue transactions used to modify the set of permissions granted to a service or
21https://1ty.me/
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entity. All transactions are stored on the blockchain, allowing for auditability and traceability.
Zhang et al. [200] proposed a solution focused on IoT blockchain-based access control [200]. The authors
introduce the concepts of Judge Contract (JC), Register Contract (RC) and Access Control Contracts (ACC).
Access control contracts record access control policies for a subject-object pair. In their system, both JC
and RC are essential pieces regarding achieving a distributed and secure access control. The JC receives
misbehaviour reports and applies penalties on them. The RC stores the misbehaviour information from the
JC and handles it through the judging method. Furthermore, it stores information such as name, subject,
object, and smart contract for access control.
Zhu et al. [206] presented a Transaction Based Access Control (TBAC) system, which integrates the
ABAC model into the bitcoin blockchain. There are four implemented transactions, subject registration,
object escrowing and publication, access request and grant. They also introduce a cryptosystem associated
with their system as a supplementary security layer. They evaluated the system in terms of security; still,
they did not examine the system’s performance and scalability.
In the federated cloud services, access control enforcement is still vulnerable to privacy breaches. Alansari
et al. [6] introduced an attribute-based access control system based on the Pedersen commitment scheme
[112] and blockchain. They designed the system to keep the users’ attributes private from the federated
organization. Users’ identity attributes and access control policies are stored on the blockchain to assure their
integrity. They also hired Trusted hardware technology to guarantee the integrity of the policy enforcement
process.
Zhang et al. [198] presented an architecture for granular access authorization supporting flexible queries
to implement secure authorization at different levels of granularity. The designed architecture offers a capable
infrastructure without needing the public key infrastructure (PKI), as a result decreasing the computation
time; therefore, it is suitable for the devices with limited resources in EMR systems. Their system can
efficiently respond to a requester without exposing unauthorized private data.
Maesa et al. [107] proposed an access control service on top of Ethereum 22. They utilized blockchain to
deploy smart contracts representing access control policies presented in eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) [12] performing the access decision making. Such smart contracts are called Smart
Policys (SPs). Thus, SPs are responsible for the policy evaluation, embedding a Policy Decision Point (PDP)
for a particular access control policy. Every time the system evaluates an access request needs to make
an access decision, and the blockchain executes it in a distributed way. The decision is made based on
information concerning the users. For this purpose, they introduce the concept of Attribute Managers (AMs)
as the components that manage the attributes of the entities involved in the process, such as subjects,
resources, and environmental context. AMs updates and retrieves their values created by an entity, the
Attribute Provider (AP). Implementation based on the Ethereum blockchain is costly because, for every
operation, the clients must pay a fee in terms of gas. Although this cost is generally unavoidable for public
22www.ethereum.org
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blockchain systems, for implementation based on permissioned implementation, this unnecessary additional
cost is imposed on the system.
The privacy and security of the data created by IoT devices are the primary concerns of the IoT system
due to the extensive scale and distributed nature of IoT networks. Many studies have considered blockchain
to provide secure access control to the IoT data to protect users’ privacy. Dukkipati et al. [56] provided a
solution to store system policies off-chain while Pinni et al. [133] stores the policies on the Ethereum platform,
which is less vulnerable to security breaches, although more costly. Ding et al. [54] focused on simplifying
the access control protocol to make it lightweight and fitting for IoT devices with limited computing and
energy resources.
2.5.1 Challenges in implementing access control system based on blockchain
In this section, I discuss the open challenges associated with blockchain-based solutions [144] for access control
systems. In the following, I discuss a list of the existing challenges.
 Off-chain and on-chain integration: Blockchain is not a suitable infrastructure for storing a large volume
of data. The original data needs to keep in secure off-chain storage, access policies, a hash of the data,
and references to the data record on blockchain [142]. The safe integration between on-chain and off-
chain storage is challenging, and it needs further investigations. Using trusted hardware technology
such as intel SGX can be admitted to keep the integrity of the system.
 Blockchain vulnerability: Besides all the desirable advantages of blockchain with empowering smart
contracts, it is still challenging to implement non-vulnerable smart contracts [104] in the blockchain.
Subsequently, designing methods and tools to improve smart contracts and blockchain security is highly
investigated [10, 20, 23]. Especially, the importance of accuracy of smart contracts significantly raises
when it comes to implementing an access control system.
 Transaction transparency: One of the main reasons blockchain has become successful was providing
transactional transparency; however, this is not favourable from the enterprise perspective and privacy
point of view. This is why we have witnessed the advent of permissioned platforms, which support trans-
action privacy and private data. However, it requires sacrificing pure decentralization and accepting
hybrid centralized and decentralized solutions.
 Blockchain performance: The performance of execution and validation of transactions has been raised
recently by proposing lighter consensus methods and more efficient transaction processing flow in
blockchain platforms such as Hyperledger Fabric. Despite recent studies in improving the perfor-
mance of blockchain [14, 53], Still, the performance of the blockchain-based solutions cannot compete
with the current centralized solutions. As we can see, most of the studies compare their given system’s
performance with other blockchain-based platforms, not existing decentralized solutions. To resolve the
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performance and scalability problem [105] proposes an architecture based on multiple blockchains on
the cloud systems. The designed architecture comprises various layers, including the device layer, edge
networking layer, fog layer, core network layer, and cloud layer. Multiple blockchains are implemented
in the fog layer based on different edge networks to keep access control and key management trans-
actions. The cloud layer includes all the blockchains in the fog layer and implements the interactions
among these blockchains. Simulation results show that dividing a load of block mining into multiple
blockchains decreases the transaction collection time, blocks mining time consumption, and enhances
the system’s performance.
 Access control methods: As in traditional systems, most trending access control systems use ABAC
as an access control method. Based on table 2.17, it is clear that ABAC is also very common for
implementing an access control system using blockchain; however, current access control techniques
which are static might be inadequate for future designs [31] and more dynamic access control methods,
one in which resources define their access control, might be required. Integrating blockchain with
dynamic access control approaches could be an exciting area to investigate in the future.
2.6 Contribution of the work presented in this chapter
This chapter comprehensively and systematically reviewed smart contracts topics from different angles. The
implementation aspects, security enhancement approaches, performance improvement studies and decentral-
ized application based on smart contracts were discussed thoroughly. I studied the design, structure, features,
and implementation of smart contracts.
This chapter also investigated centralized and traditional access control systems’ problems and discussed
how we could address them with blockchain technology. A review of access control studies based on blockchain
by presenting state of the art and future direction was presented.
The contribution of this chapter has been published in two review papers as below.
Rouhani, Sara, and Ralph Deters. ”Security, performance, and applications of smart contracts: A
systematic survey.” IEEE Access 7 (2019): 50759-50779, doi: 10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2911031.
Rouhani, Sara, and Ralph Deters. ”Blockchain based access control systems: State of the art and
challenges.” In IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence, pp. 423-428, 2019, doi:
10.1145/3350546.3352561.
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Table 2.17: A summary of blockchain-based access control applications.
Research paper Domain Access control method Privacy Support Scalability
Maesa et al. [106] General access control ABAC x x
Guo et al. [66] General access control ABAC x X
Laurent et al. [109] General access control Access Control List X x
Maesa et al. [107] General access control ABAC x X
Guo et al. [68] General access control ABAC X x
Lee et al. [97] General access control Role-based X x
Jemel and Serhrouchni [84] Data sharing ABAC + Attribute-based Encryption X x
Wang et al. [175] Data sharing ABAC + Attribute-based Encryption X x
Zhu et al. [206] Resource sharing ABAC X x
Hu et al. [78] Knowledge sharing Fine-grained x x
Ferdous et al. [58] Cloud federation - x x
Alansari et al. [6] Cloud federation ABAC X x
Zhang and Posland [198] Health care ABAC X x
Rouhani et al. [142] Health care Role-based X X
Asaph et al. [15] Health care - X X
Xia et al. [183] Health care - X x
Dagher et al. [47] Health care Role-based X X
Rajput et al. [136] Health care Role-based X X
Zyskind et al. [210] Mobile applications Policy-based X X
Novo [122] IoT - x X
Outchakoucht et al. [128] IoT Policy-based x x
Zhang et al. [200] IoT Policy-based and dynamic access control x x
Xu et al. [185] IoT Capability-based X X
Nakamura et al. [118] IoT Capability-based x X
Dukkipati et al. [56] IoT ABAC X x
Pinno et al. [133] IoT ABAC X X
Ouaddah et al. [126] IoT - X X
Ding et al. [54] IoT ABAC x X
Ma et al. [105] IoT Generic X X
Rouhani et al. [145] Physical access control Role-based x X
Es-Samaali et al. [57] Big data management ABAC X X
Xu et al. [186] Space situation awareness Capability-Based x X
Paillisse et al. [129] Multi-administrative domain - X x
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3 Trust establishment in business process management
The progress in digitization and internationalization of business processes in various business-related
areas, such as e-commerce and supply chain, led to increasing inter-organizational collaboration. In such a
partnership, multiple organizations work together toward a common objective. Each organization carries out
its own sub-processes, which are beyond the domain of influence of other collaborators. However, the result
of these sub-processes affects the main collaboration’s outcome. Thus still collaborators want to engage in
the process, and they need trust [116].
Numerous studies examined the effects of the business processes integration on either firms’ operations or
business performance. As any level of integration can increase business performance and dimension. However,
two prominent issues exist in almost every proposed integration approach, lack of shared repository and lack
of trust. The first issue is the lack of a reliable, trustable, and tamper-resistant database. Despite advances
in databases in terms of communication methods and encryption techniques, most business parties still store
their data and transactions in their separate confidential databases.
The main problem with such an approach is that it is complicated to track the business’s state and trace
transactions between collaborative parties. Another problem is that cooperative parties may tamper with
stored data on their databases to cheat others and gain more profits. The second object is the lack of trust
between collaborative business parties. We are considering a collaboration between several organizations or
individuals while some might be competitors. Typically, there are many conflicts to select an orchestrator.
In such an untrusted network, who should be held as a central controller core and get everyone’s agreement?
A collaborative business process comprises multiple competitors. Each party must ensure that the data
related to their business contracts, assets, and transactions are kept private from their rivals. Hence, to
implement the collaborative business process on the permissioned blockchain, it is necessary to provide
reliable access control administration.
Lack of trust and scattered data on different isolated databases is a real issue in collaborative business
processes. Blockchain technology offers features to establish trust between multiple cooperators in sharing
collaborative business processes by monitoring the process of using and sharing data. Blockchain applies
consensus mechanisms to eliminate the trusted third party’s necessity to reach agreements and confirm
transactions. It provides a distributed shared ledger, which facilitates the task of the process monitoring for
the parties. The smart contract can be utilized to define the guaranteed autonomous programs. Besides,
using a permissioned blockchain for managing the access control can keep the privacy of the data.
Blockchain’s inherent features can potentially contribute to feasible solutions for these obstacles in col-
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laborative business processes.
Blockchain platforms employ consensus mechanisms to validate the transactions in the untrusted network.
Hence, they do not require trusted third parties anymore. Several parties can join the blockchain network,
including a circle of business partners, without any concern about the potential of tampering or fraud. Because
every party has a duplicate copy of the ledger, they can trace the process’s state and all confirmed transactions
reliably. We can deploy smart contracts to monitor and trace the business process flow. Furthermore, we
can utilize smart contracts to implement complex business and regulatory rules.
In this chapter, I demonstrate how blockchain can impact untrusted business process management. I
investigate the execution of a real-world business process on a permissioned blockchain. I examine the
usage of a permissioned blockchain for access management and monitoring components to maintain the
collaborative business processes. The examination is done by implementing the process of Order Processing
on the Hyperledger Fabric Fabric as permissioned blockchain and Hyperledger Composer as the development
framework are utilized.
In permissioned blockchain networks, only authenticated users can join the network. However, this is not
sufficient for covering all business processes scenarios because every authenticated participant can still see all
the data and transactions within the network. At the same time, we need to restrict access to the users who
authenticated and joined the network. We need more granular access control in business process scenarios
offered by permissioned blockchains.
3.1 Business process
A business process is “a collection of activities that takes one or more inputs and creates a valuable output
to the customer” [71]. In other words, a collection of tasks and activities, relationship between different
activities, specific inputs and outputs, and customer(s) define a business process. A collaborative business
process is when multiple organizations work together toward a particular goal.
A business process regularly is modelled as a flowchart. Business Process Modelling and Notation Business
Process Modelling and Notation (BPMN) [180] is the most common standard that present graphical illustra-
tions of business processes. A BPMN process includes diverse types of elements: objects, sequence flows and
message flows. An object itself can be an activity, an event, or a gateway.
3.2 Order processing model
Figure 3.1 shows the BPMN flowchart of the order Processing model. C, M, and L letters are assigned to
the business model’s activities, start event and XOR decision gateway to define which party can access those
elements. These letters stand for the customer, manufacturer and logistics, respectively.
The customer can create an order to buy a commodity from the manufacturer. Then the manufacturer
receives the order and assesses it. It can either reject or accept the order based on order assessment. If the
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Figure 3.1: Order processing model.
manufacturer accepts the customer’s request, it fills the order and sends the invoice back to the customer. The
customer should then pay the fees, and the manufacturer should review and accept the customer’s payment.
After filling the manufacturer’s order, the logistics ship the ordered commodity from the manufacturer to
the customer. It is a parallel flow, so the Ship Order task can occur any time after the Fill Order task,
independent from Send Invoice, Make Payment and Accept Payment tasks. Finally, if the manufacturer
declines the order or when both the Ship Order and Accept Payment tasks are fulfilled, the manufacturer
can close the order.
3.3 Privacy and access control in collaborative businesses
Privacy is an essential part of any practical collaborative business. Therefore, it is required to define access
procedures for the deployed smart contracts as well. Consequently, we should define access policies to regulate
access permissions on system resources, transactions, or smart contracts programs in the blockchain network.
A few permissioned blockchains, such as Hyperledger Fabric, provide a structured infrastructure to manage
access to different elements in blockchain networks. For example, authenticated users might be restricted
from accessing the smart contract programs or private data stored on the ledger.
Although using a universal centralized access control system simplifies the administration task, some
weaknesses are associated with this method, such as single point of failure and unreliability. Furthermore,
in an untrusted collaborative process, allocating the access control authority to one contributor could cause
unclarity and this lack of transparency may develop further issues.
In this study, I used Hyperledger Composer framework to determine different business network elements,
including access control rules. Hyperledger composer is a framework for creating business applications on top
of Hyperledger Fabric permissioned blockchain. Hyperledger Composer contains an Access Control Language
(ACL) that provides a declarative definition of access control over all resources defined in the model file.
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Furthermore, the advantages of using a decentralized access control system do not limit to collaborative
processes. Therefore, we can extend its usage to specify different levels of access in intra-organizational
scenarios.
3.4 Business network implementation
3.4.1 Defining the model as a business network archive
Within the Hyperledger Composer, each business model, which in this case study is an order processing
model, is defined as a Business Network Archive (BNA) comprises a model file, a script file, an access control
file, and query implementations. I defined the business model’s distinguished aspects and stored them through
these files, and then I compressed them as the BNA. Lastly, I deployed the BNA file on the Hyperledger
Fabric blockchain platform.
I defined the business domain in the model file employing the Hyperledger Composer’s object-oriented
modelling language. The model file includes the definition of assets, participants, and transactions. For any
collaborative business model, we need to define these resources in such a way that the business rules are
followed accurately.
I considered the business flow as an asset, including: 1) Boolean properties for each business model
factor, which requires business parties’ actions, such as tasks and decision gateways. 2) Relationships to
corresponding participants. 3) And required properties for describing the content of the business. Therefore,
we can easily monitor and trace the business flow and define who can access assets’ status with details. Table
3.1 represents the considered asset components for implementing the order processing model.
Status is an enumerated type that can be either active or closed. Once the customer opens an order, the
order status is active, and when the order is closed by the manufacturer, the order status becomes closed. ID,
name and description properties define an order. Although they are completely arbitrary, they are general
attributes that might be chosen to describe and recognize different orders. The Boolean properties are used
to track the process status. In general, the properties of relationship types are unidirectional references
to the participants. Here, the shopper, seller and delivery relationships are used to specify the customer,
manufacturer and logistics of any business network instance determine the verifiable individuals or legal items
with access to read a particular asset. Besides, the responsible property, the relationship to the partners,
which is required to take action, is used to determine which one of the related parties can update each
situation’s asset.
We can define different collaborators of a collaborative business process as separate participants in the
model file. It is better to define fewer participants in the code and specify their kinds using some enumerated
types. Accordingly, we only require to define one participant in the order processing model file. This
participant has a property with enumerated type, which can be an option of shopper, seller, or delivery.
Furthermore, the participant definition includes some other properties to add the identification attributes
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such as first name, last name, ID, company name, and Intra organization position. Similar to the asset
resource, any participant resource requires to present an identifying field, and their unique assigned value
distinguishes its instances for this field. Here, I selected the participant’s ID property as the identifying field,
but all the identification properties are arbitrary and may vary based on the content and obligations of the
business processes.
In addition to the asset(s) and participant(s), we must declare the transactions in the model file. Generally,
each transaction declaration involves its name, relationships to the assets and the participants who need
to work with, and required properties holding new input values. Considering the collaborative business
process’s asset definition, I defined one transaction for each Boolean property to update its value. In other
words, transactions are required for those elements of the BPMN process-flow that oblige parties’ actions.
Additionally, a unique transaction is also necessary to initiate new instances of the asset. Accordingly, I
created nine transactions for their corresponding tasks and XOR gateway of the order processing model and
one transaction to create a new asset instance.
I coded the definition of model file’s declared transactions in transaction processor functions (smart
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contracts). For a collaborative business process, I reflected the BPMN model objects’ sequence in transaction
processor functions such that each transaction can be performed if and only if all its required predecessors were
already accomplished. For example, in the order processing model, the fillOrder task can be done if and only
if the received order formerly was accepted. The Close Order task can also be executed only if the received
order was rejected or both acceptPayment and shipOrder tasks were fulfilled successfully. Additionally, the
smart contract does not allow you to execute a task’s transaction more than once. Although the script file
explains each transaction’s details and their logical order, it does not answer this question: who can perform
a specific transaction? I answer this question in the next section.
3.4.2 Business process access control
I defined access control rules for any collaborative business processes using the ACL inside the access control
file. Regularly, these rules may contain CREATE, READ, UPDATE, and DELETE (CRUD) [108] actions
overall resources specified in the model file for any participant or component of the business network or their
instances. We can implement conditional access control rules, including Boolean JavaScript expressions,
to accurately implement the business norms. Furthermore, according to the business model’s content and
requirements, different access control techniques such as RBAC and ABAC could be implemented. For the
order processing business model (figure 3.1), I placed relevant access control rules to ensure the following
principles:
 Only a customer can create a new instance of the order processing asset, which is a commodity request.
 Only the related shopper, seller, and delivery, who are separate parties of the collaborative business,
can read the asset’s created instance.
 The only one who can execute the corresponding transactions to the Receive Order, Accepted/Rejected,
Fill Order, Send Invoice, Accept Payment, and Close Order objects are the asset instance’s associated
seller (or manufacturer).
 The related shopper of an asset instance is the only one who can execute the corresponding transaction
to perform the Make Payment task.
 The related delivery can only execute the corresponding transaction to the asset instance’s Ship Order
task.
I assumed that the customer selects the intended delivery from all different options while creating a new
asset. However, we can define it otherwise to cover other scenarios as well. For instance, the seller might be
interested in working with some particular deliveries. Therefore, some implementation details still may vary
from case to case.
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3.4.3 Deployment and execution of the business network
I have examined a case study to determine the validity of the implemented approach and the accuracy of the
deployed business network on blockchain.
This test was initiated with 28 participant instances, including twenty shoppers, five sellers, and three
deliveries. I created 200 random asset instances (table 3.1), including shoppers, sellers, and deliveries. All
valid and invalid transactions are defined for every step of the process flow, holding the asset instances
as separate business processes. The invalid transactions include intra-process and interprocess transactions
that do not follow the order processing model’s rules. In opposition, the valid transactions conform to the
designated BPMN model’s logic from the start event to the end.
The test went through valid transactions for each asset to complete the business process and fulfill the
closeOrder task. I designed the answer to the XOR gateway decision in the order processing’s BPMN flow
chart (figure 3.1) randomly so that each asset may include either true “rejected” or true “accepted” property
(table 3.1) at the end. After each valid transaction, the test tried an invalid transaction. This invalid
transaction could be a randomly intra-process or inter-processes transaction. Finally, the accuracy of the
presented business network is ascertained in terms of the number of successful valid transactions and the
number of failed invalid transactions. Table 3.2 outlines the statistics result of the test experiment.
Table 3.2: Business network test configuration and result.
Number of participant instances with shopper type 20
Number of participant instances with seller type 5
Number of participant instances with delivery type 3
Number of all asset instances 200
Number of asset instances with true “accepted” property 126
Number of asset instances with true “rejected” property 74
Number of all valid transactions 1430
Percentage of successful valid transaction 100%
Number of all intra-process invalid transactions 817
Number of all inter-processes invalid transactions 613
Percentage of failed invalid transactions 100%
3.5 Chapter summary
In this chapter, I discussed the implementation details of Order Processing in business process management
in a trusted permissioned blockchain. The chapter contributes to the body of data trust as a case study
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of establishing transparency and trust between multiple untrusted parties with the ability to track, monitor
and verify every committed process. In summary, implementing the collaborative business processes on the
permissioned blockchain extends the following benefits:
 In a permissioned blockchain, only authenticated users can join the network and read the state of the
ledger
 Blockchain grants a distributed tamper-proof and shared ledger that makes the occurrence of any
dishonesty almost impossible. Hence, different parties can trace the situation of the process and confirm
its detail accurately.
 Presenting the consensus mechanism, the business parties do not need to trust any single entity or any
third party anymore.
 Smart contracts can contribute to implementing the business process’s logical sequences and equip
business parties to do appropriate possible actions. Furthermore, smart contracts can be utilized to
perform automatic transactions as well.
 According to the business model’s specifications, any access control method such as discretionary or
role-based access control can be implemented to define the access levels over parties’ data, assets,
transactions, and the process flow’s data.
3.6 Contribution of the work presented in this chapter
This chapter studied data trust in an untrusted business process management, where multiple untrusted busi-
ness parties can collaborate for a common purpose in a trusted environment. The applicability of the order
processing execution as a real-word untrusted business process on the permissioned blockchain was investi-
gated. A proof of concept based on Hyperledger Composer to confirm blockchain technology’s effectiveness
for the presented purpose was developed.
The contribution of this chapter is published in the following paper. I collaborated in system design,
implementation and writing the paper.
Pourheidari, Vahid, Sara Rouhani, and Ralph Deters. ”A case study of execution of untrusted busi-
ness process on permissioned blockchain.” In 2018 IEEE International Conference on Internet of Things
(iThings) and IEEE Green Computing and Communications (GreenCom) and IEEE Cyber, Physical and
Social Computing (CPSCom) and IEEE Smart Data (SmartData), pp. 1588-1594. IEEE, 2018.
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4 Sharing medical data using blockchain
Scattered medical data has been long-established in health care delivery systems. Medical data are usually
recorded in private databases. As a result, patients’ data are scattered across different healthcare institutions,
even political jurisdictions (different provinces or states), since patients do not restrict themselves to a single
doctor or clinic. This prevents collaborative healthcare treatment and access to patient data efficiently.
This issue originates from the initial wrong presumption that the electronic medical or health record
(EHR and EMR) systems assume that patients receive medical services only from practitioners in one clinic
or one political jurisdiction. Though, in practice, patients do not restrict themselves to a single doctor or
hospital. The ability of these systems to interoperate and share medical data is deficient.
A survey in 2010 [1] has reported that the average U.S. patients have visited roughly 19 distinct medical
institutes. This study did not reflect the broader health practitioner state, such as pharmacists, physiothera-
pists, optometrists. Patients also do not bind themselves to a single EHR zone, as they travel for leisure and
work, and they relocate for long periods. Therefore, patients receive medical service from different institutes
where that provider may not have access to the patient’s medical records.
On the other hand, these systems are practitioner-centric. Patients lack the ability to control and transfer
permission in managing their own data. Institute and government policies determine access to the patient
data without involving the patients as real data owners. Therefore, even if the patients are willing to share
their data, the procedure is prolonged.
Big Data in healthcare and medicine includes different types and large amounts of data generated from
clinics or hospitals, such as electronic medical records, medical imaging and medical reports. It is often
closely associated with doctors, patients and pharmacists and consequently researchers.
Medical data is the primary source of health and safety information for patients, making it more sensitive
and private. Despite enormous investments by medical facilities and governments, medical services delivery
and health management continue to be hampered by data inaccessibility, poor interoperability, inconsistent
security of medical data assets, lack of privacy controls, and excluding patients from control access to their
own data assets.
Studies [167] have shown that merely storing medical data to the cloud systems and managing them for
sharing and analytic is not a secure option as cloud services regularly face internal and external security
threats. Thus, outsourcing sensitive health data to the cloud platforms without additional security and
privacy protection arrangement will add security risks.
In this chapter, I investigate blockchain potential as the infrastructure of a trusted system for sharing
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Figure 4.1: MediChainTM components.
medical data directly through data owners, which are patients in this particular use case. By utilizing the
decentralized nature of blockchain and automatic enforcement of smart contracts, we can develop a system
that does not rely on third parties to share and manage healthcare data access permissions. We can design
the system to define medical data as an asset belonging to the patient. They directly have the power to
submit transactions and share their medical data with anyone who is a member of the system.
Although there are similar works in the scope of access control based on blockchain, MediChainTM is the
first implementation of a functioning, real-world application based on Hyperledger Composer and Hyperledger
Fabric to utilize a permissioned blockchain to address these problems in healthcare systems.
This chapter addresses these issues with a blockchain-based architecture that allows MediChainTM to
be extensible and scalable. MedichainTM includes three main components represented in figure 4.1: a
blockchain-based access control module, off-chain data storage, and a patient-centred mobile and web user
interface. Medical data, such as X-ray images, are space demanding by nature. As blockchain ledger replicates
on all peers, storing the original medical data into the ledger is not efficiently appropriate. In order to maintain
system performance, all data assets such as diagnostic images, lab test results, prescriptions, treatment plans
are encrypted and stored on a secure cloud-based repository. The hash of the asset’s and URI (Uniform
Resource Identifier) data assets are stored in MediChainTM permissioned blockchain. With the hash value,
users can ensure that their data does not tamper. With URI, users can access data.
The system’s patient-centric design aims to solve the trust issue for the patients to share their data. First,
the patient will trust the system as long as they can control access to their data and transparently monitor
who has access to it. Consequently, it is expected that patients are more inclined to share their data.
4.1 Early studies of using blockchain for medical data management
In early 2017, very few studies implemented a medical data sharing system based on blockchain, and my
study is one of the earliest research on this topic. Furthermore, existing studies were limited to design
and architecture solutions, and the implementation and system functionality was missing in those studies.
However, it was essential to identify the characteristics, design patterns and architecture of existing studies.
Rosted et al. [139] proposes a patient-centric healthcare data sharing model using role-based and DAC
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methods. In the PCHR model, patients have the ultimate authority in determining who can access their
data.
Enigma [209] is a decentralized computation platform that considers privacy, computation, and data
storage to achieve privacy and scalability. The platform splits data into unmeaning chunks, and each node
has access to one chunk of data. Unlike blockchain, the data are not replicated and computed by every node.
However, an external blockchain is employed to control the system, manage access control, and consider a
tamper-proof database of events.
Zyskind et al. [210] employed blockchain to omit third-parties for personal data access management. As
a result, users can control access to their data. They implemented the system based on the combination of
off-chain storage and storing a pointer to encrypted data on the Bitcoin blockchain. The blockchain portion
of the system handles sharing and querying the data.
Medrec [15] is another implementation of an access control system that has used blockchain technology.
Medrec used Ethereum technology with some modifications in the mining process. The platform presents
a reward-based mining method to motivate medical stakeholders to participate in the system and verify
transactions as miners.
Xia et al.[184] introduced a blockchain framework for sharing electronic medical data stored in the cloud
repositories. The proposed system is based on a permissioned blockchain; therefore, only authorized users
would have access to the system by verifying their cryptographic keys. The performance testing based on
comparing this blockchain and bitcoin blockchain confirms light and scalable design.
Cruz et al. [46] presented an implementation of role-based access control using the smart contracts and the
challenge-response protocol based on the Ethereum blockchain. They designed a challenge-response protocol
to authenticate the ownership of roles and verify users. RBAC-SC has focused on trans-organization access
control; a user accesses one organization’s service based on his or her role in another organization.
Guo et al. [69] employed blockchain for validating EHR records by using an attribute-based signature
(ABS) method with various authorities. The evaluation result demonstrates that their system is robust
against collusion attacks and preserves the privacy of users.
The presented system (MediChain) [142] is one of the earliest studies that implemented interactions be-
tween permissioned blockchain and off-chain cloud repository and indicated the proposed solution’s feasibility.
4.2 Selecting the right blockchain platform
The few existing systems have used Ethereum blockchain to implement and analyze the proposed platform for
data sharing using blockchain. In Ethereum, users must pay for every operation in the format of transactions.
I selected the Hyperledger Fabric for developing the system. Figure 4.2 presents a representative Hyperledger
Fabric-based application. Here are the main advantages of using Hyperledger Fabric:
1. Fabric is a mature blockchain platform, and users could have different access levels based on their
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Figure 4.2: Application based on Hyperledger Fabric.
identity.
2. There is no cost of operations such as Gas in Ethereum blockchain, which reduces the overall system
cost.
3. The capabilities to communicate through a different channel and its support for private data are desir-
able for the presented application if different organizations require private communication and smart
contracts for exchanging medical data.
4.3 System implementation
The implemented system includes three main components: a permissioned blockchain, off-chain storage, and
a patient-centric user experience accessed through a web app interface. Figure 4.3 provides an overview of
the presented architecture as instantiated in the TrioovaTM 1 application. I describe each main component
as follows.
I used Hyperledger Composer to create the Business Network Archive (BNA) that defines the character-
istics and capabilities of MediChainTM. I deployed a runtime version of the BNA generated by Hyperledger
Composer over the Hyperledger Fabric network. There are three primary files made with Hyperledger Com-
poser: a model file, a script file, and the Access Control List (ACL) file.
1https://www.bioalberta.com/trioova
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 Model File: In the model file, I defined the Participants, Assets, and Transactions supported by
MediChainTM
 Participants: As a permissioned blockchain, all users are authenticated by a third party before giving
access to the blockchain components. When a user is authenticated, the Fabric membership service
assigns a blockchain ID to the Fabric wallet. There are three types of participants in the system:
patient, caregiver, and health practitioner. An individual can register as one, two, or all three and
unique IDs are assigned to each registration. Each participant type can be a data owner and a data
requester. Data requesters are authenticated users who can submit transactions that request access to
particular data owners’ data assets.
 Assets: In the TrioovaTM application, assets are patients’ medical data. Initially, each asset is assumed
to be a private asset. The owner is the only participant who has access to the asset. The owner of the
data has the right to share a data asset with others via transactions.
 Transactions: Any request for a change to asset access starts with a transaction initiated by a data
requester. The requests are managed in a publish-subscribe fashion.
 I implemented smart contracts to establish the patient and caregiver to share and access healthcare
data using blockchain without third-parties interventions.
 Script File (Smart contracts): The smart contract provides transaction details functionality. I imple-
mented the conditions and requirements of each transaction in the script file. The web interface enables
the user to specify input parameters of transactions and trigger them. For example, we can design a
transaction in the smart contract to provide time-based access to a data asset. The data requester
provides the asset’s identity and the proposed length of time (or date, etc.) for accessing the data
asset. The data owner can agree to these terms or suggest modifications. When the conditions are met,
the validator peers confirm the transaction.
 Access Control List: Hyperledger Composer provides complex condition language that can be used to
specify default policies and actions for the runtime BNA. In this file, I implemented the users who have
default access permissions to the patient data, such as the family doctor or a close relative.
 Events and queries: I used event and query components in Hyperledger Composer to implement the
proper events and queries. After all of the initial entities and transactions have been set up, the logging
and querying methods will be used to track all submitted transactions. Any data owner can track and
monitor any request. This provides the auditing capability.
 Off-chain storage: Recording the medical data directly on the blockchain is not an appropriate solution
for two main reasons. Medical data, such as medical images (X-rays and others), are large by nature.
Storing such large data increases the chain’s size significantly. Besides the performance issue, storage
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would be another concern because, in blockchain, every peer maintains a copy of the ledger. Therefore,
I kept the data in a secure decentralized off-chain system. In proof of concept implementation, I used
Google Drive to store the medical data. (However, we can integrate any other cloud storage solution
with the application.) I stored the data location references as a part of the medical data asset on the
ledger.
 Web interface: TrioovaTM is the web interface that I implemented using AngularJS to access the
MediChainTM capabilities. The core principle is that the patient is always at the center of a circle of
care. Patients determine who to include in their care circle and, at a granular level, what data to be
shared with each. For patients who need or want a trusted party’s assistance, the circle expands to
include a caregiver that can act on the patient’s behalf.
The proposed method securely links on-chain and off-chain data without incurring the restrictive com-
putational and storage loads inherent in most blockchain architectures. By utilizing smart contracts, the
patients, as data owners or their designated person (e.g. a caregiver), can easily manage access permissions
to each of their data assets. I developed a web application to interact with the application easily accessible
to patients, caregivers, and health practitioners. The proposed platform can also be utilized to find relevant
health practitioners, request appointments, and manage care plans across multiple health practitioners.
I implemented access control transactions using smart contracts, in which patients, as the owners of
healthcare data, can share their data as a part of an asset belonging to them directly. The patient is the
only one that can submit an access grant transaction unless the patient adds another user to delegate the
permission to do so. I also implemented a role-based access control model for providing default access
permissions to family doctors and maybe close relatives of the patients. I used Hyperledger Composer for
implementing the application on top of Hyperledger Fabric.
4.4 System workflow
Figure 4.4 illustrates the workflow of the system. The process is initiated by a patient who receives a medical
service in a medical clinic. The patient could request to add the results, including medical images, practitioner
notes, and prescriptions, to Medichain. The patient’s original data is stored securely in Medichain cloud-
based storage (off-chain storage). A transaction is executed, and the reference to the data location plus the
hash of the original data will be stored as a part of the patient’s asset on the blockchain. If the patient is
already assigned a practitioner, the practitioner gets an automatic notification that there is data that just
added to your patient asset. Then, the practitioner must send an access request to the patient. The patient
receives the request and can define the access terms and submit the access request’s result. The result of
the access request will store on the Medichain blockchain. If the patient approves the access request, the
caregiver gets a notification and can access the patient medical data.
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Figure 4.3: MediChainTM architecture.
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Figure 4.4: MediChainTM workflow.
4.5 Chapter summary
In this chapter, I presented a framework for sharing medical data with patient-centric design. The patient, as
the owner of medical data, has full control over access to their data. They decide on access requests, execute
the access decision transactions and audit the users who access their data.
The system facilitates the efficient exchange of health data between patients, caregivers, and even people
with research purposes while simultaneously enabling a secure protocol for health data storage. This system
provides the preferred ability to manage access to medical data, enhanced security of those data, and conse-
quently engage patients to share their data. The current architecture can be extended to be generalized to
any use case requiring the management of large digital assets such as music, visual arts, and documents.
The chapter contributes to the body of data trust as a case study of trusted medical data stewardship.
4.6 Contribution of the work presented in this chapter
This chapter contributed to the body of knowledge by presenting a patient-centric system for access manage-
ment and medical data sharing. The system utilized blockchain’s smart contract to manage access permissions
under the control of patients. A proof of concept to evaluate the proposed solution was implemented.
This study is the result of my Mitacs internship with Trioova company. The contribution of this study
has been published in the following IEEE conference.
Rouhani, Sara, Luke Butterworth, Adam D. Simmons, Darryl G. Humphery, and Ralph Deters.
67
“MediChain TM: a secure decentralized medical data asset management system.” In 2018 IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Internet of Things (iThings) and IEEE Green Computing and Communications (Green-
Com) and IEEE Cyber, Physical and Social Computing (CPSCom) and IEEE Smart Data (SmartData), pp.
1533-1538. IEEE, 2018, doi: 10.1109/Cybermatics 2018.2018.00258.
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5 Physical access control system
In the previous chapter, I presented a decentralized access control and data sharing for medical data. This
chapter introduces a decentralized access control mechanism for another application domain. This chapter
presents my study focusing on access control for the software layer of the physical access control system.
There are two types of access control systems, logical access control and physical access control. The
logical access control system manages access permissions to the logical resources such as data. Physical
access control limits access to physical places such as buildings, rooms, and network equipment. Most of
the studies on access control systems have focused on logical access control. While physical access control
systems are also very important, and there is potential to enhance their security and reliability.
Physical access control systems use keys, badges, and fingerprints to authenticate users and grant access.
Behind these hardware infrastructures, there is a software layer that manages access permissions. The
software layer handles users’ access control and keeps track of who is coming and going in restricted areas.
Typically the software system in physical access control systems is implemented centralized, and organizations
must rely on third parties for implementing and maintaining their physical access control system.
As I discussed earlier, there are multiple security and reliability concerns with centralized solutions,
such as single point of failure, availability, data tampering, the presence of third parties and hacking attacks.
Besides the security vulnerabilities that arise from involving a third party, the logging approach in centralized
implementation is not entirely trustable. There is always the chance of malicious behaviour and erasing all
available evidence.
Blockchain provides a reliable history of all transactions, which are metadata related to access requests
and responses in the current case study. Moreover, with smart contract automation, the system can operate
directly by parties without requiring third parties.
In this chapter, I discuss the blockchain’s potential as an infrastructure for the software layer in the
physical access control systems. I utilize blockchain’s immutability and tamper-proof features for access
control systems by accessing an auditable transaction trail.
There are two main advantages of using blockchain for physical access control systems. First, the history
of all recorded transactions stored on a trusted tamper-proof database significantly reduces the chance of inner
organization malicious behaviour. This trust comes from the secure and solid logic behind the cryptographic
nature of the blockchain. Second, using smart contracts for access permissions management eliminates the
need for third parties for system operation and maintenance. Authorized users can grant or revoke access
permissions directly.
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In this chapter, I outline the access control application [145] implemented using Hyperledger Composer
1 and Hyperledger Fabric 2. Figure 5.1 shows how the software layer of a physical access control system
interacts with the blockchain to request data from the blockchain and read access permissions.
Figure 5.1: The interaction of access management software with blockchain.
5.1 Access control method
Most of the physical access control systems are designed based on the role-based access control model. Role-
based access control is easy to implement and operate. After reviewing various access control models and
considering the blockchain capabilities, I developed the combination of two access control methods, role-based
access control method and Rule-based access control method.
The Role-based access control method is applied to regulate users’ default access permissions based on
their roles in the organization. I also implemented rules using smart contracts, and they determine who has
the privilege to change other users’ access permissions. The authorized users can instantly modify users’




I used the ACL module of Hyperledger composer to implement the role-based access control method to set
participants’ default access permissions. Each participant denotes a different role in the system. For dynamic
or rule-based access control, an authorized user can change other users’ access permissions by submitting the
relevant transactions: grantAccess and revokeAccess. The transaction is only accessible to the predefined
users. It invokes the related smart contract, and based on predefined rules, the default access permission of
the intended user alters. All these transactions’ results and logs are recorded permanently in the blockchain,
and no one can remove or change them.
5.2 System implementation
I employed blockchain as a decentralized database for storing access requests and access permissions. Users
send access requests through application API. There are two parameters involved in access decisions. First,
the user role in the system determines the default access permissions. Second, despite the users’ roles, their
default access permissions can change directly by high privileged users (such as directors) and the rules and
conditions defined in smart contracts.
Hyperledger composer is a framework to implement blockchain applications and deploy them on Hyper-
ledger Fabric. All components in composer modular are packed as one archive file and deployed on the
Hyperledger Fabric blockchain. The composer module includes a model file, ACL file, Query file, and a set
of Scripts. Scripts in Javascript language are smart contracts.
In the model module, I outline Participants, Assets, Transactions, and Events. All participants in the sys-
tem, such as systems administrators who define the access control policies and other authenticated users who
need access to physical places, have been designated as participants in the model file. Defining participants
include the unique participant key (such as user ID) and other attributes. I defined the physical places as
data assets in the system. I implemented access to physical places through transaction processing functions
or smart contracts and access rules defined in ACL file. For example, in the application, I considered a unique
string that refers to the input door of physical places secured by a physical access control device. It could
incorporate any other related attribute or map to any specific participant who can manage access policies
over it.
Authenticated users submit transactions to change the default access permission dynamically. I defined
the transactions’ attributes in the model module and their processing functions (smart contracts) in the
JavaScript file.
There are three transactions implemented for manage access permissions. One transaction for granting
access permissions, one transaction for revoking a user default access permission. Additionally, there is a
transaction to delegate authority to other users. In this way, they can submit the grant access or revoke
access transactions to physical places for the other users. I wrote the default access control policies in the
Access Control Language (ACL) module. These policies include the following items:
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Table 5.1: ACL notations.
Notation Meaning
P Set of Participants
R Set of Resources
C Set of Conditions
A Set of Actions (Create, Read, Update and Delete)
O Set of Operations (Allow and Deny)
 Participants with specific roles have access to which resources by default
 Participants with specific roles can send transactions
 System access permissions
 System administrator role access permissions
 Participants with specific roles access permissions to read historian records
I defined five sets of Participants, Resources, Conditions, Actions, and Operations in the composer ACL
file. Table 5.1 explains the meaning of each notation. In the basic model, users can access the resources
based on their predefined roles in the system.
In the model file, I defined different types of participants to reflect different roles in the system. These
participants have access to resources by default based on their roles and conditions.
Ur ⊆ U × r is the set of user-role assignments and rR ⊆ r × R is the set of role-resource assignments.
A user u have access to the resource r if and only if there is a participant p defined in the model file and
(u, p) ∈ Ur and (p, r) ∈ rR and condition c is met. A privileged user submits a transaction to change another
user’s access in the dynamic access modification model. This is separate from static ACL module definitions.
Events can be implemented as part of the model file and embedded in transactions. Then, we can subscribe
events to an external application. For example, in this system, I assume several continuous efforts to access a
physical place. As a result, the system triggers an event to an external application to apply necessary safety
considerations such as triggering intrusion alarms to deter unauthorized access.
I implemented queries in the queries file to query transactions’ logs. Log entries demonstrate the results
of the transactions that have been fired from transactional processing functions. Composer Transaction
Processor functions are part of JavaScript files. These JavaScript functions translate to fabric chainCode
(equivalent to smart contracts). They define the logic of every transaction and the conditions that need to
meet for executing this logic. The Transaction Processor Functions are automatically called through smart
contracts invocation when an authorized user submits the relevant transaction. Figure 5.2 explains the access
permission process based on the GrantAccess transaction.
72
Figure 5.2: Access permission procedure.
Hyperledger Composer’s Identity Management is responsible for creating a participant and issuing an
identity to that participant. Composer employs the concept of cards inspired by real-world ID cards. An
ID card is an access card to the blockchain network, and it includes three parts, 1) the data related to the
identity, 2) a connection profile, and 3) a certificate for chain access. The connection profile is used to connect
the Composer’s network to the runtime Fabric. These ID cards can map to real-world physical access control
smart cards to access physical places.
The query file incorporates the declaration of queries. Queries are based on tamper-proof data. We can
be sure that no one has altered or deleted the data. Hyperledger Composer presents a Historian record
feature. It records successful transactions with details, including transactions’ information and participants
who submitted the transactions. Figure 5.3 shows the historian transaction details.
Figure 5.4 shows the presented application’s architecture model based on Hyperledger Composer and
Hyperledger Fabric. The system comprises a model, smart contract (JavaScript code), access control, and
query components. All these modules are packed into a business network archive (bna file). This archive file
(.bna) later deploys on Hyperledger Fabric runtime Blockchain, and afterward, users can interact with the
blockchain through JavaScript API and the application’s user interface.
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Figure 5.3: Historian transaction.
Figure 5.4: System architecture.
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Figure 5.5: Performance result.
5.3 System performance analysis
I used Hyperledger Caliper 3 to generate the workload and analyze the performance of transactions. Hy-
perledger Caliper is a blockchain benchmark tool that allows users to measure the performance of their
blockchain implementations. The system configuration used for testing the system includes 32GB memory
(RAM) and Core(TM) i7-6700 CPU.
I implemented a test module to generate workloads based on implemented transactions. Three main
functions of the test module include init(), run(), and end(). The init() function handles the initialization
phase of the test. The run() function generates workloads and submits multiple transactions repeatedly in
an asynchronous way. The end() function finalizes the end of the test.
As I explained in the previous chapter, in the model file, I mapped different participants to different
roles in the system. Each role has a different level of access, such as managers and employees. I defined the
physical places as assets. I categorized data assets into various departments, so access to each department is
controlled by a different user (for example, the department’s director). I defined user (participant) instances
and asset instances in the init() function. Afterward, test Transactions were fired through the run() function.
Figure 5.5 shows the result of 500 transactions based on three different transactions, createAccessRule,
queryAccess, and queryACL. The createAccessRule is a transaction that adds a new access rule to the ledger.
It performs the write operation on the ledger, and its average latency is 1.08 seconds. The queryAccess
and query ACL perform read operation from the ledger. The queryAccess transaction queries the access
permissions for a single user, so it is a relatively faster transaction with an average latency of 0.02 seconds. The
queryAcl transaction queries all access control lists for all users in the system. Compared to the queryAccess
transaction, it is slower with an average latency of 0.14 second, but still faster than the createAccessRule
transaction because it queries the ledger because it does not update the state of the ledger.
The test result indicates that the presented application has worked a hundred percent correctly based on
a predefined use case. I tested the accuracy of the application in two phases. First, I checked users’ access
permission based on their roles to examine the accuracy of the ACL module. Second, I tested the smart
contracts functionality by simulating a test in which authorized users (such as managers) change other users’
access levels directly through invoking the related transactions implemented in the smart contract.
3https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/caliper
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Figure 5.6: Resource consumption.
Figure 5.6 shows the result of the resource consumption of two organizations that each one runs one
peer (peer0.org1.example.com and peer0.org2.example.com) and one orderer (orderer.example.com) in the
Hyperledger Fabric network.
5.4 Chapter summary
In centralized systems, access to resources is controlled by trusted parties such as system administrators who
have full control of the system’s data and actions. As a result, centralized solutions are always in danger of
security attacks and trust issues. This chapter presented a novel application to implement an access control
system using permissioned blockchain for physical access control systems. By utilizing Hyperledger Fabric
and Hyperledger Composer potential, I have implemented a dynamic access control application for managing
access permissions on physical places. The system is trustable since it is protected from unwanted tampering.
The system provides a reliable transactions log to query, and it could be accessible by authenticated and
authorized users. The transaction logs of access requests and access permissions can later be utilized in
terms of non-repudiation. The analysis reports extracted by Hyperledger Caliper indicates system stability
and accuracy, including a hundred percent successful transaction rate.
5.5 Contribution of the work presented in this chapter
This chapter proposed a novel application for employing blockchain in physical access control systems. It
improves the security and reliability of software layers in physical access control systems by managing access
permissions through smart contracts and audit access requests from the tamper-proof ledger. The reliable
and secure infrastructure reduces the chance of inner organization malicious behaviour. The system was
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implemented using Hyperledger Composer and evaluated by Hyperledger Caliper.
The contribution of this chapter has been published in the following paper:
Rouhani, Sara , Vahid Pourheidari, and Ralph Deters. ”Physical access control management system
based on permissioned blockchain.” In 2018 IEEE International Conference on Internet of Things (iThings)
and IEEE Green Computing and Communications (GreenCom) and IEEE Cyber, Physical and Social Com-
puting (CPSCom) and IEEE Smart Data (SmartData), pp. 1078-1083, IEEE, 2018, doi: 10.1109/Cybermat-
ics 2018.2018.00198.
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6 Decentralized Attribute based access control system
Auditing is one of the essential controls in systems security. Auditing is the action of tracking all access
attempts, including both legitimate and illegal access attempts. Keeping track of legitimate access attempts
helps with non-repudiation, and keeping track of illegal access attempts helps identify potential threats.
Auditability is also one of the key characteristics of blockchain. Blockchain provides a trustable history
of all transactions. Blockchain can employ smart contracts to store access control policies, make access
decisions and store the result of access attempts. Then, at any point in the future, all the access attempts
toward a particular resource can be queried from blockchain, and it can be used as an authentic proof for
non-repudiation, or it can be studied for further analysis to identify possible threats.
Besides, blockchain presents other beneficial features that are desirable for access control systems, such
as immutability and transparency. For example, suppose a malicious system administrator changes a policy
to grant or deny someone access. In that case, it will be recorded on the blockchain, and it is not possible
to delete the trace of updates on policies from the blockchain. Each policy has a history of changes applied
in the policy that can be queried by permissioned users in permissioned blockchain. However, we can avoid
such a problem by configuring smart contracts so that authenticated parties must approve any change in
access control policies before execution.
Many studies have investigated blockchain as a back-end infrastructure for the distributed access control
system. However, most of the prior works in this area are domain-specific. It means their designed access
control solutions for a particular domain, such as healthcare data or IoT data. Besides, most of these studies
lack the details of implementation and performance analysis. As a result, it remains unclear if a blockchain
can be the basis for access management at a large scale.
In this chapter, I propose a complete solution for implementing an ABAC system focusing on policy-
based architecture based on Hyperledger Fabric permissioned blockchain. The research contributions are
summarized as follows:
 All access control components including AM, PDP, Policy Administration Point (PAP) are implemented
as smart contracts (or Chaincode) and they are operated by Hyperledger Fabric.
 I utilize Hyperledger Fabric as Policy Information Point (PIP) to provide accountability through the
immutable, traceable transaction history offered by Fabric ledger.
 I present a specific use case of digital libraries to represent the system operation modelling.
 I carry out multiple experiments, I present the performance analysis of the presented access control
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application using Hyperledger Caliper 1 based on various configurations, including different databases
and consensus methods.
 I also present a performance analysis results conducting from a comprehensive comparison between
existence configurations based on Hyperledger Fabric.
6.1 Attribute based access control
ABAC [80] is logical access control that comprises access control lists, role-based access control, and its own
method for providing access based on the evaluation of attributes [79, 192]. ABAC controls access to the
system resources by evaluating policies (system rules) against entities’ attributes, including subject, object,
and environmental attributes. Attributes are characteristics of the subjects (users) and protected objects
(resources). The environment conditions as the environment’s attributes can also be taken into account for
ABAC decision making.
ABAC is a flexible and fine-grained mechanism that is also capable of enforcing the other three methods.
Distributed systems also adopted ABAC as they require federation and autonomy control among coordinated
systems, and ABAC enables granular and meta attribute capabilities that support privilege delegation in a
distributed application [78].
ABAC has some advantages over other access control models as, (a) It can provide fine-grained and
flexible access control because it allows an arbitrary number of attributes in access control decisions; (b) The
implementation of complex policies is simple and applicable; and (c) It can provide dynamic and effective
access control decisions by involving environmental attributes to decision making.
Hyperledger Fabric has integrated the ABAC mechanism, so it is possible to build permission groups for
access control by checking members’ attributes. However, access control parameters and permission groups
have to be predefined. It is not suitable for applications that require dynamic and flexible access control.
6.1.1 Policy based architecture
XACML [12] introduces a policy-based architecture for the specification and enforcement of access control
policies. The architecture comprises the following components.
 Client : the device that requests access to a resource, possibly on behalf of a user.
 Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): the network device on which access decisions are carried out. PEP
serves as the gatekeeper to the intended resource.
 Policy Information Point (PIP): the repository that holds information (attributes) about the client
and provides this information to the PDP.
1https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/caliper
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Figure 6.1: Attribute based access control.
 Policy Decision Point (PDP): the program that decides to allow or deny the client access to the
resource.
 Policy Administration Point (PAP): the component that is responsible for managing access control
policies.
 Accounting or Auditing : The component that is responsible for tracking access attempts.
Figure 6.2 illustrates how these components interact with the client and each other. A client sends an
access request, and Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) forwards the request to Policy Decision Point (PDP).
Policy Decision Point (PDP) queries the related policy and attributes from Policy Administration Point (PAP)
and Policy Information Point (PIP). After receiving the required information, Policy Decision Point (PDP)
assesses the access decision and sends the result to Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) for enforcing access
decisions.
6.2 System model
Centralized access control systems suffer from various problems such as: (a) the risk of privacy leakage,
and (b) the risk of a single point of failure; (c) interoperability issues; (d) unreliability of the access control
system, and (e) the presence of third parties.
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Figure 6.2: ABAC and policy based architecture [12].
An access control system can utilize blockchain technology to address these problems. The decentralized
nature of the blockchain resolves the problem of a single point of failure. Cryptographic methods ensure
the reliability of the ledger. Consensus mechanisms ensure that the state of the ledger is valid and it is the
same for every participant. Smart contracts allow monitoring and enforcement of sophisticated access control
decisions. Also, with automatic enforcement, they can address privacy issues.
This solution empowers both resource owners and subjects (typically access requesters). The details of
each granted or revoked access permission can be queried from the ledger, including the policies that have
been applied by the smart contract, the attribute values and the time of access request.
In practice, under no circumstances, resource owners do not deny access to a resource by a rightful
requester. On the other hand, the resource owners leverage provided audit trails while ensuring that no user
has subverted the system.
To provide a solution to these problems, I have employed Hyperledger Fabric as the blockchain infrastruc-
ture. In the blockchain, there have to be at least two endorsing nodes belonging to different organizations.
These nodes are responsible for executing smart policies. Clients would be the systems that use this system,
as depicted in figure 6.3.
The workflow of the users remains unaltered. The only difference is that the authorization requests are
now mediated through one or more nodes representing the given system, as the evaluation of access control
policies could be not trusted for the subject of the request, who instead requests invalid access to resources.
In order to protect users’ privacy, Hyperledger Fabric provides private data features to protect sensitive
users’ data. I have utilized this feature to represent the attributes required for access permissions based on the
organizations’ defined policies. The private data is hashed, and then it will be endorsed and ordered like other
data. Finally, the chaincode writes hashed data on the ledgers of every peer. However, only organizations
that require these private attributes to give access permission have access to them. Using Zero-knowledge
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Figure 6.3: High level system architecture using Archimate.
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Figure 6.4: Blockchain-based access control system architecture [141].
proofs Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) is another alternative that can be applied for highly private-preserving
case studies that require the protection of all users’ attributes from all access providers and data owners.
However, ZKP requires additional time and computational resources compared to the presented solution
based on Hyperledger Fabric private data feature.
6.3 System architecture
In the presented solution, as depicted in Figure 6.4, the blockchain acts as a mediator between the entity
that requests access to a specific resource and the entity that manages that resource. The system includes
two main components. The first component is an off-chain system that relies on a permissioned blockchain
to store its access control attributes and query access permissions. The second component is a permissioned
blockchain that manages different access control components through smart contracts and stores the data on
a tamper-proof ledger.
The three main smart contracts are PIP contract, PAP smart contract and the PDP contract. Subject
(users) and resource (objects) attributes are stored in a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data format
through the PIP contract. The PIP is also responsible for checking write conflicts and updating attributes.
Policies are also recorded in the system as JSON data format, and PAP contract is responsible for managing
policies and updating policies. We can implement the system to work with multiple PAP run by different
organizations. Even if there is only one PAP, the transparency offered by this solution distributes the trust
and the responsibility of these access policies. PDP contract evaluates policies to make an access decision.
Figure 6.5 shows the details of the implemented smart contracts.
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The pseudocodes of transactions implemented in smart contracts are presented in algorithms 1-4. Algo-
rithm 1 shows how we have stored the list of resources and subjects attributes on the ledger. Algorithm 2
presents how we have recorded policies on the ledger. Algorithm 3 explains how we query policies and the
history of changes to the policies from the ledger. Algorithm 4 shows the detailed implementation of the
PDP transaction, which includes querying the relevant attributes and policies from the ledger and making a
decision based on their values.
Algorithm 1: Record attributes transaction
Input: attributeKey, attributes (subject or resource attributes)
Result: add attributes on the ledger
attributeKey (subject or resource key) ← getState(attributeKey)
if subjectKey then
throw error ‘attributekey’ is already exist you can update the attributes using Update transaction
end
putState(attributeKey, attributes)
Algorithm 2: Record polices transaction
Input: policyKey, policy
Result: add policies on the ledger
policy ← getState(policyKey)
if policyKey then
throw error ‘policyKey’ is already exist you can update the policy using UpdatePolicy transaction
end
putState(policyKey, policy)
Algorithm 3: Query and trace policies
Input: policyKey
Result: query policies info
policyBytes ← getState(policyKey)
if !policyBytes then





After smart contracts evaluate SPs against their respective attributes, the PDP returns its decision to
the PEP. This process allows a decoupling between users and the blockchain administration (as users do not
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Algorithm 4: Policy Decision Point (PDP) transaction






if !subjectBytes OR subjectBytes.length == 0 then
throw error subject’s attributes does not exist
end
resourceAttributes ← JSON(resourceBytes)
if !resourceBytes OR resourceBytes.length == 0 then
throw error resource’s attributes does not exist
end
policy ← JSON(policyBytes)
if !policyBytes OR policyBytes.length == 0 then
throw error policy does not exist
end
ABAC = Abac(policy);
permit = ABAC.enforce(rule, subjectAttributes, resourceAttributes)
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Figure 6.5: Smart contracts architecture.
need to have a node on the blockchain, which is desirable).
The presented solution logs all access requests in an immutable ledger and provides a framework to
control all access controls concerning the network participants. Nodes from the private network can access
the blockchain, check transactions’ history, and audit the history of access requests and results. Automatic
auditing techniques can be developed by analyzing the history of access request transactions. I provide a
fine-grained access control solution that enforces access validation through blockchain-based service providers.
6.4 Case study
A digital library is a collection of documents in an organized electronic form that allows users to access them
online. A highly dynamic user population and the numerous collection of digital libraries’ resources require
a fine-grained, dynamic access control method such as ABAC [4]. It requires that access policies specified
based on users’ attributes and characteristics rather than users’ roles in the system.
In this section, a case study is selected for access control in digital libraries to illustrate and explain the
application of the presented ABAC system.
Every subject is stored with a subject ID (SID), and the set of its attributes and values, and the same for
Objects attributes. Attribute ID is a required field to store attributes in the Hyperledger Fabric database and
later retrieve the respective attribute for permission decision. Both Hyperledger Fabric supporting databases
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(CouchDB and Level DB) are key-value stores, and I have used the ID field as keys.
SnA is the set of attributes associated with the subjectn and SnID defined as a key for storing the
correlated attributes. Similarly, OnA is the set of attributes associated with the objectn and OnID defined
as a key for storing the correlated attributes.
PnSA and PnOA are the sets of subjects and Objects determinative attributes in the policy of n. Same
as attributes, Policy ID (PnID) is a required field to store attributes. For every policy, the determinative
attributes (PnSA,PnOA) have been stored along with the policy’s rules.
SnA = {SnID, {{SnA1, value}, ..., {SnAn, value}}}
OnA = {OnID, {{OnA1, value}, ..., {OnAn, value}}}
Defining SA as the set of all subjects attributes and OA as the set of all objects attributes, we have:
SA = (S1A ∪ S2A ∪ ...SnA)




Pn = {PnID, PnSA,PnOA, rules}
Resulting, we have the following attributes for the subject S1A and object O1A:
S1A = {“s001”, {“status”, true}, {“expiration”, “2020− 05− 12”}, {“libraryGroup”, 12}}
O1A = {“r001”, {“libraryGroup”, 12}}
The policy P1 with the id “policy01” is as following:
P1 = {“policy01”, S1A,O1A, {“status == true” ∧ “expiration” > “1Day” ∧ “user.libraryGroup” ==
“resource.libraryGroup”}}
6.4.1 JSON data format
In my implemented solution, the access control data (attributes and policies) is followed by the JSON format.
Using JSON, as a widespread data format, can be used by a broad range of applications. An example of a
sample policy, including the subject (user) attributes and object (resource) attributes, is illustrated in the
following JSON code snippet. Based on the presented policy, the subject and the resource attributes, the
subject has valid access permission to the resource, as the subject has valid Identifier (ID), active status,
non-expired membership and the subject library group matches with the resource library group. If one of
the subject’s attributes does not pass the policy rules, the access permission will be denied.
Listing 6.1: Definition of a sample access control policy, subject and resource
po l i c y = {
‘ ‘ pol icyID ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ p o l i c y 01 ’ ’ ,
a t t r i b u t e s : {
‘ ‘ user ’ ’ : {
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‘ ‘ s tatus ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ Active ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ exp i ra t i on ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ Date o f exp i ra t i on ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ l ibraryGroup ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ Group ID ’ ’
} ,
‘ ‘ r e source ’ ’ : {
‘ ‘ l ibraryGroup ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ Group ID ’ ’
}
} ,
‘ ‘ r u l e s ’ ’ : {
‘ ‘ u se r . s tatus ’ ’ : {
‘ ‘ comparison type ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ boolean ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ comparison ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ boolAnd ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ value ’ ’ : t rue
} ,
‘ ‘ u se r . exp i ra t i on ’ ’ : {
‘ ‘ comparison type ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ datetime ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ comparison ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ isMoreRecentThan ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ value ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ 1DAY’ ’
} ,
‘ ‘ u se r . l ibraryGroup ’ ’ : {
‘ ‘ compar i son target ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ l ibraryGroup ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ comparison type ’ ’ ‘ ‘ numeric ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ comparison ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ i s S t r i c t l yEqua l ’ ’ ,






sub j e c t = {
subject ID : ‘ ‘ s 123 ’ ’ ,
a t t r i b u t e s : {
‘ ‘ s tatus ’ ’ : t rue ,
‘ ‘ exp i ra t i on ’ ’ : ‘ ‘ 2020−05−12 ’ ’ ,
‘ ‘ l ibraryGroup ’ ’ : 12
}
}
r e s ou r c e = {
resourceID : ‘ ‘ r 123 ’ ’ ,
At t r ibut e s : {





In this section, I evaluate system performance. I used Hyperledger Caliper to generate workloads and
measure its performance based on customized benchmarks and various configurations. The program codes
of the project implementation and evaluation experiments are available in the Github repository 2
6.5.1 Performance parameters, test environment configuration and assumptions
I have evaluated each component of the system against two different databases, Couchdb and Goleveldb and
two orderer services, Raft and Kafka. I also present the results of the evaluation based on the Solo orderer.
Raft 3 is a Crash Fault-Tolerant (CFT) ordering service based on the implementation of Raft protocol.
Raft simply follows the “leader and follower” model. The leader makes decisions, and the followers follow
the leader. The leader changes frequently, and every follower can be a candidate to become the next round
leader.
Similar to Raft, Kafka 4 is a CFT ordering service and follows the “leader and follower” model. However,
it uses ZooKeeper 5 to manage clusters. Zookeeper keeps track of the status of the Kafka cluster nodes and
partitions. Solo is a single ordering node, and it is not fault-tolerant. It is developed to be used only for
testing purposes.
I have tested the application on a Virtual Machine (VM) running Google Cloud Platform, VM to collect
performance analysis data. The machine type is n2-highcpu-8, which includes eight virtual CPUs and 8 GB
of memory. All the tests are run on the same virtual machine, as Caliper emulates workload distribution
between several clients.
The default number of blockchain clients is 10 (each client emulated by a different NodeJS6 process), the
default number of transactions is 5,000, and the default transaction type is policy decision transaction, which
queries the related data from ledger based on access request and determines the result of the access request.
The default database for Raft and Kafka is GoLevelDB. The default number of organizations is two, and the
default number of peers is one.
6.5.2 Network topology
Hyperledger Fabric offers a distributed infrastructure that allows multiple organizations to interact. The
concept of channels is introduced to separate the communication between organizations and provide private
data. Each organization can join multiple channels and establish private communication resulting in a







responsible for maintaining a copy of the ledger and executing smart contracts. Smart contracts are installed
on peers and then defined on the respective channel. Ordering service consists of multiple nodes called orderer
responsible for reaching deterministic consensus (unlike public platforms such as Ethereum and Bitcoin with
the possibility of a fork) and ordering the transactions and bundle them into blocks.
Figure 6.6 illustrates an example of a Fabric network. Assume we have three organizations that offer
digital library services. Library A and library B are interested in offering an integrated service to their users,
and the service is limited to their registered users. The first step is defining a consortium and storing it in the
network configuration. Channel 1 will then be created based on network configuration. Each organization
(library) contributes one peer to the channel. In the next step, chaincodes responsible for implementing the
ABAC system will be installed on both peers and defined on Channel 1. The data stored on the ledger will
be only accessible to the members of Channel 1. It is also possible to restrict the users’ access level through
Fabric membership service and implement more granular access at the Fabric network level. So far, this
reflects the network topology for the implemented application. It includes two organizations (org1 and org2)
connecting through Channel 1, two peers (peer0.org1 and peer0.org2). I have tested the application through
two different endorsing services. Raft ordering service established through three orderer nodes (ordered 0,
orderer 1, orderer 2). Raft is a CFT that can withstand one failure out of three nodes. Kafka is established
through two orderer nodes (orderer 0 and orderer 1).
Figure 6.6: Network topology.
As an extension to this scenario, consider that Library B is interested in integrating another service with
a new organization (library C). To implement the ABAC access control, they are required to store the related
attributes and policies on the ledger. They can establish a new channel (Channel 2) and maintain a separated
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ledger on their peers. The data stored on the new ledger is not exposed to the organizations joined Channel
1. Library B either can use the same peer (Peer B) for both channels, or it can provide two separate peers
to contribute separately in Channel 1 and Channel 2.
6.5.3 Performance evaluation results
Figure 6.7 shows the average latency (in seconds) for three different transactions, Record attributes, PDP,
and query data from the ledger based on Kafka orderer. Record includes storing both subjects and resources
attributes and storing policies; there are three transactions, record objects’ attributes, record subjects’ at-
tributes and record policies. Since these three transactions basically do the same task, their extracted results
were very similar. I have considered the average latency of these three transactions for Record. Query queries
the stored data from the ledger, including attributes and policies. PDP queries the related data from ledger
based on access request and determines the result of the access request.
In every round of the test, we configured the test with a different number of transactions. Although the
average latency increases with the number of transactions, the increase is not sharp, growing very slowly.
As illustrated in the following results, the system can process a throughput of around 270 transactions per
second (PDP decisions) with an average latency of 0.54 seconds.
Figure 6.7: Average latency of Kafka as a function of the type of transactions.
Figure 6.8 shows the average latency (in seconds) for the same three different transactions, based on the
Raft orderer. The test result is based on a different number of transactions. Similarly, the average latency
increases with the increase in the number of transactions. The test run failed for the Raft orderer with
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Figure 6.8: Average latency of Raft under different transactions.
10,000 transactions due to VM Memory limitation. Later, the resource consumption result indicates that
Raft consumes almost 4.5 times more memory compared with Kafka, which explains why the test failed in
the middle for 10,000 transactions with Raft orderer.
For both Raft and Kafka orderers, increasing the number of transactions increases the average latency
for the record attributes transaction. Policy decision transaction has the minimum average latency for both
Kafka and Raft, based on 3,000 transactions. For Record attribute and query data transactions, the average
latency in Raft is slightly higher than Kafka. For the policy decision transaction, the average latency in
Raft for 1,000 and 3,000 transactions is slightly lower than Kafka, but for 5000 transactions, the result is the
opposite.
Figures 6.9 and 6.10 show the average latency and throughput for the policy decision transaction for
Raft and Kafka based on different send rates. The number of transactions for these two tests is 5,000. The
dendrite of 200 Transactions Per Second (tps) is an optimal point for Kafka as it exhibits the lowest average
latency, and the average latency increases sharply after the send rate of 200 tps. Raft is also exhibiting an
increase in average latency after the send rate of 200 tps, but comparatively performing better than Kafka.
The reason could be related to the fact that Raft is has used three orderer nodes to handle the ordering
service, and Kafka is using two orderer nodes as it is shown in table 6.1.
The maximum throughput for both Raft and Kafka orderers is at the send rate point of 300 tps; afterwards,
the throughput drops for both of them. Overall, in terms of throughput and average latency, Raft performed
better than Kafka.
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Figure 6.9: Average latency of Raft and Kafka based on different transactions.
Figure 6.10: Throughput of Raft and Kafka under different transactions.
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Figure 6.11: Throughput of Raft and Kafka under different transactions.
Figure 6.12: Average latency based of Raft and Kafka with different number of clients.
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Table 6.1: Resource consumption for Raft and Kafka.
Orderer Name Memory(max) Memory(avg) CPU(max) CPU(avg) Traffic In Traffic Out Disc Read Disc Write
Raft dev-peer0.org1 74.4MB 71.MB 32.25% 28.21% 13.8MB 5.3MB 0B 0B
dev-peer0.org2 73.3MB 69.7MB 33.23% 28.28% 13.8MB 5.3MB 0B 0B
peer0.org1 379.3MB 369.4MB 67.21% 56.32% 31.1MB 23.7MB 0B 21.8MB
peer0.org2 284.0MB 274,1MB 70.78% 55.66% 31.1MB 23.6MB 4.0KM 21.8MB
orderer1 554.1MB 535.4MB 26.11% 15.41% 22.4MB 59.1MB 0B 37.2MB
orderer2 525.3MB 506.5MB 18.78% 11.88% 27.6MB 28.7MB 0B 37.0MB
orderer0 513.3MB 494.7MB 19.40% 11.63% 27.5MB 10.6MB 0B 37.2MB
Kafka dev-peer0.org1 73.5MB 72.8MB 17.87% 15.26% 7.5MB 2.5MB 0B 0B
dev-peer0.org2 64.5MB 62.8MB 18.73% 15.69% 7.5MB 2.5MB 0B 0B
peer0.org1 295.9MB 286.2MB 52.08% 49.15% 27.1MB 17.0MB 368.0KB 21.2MB
peer0.org2 294.1MB 282.7MB 51.54% 48.38% 27.1MB 17.1MB 152.0KB 21.2MB
orderer0 121.1MB 113.1MB 25.80% 23.30% 29.6MB 11.1MB 4.0KB 18.4MB
orderer1 124.1MB 115.2MB 21.87% 20.25% 29.7MB 46.5MB 276.0KB 18.4MB
Figure 6.11 shows the effect of increasing the number of organizations and peers and comparing two
different databases, GoLevelDB and CouchDB. Increasing the number of organizations and peers increases
the average latency for all three transactions. For the CouchDB database with three organizations and two
peers, the average latency increases sharply to 43.81 seconds for the policy decision transaction, which is
17.73 times more than GolevelDB and 64.42 times more than the same database, with two organizations and
one peer. It shows that CouchDB does not perform acceptably in terms of scalability for the presented access
control application.
Figure 6.12 shows the average latency for both Raft and Kafka based on the different number of clients.
This test is run based on 5,000 transactions and the policy decision transaction. For Kafka, 25 number of
clients is like an optimal point that has the lowest average latency (0.3 seconds). However, 25 is an optimal
point for the system with current resources. As the graph shows, for Raft, there are two points for the
minimum average latency, corresponding to 20 and 25 clients. In general, Kafka performs better under 25
clients, but after 25 clients, it shows a sharp increase in the average latency. Although it shows that the
system is not scalable after 25 clients, it significantly depends on the computation power and limitations of
the VM instance. We have repeated the test with a more powerful VM instance, and the average latency was
0.36 second for Raft and 0.31 second for Kafka with 60 clients. Similar to the previous experiments (figures
6.9, and 6.10), Kafka performs better under the optimal point, but when the number of clients is increased
to more than 30 clients, Raft performs better.
Table 6.1 presents the resource consumption for policy decision transactions based on 5000 transactions
for Kafka and Raft. As the presented numbers in the table demonstrate, Raft consumes 4.33 times more
memory on average in comparison with Kafka. It clarifies that the early test results with 10,000 transactions
with Raft ordered failed because the VM ran out of memory.
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6.5.4 Security considerations
The presented system alleviates security and privacy concerns that centralized access control systems suffer
by offering a pluggable distributed application for access control that provides reliable auditing data for
accountability and non-repudiation. However, there are additional precautions that need to be taken. It
allows engineers to reuse the presented access control component, which is decoupled from the underlying
resources that are protected. While this provides ease of implementation, new concerns arise. We need to
ensure that there are no other ways to access protected resources. It is also essential to ensure that the local
world state database is not tampered with or accessed by the system administrators. The possible solution
includes enforcing only one access control channel (the blockchain) and secure, tamper-proof storage for logs
(for example, another blockchain) [17]. Although using blockchain to store resources increases its resiliency,
there are data integrity vulnerabilities. Further research is needed to assess the practical implications of such
an approach.
6.6 Chapter summary
Reliable accountability mechanisms are essential for audits. In this paper, I discussed how permissioned
blockchains could be helpful as a trustable backend in access control systems by providing a solid basis for
audits. I proposed a distributed ABAC system based on Hyperledger Fabric, focusing on audibility and
scalability. I validated the solution through a decentralized access control management application in digital
libraries. First, I presented a comprehensive review of studies focusing on blockchain-based access control
studies. Then I presented the system architecture and implementation details, where I implemented the
PDP, PAP, and AM components using smart contracts on-chain, and the PEP was implemented off-chain -
based on the blockchain clients’ requirements.
I considered various experimental evaluation parameters based on the Hyperledger Caliper framework in
terms of system performance. The evaluation results indicate that the presented system effectively handles
a throughput of 270 transactions per second, with an average latency of 0.54 seconds per transaction.
6.7 Contribution of the work presented in this chapter
This chapter presented a decentralized attribute-based access control system based on Hyperledger Fabric.
All ABAC components in the context of policy-based architecture were implemented as smart contracts and
automatically enforced access control decisions. The system was evaluated through a case study of digital
libraries. A complete performance analysis based on two different orderer services, Raft and Kafka, two
databases, CouchDB and GoLevelDB, and various network configurations, indicated the system’s acceptable
performance and scalability.
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This study is the result of my internship project with the Linux Foundation, Hyperledger project. The
contribution of this chapter has been published in the following paper:
Rouhani, Sara , Rafael Belchior, Rui S. Cruz, and Ralph Deters. ”Distributed attribute-based access
control system using a permissioned blockchain.” world wide web(2021), doi: 10.1007/s11280-021-00874-7.
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7 Data trust framework
Data sharing has become a big concern regarding privacy and confidential issues, abusing data, and legal
and ethical violations. The lack of a transparent and trustworthy framework for data trust hinders many data
owners from sharing their data, which could be vital for many research purposes. Data sharing is not merely
a big concern for data owners, but also data users are concerned about the trustworthiness and reliability of
the provided data at the origin. Hence, trust is a two-way problem for both data owners and data users.
Data trust is a fairly new concept that aims to facilitate data sharing by forcing data users to be trans-
parent about the process of sharing and reusing data. Data trust entails legal, ethical, governance and
organizational structure as well as technical requirements for enabling data sharing. Previous studies have
suggested the potential of web observatory [124] and institutional repositories [9] for implementing data trust.
Although many other studies investigate blockchain potential for data sharing and access control, they
are mostly scattered studies focused on a particular step or specific aspect of data sharing or have taken side
one of the parties in data sharing addressing only data owners concerns.
This study proposes an end-to-end framework for data trust based on blockchain, which ensures the
trustworthiness and quality of the data at origin for data users and ethical and secure usage of data for data
owners.
I introduce a trust model to assess input datasets’ trustworthiness using three parameters: data owner
endorsement and reputation, data asset endorsement and data owner confidence level in the provided dataset.
I have recorded all these parameters on the ledger using implemented smart contracts, and they will be
updated with every new transaction.
Adaptive transaction validation is applied using Hyperledger Fabric state-based endorsement based on
datasets trust value. I have conducted a comprehensive performance analysis to demonstrate the system’s
efficacy in handling large sets of transactions and scaling across multiple organizations. The proposed sys-
tem presents all the properties required for data trust. At the same time, it benefits from transparency,
immutability, security offered by blockchain technology, and smart contracts’ automation capabilities.
This chapter addresses the following questions:
 Why blockchain is a suitable infrastructure for implementing data trust?
 How can we implement data trust’s required properties using blockchain?
 How can we develop an end-to-end solution for data trust using blockchain?
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7.1 Data trust studies
Various studies have investigated blockchain potential for trusted data sharing. Some studies have considered
incentive mechanisms to encourage data owners to share their data without losing control and ownership. I
have assessed input datasets’ trustworthiness through multiple trust models such as reputation-based models,
smart contract verification, and algorithmic solutions.
Hawlitschek [73] et al. presented a literature review on trust in the context of blockchain technology and
sharing economy. Karafiloski et al. [87] discuss the blockchain-based solutions associated with trust, data
ownership, protection and security in big data.
Table 7.1: Blockchain based data sharing and quality control studies.
Study Incentive-based Quality control Blockchain network Implementation Application domain
Xuan et al. [187] Yes - - Partially General data sharing
Shrestha et al. [163] Yes - Ethereum (public) Yes General data sharing
Shen et al. [161] Yes - - Partially Cloud data
Chen et al. [39] Yes Yes Ethereum (public) Yes Internet of Vehicles
Zhu et al. [205] Yes - - Partially Medical data
Su et al. [166] Yes Yes - Yes Disaster rescue
Casado et al. [33] - Yes - No IoT
Zheng et al. [204] - Yes Ethereum (public) Yes Medical data
Cappiello et al. [32] - Yes Ethereum (public) Yes General data sharing
Huang et al.[81] - Yes Ethereum (public) Yes Crowd sensing
An et al. [11] - Yes - Yes Crowd sensing




Zovolokina et al. [195] Yes Yes
Hyperledger Fabric
(permissioned)
Yes Digital car dossier
Dedeoglu et al. [51] - Yes Custom (private) Yes IoT
Shala et al. [159] Yes - - Yes IoT
Yue et al. [193] - - - - Big data sharing
Brandao et al. [24] - - - - Smart places
Kang et al. [86] - Yes Consortium blockchain Yes
Vehicular
edge computing
Yang et al. [189] - Yes - Yes Vehicular networks
Kim et al. [89] - - - Yes Wireless sensor network
Kochovski et al. [90] - - Ethereum (public) Yes Fog computing
Wei et al. [179] - - - Yes Cloud data








Presented system - Yes
Hyperledger Fabric
(permissioned)
Yes General data sharing
Table 7.1 provides the summary of blockchain-based data sharing, data trust and quality control studies.
Shala et al. [159] introduce an incentive mechanism to motivate low trusted peers in the IoT network to
increase their trust score. The incentivization system uses control loops that contain a target trust score. For
the service providers with low trust scores, a package of incentives, such as discounts for other services, will
be sent to encourage them to offer a better service in exchange for the promised benefits. In [205], authors
present an incentive-based model to encourage medical data owners to share their high-quality data (real and
practical) and earn revenues, as well as miners who get benefit by participation and validating transactions.
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Wang et al. [174] introduce a privacy-preserving incentive mechanism to achieve high-quality contribution
in crowdsensing. The trust model motivates participants to share their high-quality sensing data and profit
in the form of Bitcoin or Monero cryptocurrencies. Miners verify the quality of data and earn revenue as
well. Zavolokina et al. [195] provides a financial incentive for participating in the network and provides
high-quality data for car dossiers. The system expects to fix errors by punishing harmful behaviour. They
employ smart contracts for automatically calculating and enforcing incentives. [163] utilizes blockchain and
smart contracts to encourage data owners to share their research data without losing control and ownership
of it. The system incentivizes the participants by providing access to aggregate, anonymized data in exchange
for involving as miners in the network.
Kang et al. [86] propose a subjective logic model to assess nodes’ reputation to ensure high-quality data
sharing in the vehicular network. Dedeoglu et al. [51] present a trust model to assess the trustworthiness
of data observed by sensor nodes in the IoT network. The model consists of three elements: evidence from
other neighbour sensor nodes observations, the data source’s confidence, and its reputation. They also employ
blockchain to control shared data trustworthiness by detecting inaccurate or suspicious data captured by IoT
devices or mobile crowdsensing. Choudhury et al. [43] ensure data trustworthiness while maintaining data
privacy. Regulatory agencies assess the quality of data as network participants. Data privacy is ensured
by creating activity-specific private channels. An et al. [11] present a lightweight consensus mechanism
called delegated proof of reputation (DPoR) to solve the heavy computation problem appropriate for data
quality control in crowdsensing nodes. Huang et al. [81] examine the quality of collected data from sensor
nodes in the crowdsensing network through verification rules embedded in smart contracts. Su et al. [166]
have designed a two-tier reinforcement learning (RL)-based incentive algorithm to improve high-quality data
sharing. Casado et al. [33] also present a cooperative algorithm based on game theory in the edge computing
layer to promote data quality and false data detection. Table 7.1 outlines the summary of incentive-based
and quality control for data stewardship using blockchain technology.
7.2 System architecture
As I discussed earlier, the proposed system aims to establish a data trust framework beneficial for both data
owners and data users. To tackle this goal, I present two main components in the system architecture. 1)
a trust model to examine the trustworthiness of input datasets and 2) a secure and traceable access control
management. Figure 7.1 presents the proposed data trust framework architecture.
I model trust for the input datasets as follows. For any initial dataset, the system calculates its trust value
through a blockchain-based application. This value is used to ensure only trusted datasets are confirmed,
and the system only records trusted data assets on the ledger. Section 7.3 explains which parameters are
involved and how I have calculated the trust value.
The datasets with lower trust values are considered suspicious, and they are required to be validated by
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Figure 7.1: End to end data trust architecture with adaptive validation.
more verifiers. This adaptive selection of the number of verifiers provides an acceptable trade-off between
the system’s data assets trustworthiness and its performance and resource consumption. In order to prevent
a data breach by data investigators, they would have access to a small chunk of data. The accuracy and
quality of the data are examined through that small chunk.
Once the datasets’ information is recorded as data assets on the ledger, the data users interested in
accessing a dataset can prepare a request to access the dataset. The data owner will receive the requests
directly, and they will decide to give access to their datasets under which terms and conditions. Using
blockchain and smart contracts, all transactions are automatically enforced, and there are no third parties
involved. The access control policies could be served through a smart contract, created and stored on the
blockchain directly by the resource owner. Moreover, the data owners can transparently query the immutable
and permanent storage of blockchain and trace who had access to their dataset previously and who currently
have plus all the history of access requests despite the data owners’ response type. Section 7.4 describes the
details of implemented smart contracts for access control and consent management.
7.3 Trust model
This section discusses how I calculate the trust value for the input datasets. Later, this value will be available
for the data users interested in a particular dataset. Moreover, the system adaptively includes this value to
define the number of verifiers for confirming the dataset. The higher trust value requires fewer number of
verifiers; therefore, the dataset will be verified faster.
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7.3.1 Terminology
I call datasets the data assets as they are assets used in the distributed data trust framework to manage
them and control access to them. Every data asset has an owner (data owner) that has full control over the
data. Every data asset has a unique identifier (key).
Data owners are the one who provides the data asset. The data owner has full control to decide who
will have access to the data, for what purpose and the access permission level and conditions. The system
provides a transparent history of all granting and revoking access permissions executed by the data owner.
A data subject refers to any person whose personal data is being collected and can be identified, directly
or indirectly, via an identifier such as a name, an ID number, address, or his or her information on social
media.
The datasets provided by data owners may or may not include personal data. In any case, they require a
precise procedure to share datasets. Sharing datasets that include personal data requires additional mecha-
nisms to protect data subjects by preparing the dataset in a way that does not contain individually identifiable
information any more. The pre-requisite steps must be provided to ensure sufficient privacy safeguards are in
place for protecting data subjects’ personal information. These mechanisms could include de-identification
or anonymization. De-identification refers to erasing or replacing personal identifiers to make it difficult to
re-establish a link between the individual and his or her personal information. Anonymization refers to the
permanent removal of the link between the individual and its personal data to the degree that it would be
practically impossible to re-establish the link [95].
Data users are potential users interested in datasets, such as data analysts, data miners, or data scientists
to extract knowledge, insights, and meaningful or profitable patterns from the dataset. They use the proposed
data trust framework to discover and request access to their intended datasets. They also require trust in
the quality of the provided dataset.
7.3.2 Input datasets trust assessment model
I have used a trust factor in the represented data trust framework to examine the level of trust in the input
datasets. I have considered this trust factor to determine the number of verifiers to examine the dataset’s
trustworthiness before confirming the dataset and record it as a valid data asset in the ledger.
In the adaptive trust model, trust is modelled for the data asset with the key of i as:
Trusti = f(reputationuj , endorsmentuj , λ(confidencei))
λ ∈ [0, 1]
(7.1)
where f is a function with three input parameters, including data owner’s reputation, reputationuj , data
owner’s endorsement, endorsmentuj , and data owner’s confidence for the provided dataset, confidencei.
The λ factor determines the impact of the selected confidence in the total trust score. Later, I will discuss
102
Figure 7.2: Trust assessment of input datasets.
how the λ coefficient is calculated based on the received assessments from data users. Figure 7.2 represents
trust assessment model for input datasets.
I have implemented three smart contracts for calculating reputation, endorsement, and confidence param-
eters. The smart contracts read the required values from the ledger and calculate the specified parameter
value. Subsequently, the smart contract stores the result of each parameter on the ledger. Those results will
be included in the next round of the parameter calculation, such as calculating the confidence parameter
and calculating the total trust value, which will be used for system analysis in the future. Finally, I have
implemented another smart contract to invoke the three input parameters smart contracts and calculate the
current dataset’s trust value.
Reputation
I calculate the data owner’s reputation considering the user’s previous successful transactions as well as the
minimum and the maximum number of successful transactions for all users, using the min-max normalization:
reputationuj =
∑n




∀ u ∈ U
∑h










∀ u ∈ U
∑h
i=1 Ts are respectively the minimum and maximum number of successful transactions for all
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users in the framework.
More successful transactions, which means more submitted valid data assets by the data owner, increases
the data owner’s reputation. Multiple validators examine every input data asset; the number of these
validators will be defined based on the trust factor. Because the new users do not have any history of
valid data assets, their reputation score is relatively low. As they interact more honestly, they gain more
reputation. Subsequently, their following transactions will require fewer validators, and their transactions
will get validated faster.
Endorsement
Data owners can receive two types of endorsements. In the first type, any user in the system knows the
data owner can endorse one; for example, they could have worked together previously. The second type of
endorsement is received from the data users who have previously studied a dataset provided by the current
data owner. The data owner receives an endorsement based on the data user’s experience regarding the high
quality of the data set. The second type of endorsement has a more substantial influence on the data owner’s
total endorsement score. Endorsement value for the data owner j is calculated as:




endorsduj ) / β (7.3)
Where
∑
endorsuj is the total endorsements that the user uj has received from other ordinary users, and∑
endorsduj is the number of endorsements, the submitted data asset has received in the framework. Also,
β is a factor that defines the speed of reaching the highest possible endorsement value, which is one here. α
is a positive weight that defines the importance of data asset endorsement versus user endorsement. Figure







For any initial data set, the data owner enters a confidence value between 0 to 1 (considencei ∈ (0, 1]) to
express her or his confidence in the provided data set. This value will only be considered in the data asset’s
total trustworthiness if there is a history of previously entered data sets by the current data owner studied
by a data user.
For the new data owners that the system does not have any assessment of their previous confidence value,
the initial λ is zero. It means their confidence will not be considered to calculate the trustworthiness of the
provided data set. However, this confidence value will be recorded in the system. Later, once a data user
rates the data set’s quality, the difference between the data owner’s provided confidence, and the data user’s
rate will be calculated as ∆. The proposed calculation of the λ value is given as:
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Figure 7.3: The effect of alpha and beta on the data owner’s endorsement.
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∆ = DataSetRating −DataOwnerConfidence
λnew =
∆ ≥ 0 min(1, λold + φ(1−∆))∆ < 0 max(0, λold + φ∆)
λ ∈ [0, 1]
φ > 0
(7.4)
Where φ is a factor that determines the speed of reaching the maximum of λ, which is one. Adaptively, as
the data owners provide more accurate predictions about the quality of their data set through their entered
confidence value, later their input confidence value will have more effect on the total trust value of the new
data set.
7.4 Access management and sharing data assets
As discussed previously, the proposed end-to-end data trust framework addresses the concerns of both data
owners and data users. The previous section explained how the proposed data trust model calculates the
trustworthiness of input data sets and how it adapts to the confidence of data owners in their provided data
sets. This section describes how we can implement a secure and trustable access management system using
distributed ledger technology. It also describes how to design smart contracts to meet the requirements of
the data trust framework.
Blockchain’s features, such as transparency, auditability and trust distribution, along with leveraging
smart contracts, make it possible to achieve secure and fine-grained access control, thereby promoting the
data-trust framework. This section introduces the access control and consent management components for
the presented data trust framework.
Once the data is approved, the data set could either be recorded on a secure cloud storage service provided
by the data trust implementing party, or it could stay at the owners’ side. In the second case, the owner
party is responsible for providing access to the data set, but still, they adopt the blockchain-based access
control and consent management system. Despite the location of storing the data sets, for any new data
asset added to the data trust framework, a new record will be recorded on the ledger, including data asset id,
the owner of the data asset and the hash value of the data asset. Any access permission requires the digital
signature of the owner for approval.
Access permission can be granted to a particular user or a sub group of users belong to one or multiple or-
ganizations. Three primary smart contracts are responsible for handling access requests, consent management
and access provenance. Figure 7.4 illustrates the smart contracts design and interactions.
Access control smart contract receives access requests, checks default access permissions. Suppose the
user has access to the data set based on the system’s previous rules and prior consent between the data owner
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Figure 7.4: Design of smart contracts for access control, consent management and data provenance.
and data user. In that case, it submits a transaction for recording the access request and the result of access
permission.
If there are no default access rules that match the current access request, it sends the access request to
the data owner. The data owner investigates the access request and decides to accept or reject it based on
metadata provided by the data owner. Suppose the response received from the data owner is accepted. In
that case, the access control smart contract invokes the consent management smart contract to handle the
agreement between the data owner and data user.
The consent management smart contract is responsible for sending the owner’s terms and conditions to
the data user and collecting the required signatures. It records the agreement to be permanently stored on
the ledger.
Data asset provenance smart contract is implemented to query all the access requests, permissions, and
revokes toward data assets. All transactions are appended to the blockchain history, whether valid or invalid.
Therefore, all access requests are recorded on the ledger despite their acceptance and rejection outcome.
They are valuable resources to analyze in the future and detect possible threats. If somebody had tried to
compromise the systems’ security, all the access attempts were recorded on the transactions’ history. Data
owners are able to query the data users who currently have access to their data assets as well as query the
previous history of access changes. Utilizing smart contracts for querying data asset provenance makes it
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Figure 7.5: Smart contract transactions.
possible to generate customized and flexible queries.
7.5 System implementation
In this section, I discuss system implementation with regard to smart contracts design and implementation
and adaptive endorsement. The program codes of the project implementation and evaluation experiments
are available in the Github repository 1. I have used Hyperledger Fabric version 2.2.0 for implementing the
system. Hyperledger Fabric [13] is a well-known permissioned blockchain with a modular structure. This
allows pluggability and customization. It also supports private communication and private data collections.
Organizations can establish private communication by creating separate channels. Each organization can
participate in separate channels so that it can develop multiple private communications. Each channel has
a separate ledger, and the communications are restricted to the organizations within the channel. Moreover,
the ledger can be privatized granularly to include only a particular set of participants.
7.5.1 Smart contract design
Figure 7.5 presents the transactions implemented in smart contract (chaincode) to assess data trust. As
discussed in section refTrustModel, reputation, endorsement, and confidence are three main factors to asset




 dataID: a unique identifier for data assets.
 dataOwner: the userID that creates a data asset.
 hash: the hash value of a data asset stored in off-chain storage.
 owenrConfidence: the owners confidence in the provided data set. A float value between 0 to 1.
 endorsement: the number of endorsements that the data set is received. I have initialized it to 0.
 rating: the rating value that the data set is received from the users who studied the data set. A float
number between 0 to 1.
 lambda: this is a factor discussed in formula 7.4, that indicates the effect of data owner’s confidence. I
have initialized it to 0.
 trust: the trust value that later will be calculated based on reputation, endorsement and confidence. It
is initialized to null.
Reputation is based on the number of previous successful transactions that recorded a new data set to
the system. This value will be calculated based on the ratio of the other users’ reputations.
MinMax is a heavy computation transaction that queries all data assets stored on the ledger by dataOwn-
ers properties, counts the number of data for each owner’s assets, and stores the minimum and the maximum
number of owner’s data stored on the ledger. Since MinMax is a heavy transaction, the MinMax transaction
is not invoked to calculate the users’ reputation. The system can regularly (for example, every hour) call
the MinMax transaction and update the MinMax value on the ledger. Reputation transaction instead just
queries the value of MinMax data stored on the ledger. This leads to significantly improving the performance
of reputation transactions and, eventually, data trust transaction performance.
The endorsement is calculated based on two items, data asset endorsements and the owner of the data
asset endorsements. Endorse User and Endorse data are two respective transactions that update data owners’
endorsements and data assets’ endorsements. Endorsement transaction calculates the data asset’s endorse-
ment based on querying the data related to the data asset endorsement and the owner of the data asset
endorsement.
Every user who has studied the data asset can rate the quality of data by submitting a RateData trans-
action with a ratio between 0 to 1. Delta will be calculated based on the difference between the average
ratings that the data asset has received and the owner’s initial confidence. The new value for the lambda
will be calculated and updated on the ledger accordingly. Confidence transaction queries the latest state for
the lambda value for the data owner of the respective data asset. Eventually, data trust transaction invokes
the three transactions, Reputation, Endorsement and Confidence, and returns each item’s respective values.
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7.5.2 Adaptive validation
Endorsement policies determine the smallest set of organizations with respect to their roles required to
endorse and sign a transaction for it to be valid. The running peers refer to the endorsement policy to
decide whether a transaction is valid. For example, OR(‘Organization1.member’, AND(‘Organization2.peer’,
‘Organization3.peer’)) is an endorsement policy that indicates either a member from organization1 must sign
the transaction or one signature from a peer of the Organization2 MSP and one signature from a peer of the
Organization3 MSP are required.
Hyperledger Fabric allows flexible endorsement at three different levels, chaincode level endorsement,
collection-level endorsement and key-level endorsement 2. Chaincode-level endorsements are agreed to by
channel members. It means all transactions implemented in the chaincode follow the same endorsement policy.
Collection-level endorsement policy sets the endorsement for a collection of data that are kept private in the
channel. Key-level or stated-based endorsement provides a granular level, which we can utilize to achieve
adaptive validation based on data owners’ trustworthiness and data assets. In the key-level endorsement, we
can implement a different endorsement policy for any single data stored on the ledger. This way, we can set a
looser policy that requires fewer signatures for data assets that are higher trustworthy. We can set a tighter
endorsement policy that requires more verifiers for less reliable data assets.
7.6 Evaluation
In this section, I present the result of the performance evaluation of the system. For implementing the system,
I have used Hyperledger Fabric v2.2.0, and for measuring the system’s performance, I have used Hyperledger
Caliper v0.4.2. The system setup is based on 32GB memory and 4vCPU. The default network setup includes
two organizations and two peers. For the last experiment, a new organization is added to the network. I
initiated the ledger with 1000 data assets, randomly belonging to 10 participants, and their confidence value
is a random number between 0.1 and 1. Alpha, beta, phi values have been assumed to be the same constant
number for all participants. Table 7.2 describes the transactions that are invoked during test runs and their
actions on the ledger.
Data owners create a new data asset on the ledger by invoking the CreateData transaction. 7.6 illustrates
average latency, send rate and throughput for CreateData transaction in five rounds experiments, in which
I have generated a different number of transactions in each round.
Figure 7.7 shows MinMax transaction average latency, send rate and throughput. MinMax is a heavy
computational transaction that queries and counts all users’ data assets and returns the minimum and max-
imum values. It stores these values on the ledger, which will be queried later for calculating data owners’
reputations. This transaction can be regularly invoked to update the value of MinMaX. Therefore, Reputa-
2https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/release-2.2
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Table 7.2: Workload transactions.
Transaction Description Action
CreatData Create a data asset belong to a random owner with random confidence Write
MinMax
Queries all data assets stored on the ledger by dataOwners properties, counts the number
of data for each owner’s assets, and stores the minimum
and the maximum number of owner’s data stored on the ledger
Read-Write
Reputation
Calculates the reputation value for the input user by counting the ownser data and reading the
MinMaX value form the ledger
Read
EndorUser Read the stated of the data asset and updates the Endorsement value for the input user Read-Write
EndorsData Read the stated of the data asset and updates the Endorsement value for the input data Read-Write
Endorsement
Calculate the endorsement value for the input data by querying the endorsement values
belong to the data owner and data asset
Read
RateData Read the stated of the data asset and add new ratring to the data asset Read-Write
Lambda
Calculate the value of lambda based on delta (owner confidence and dataasset average rating),
Update the new value for the lambda
Read- Write
DataTrust
Updates the value of Reputation, Endorsement, and Lambda (the effect on confidence )
for the input data asset
Read-Write
Figure 7.6: Send rate, throughput and average latency for CreateData transaction.
tion transactions and, consequently, DataTrust transactions do not overload with computing instantaneous
MinMax values.
EndorsData and EndorsUser are two transactions that update the endorsement values for data assets and
data owners. Ratedata also updates a data asset’s rating by adding a new rating to the data asset rating
array. Figures 7.8 and 7.9 shows the send rate, throughput and average latency for these transactions in five
rounds experiments with a different number of transactions.
A comparison between send rate and throughput in all transactions involved in computing data trust
are presented in figures 7.10 and 7.11 respectively. This evaluation is also based on five rounds with a
different number of transactions. Confidence and Endorsement transactions present the highest send rate
and throughput values as they query a single data asset and they calculate the Endorsement and Confidence
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Figure 7.7: Calculate and record the minimum and maximum number of data assets belong to a
single user (MinMax).
Figure 7.8: Sendrate and throughput for RateData, EndorsData, and EndorsUser transactions.
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Figure 7.9: Average latency for RateData, EndorsData, and EndorsUser transactions.
based on data asset properties explained in section 7.5 (ownerConfidence, endorsement (both data and owner),
rating, and lambda). CreateData transaction comparatively handles a high send rate (around 100 tps), but
its throughput is between 16.4 to 14.2. EndorsData, EndorsUser, and RateData perform and update action
on the ledger, and their send rate and throughput are around 10 tps. Reputation transaction has the lowest
send rate and throughput, which are around 4.8 tps. Relatively, Reputation is a heavy transaction because
it queries all data assets by filtering the data owner matches the current data owner.
Figure 7.13 shows the average latency for three main factors: reputation, endorsement, and confidence
based on a different number of transactions. The confidence and endorsement are very fast transactions with
a very low average latency because they only read a single value from the ledger. The reputation transaction
is relatively a slower transaction. Although it does not have the overhead of MinMax transaction and only
queries the latest value of the MinMax from the ledger, it still requires to query based on the number of
data assets belonging to the current data owner. Therefore, it is a slower transaction comparing to the
endorsement and confidence transactions.
Figure 7.14 presents the average latency for DataTrust transaction based on time. The left vertical axis
indicates the number of successfully executed transactions during the given time, presented in the right
vertical axis. The average latency for computing the data trust for 2502 transactions is 0.37 seconds that are
completed in 500 seconds.
I have added a new organization and one new peer to the network. I have run the experiments on all
transactions again. The comparison result between the average latency of all transactions in a network with
two organizations and two peers and three organizations and three peers are presented in figure 7.15. As it
is illustrated in the graph, adding a new organization does not affect the performance.
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Figure 7.10: Send rate for all transaction.
Figure 7.11: Throughput for all transaction.
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Figure 7.12: Average latency for DataTrust, Reputation, Endorsement and Confidence transactions.
Figure 7.13: Average latency for three main factors: reputation, endorsement, and confidence based
on different number of transactions.
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Figure 7.14: Average latency for DataTrust based on time.
Figure 7.15: Increase the number of organizations.
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7.7 Discussion
This section outlines how the proposed blockchain-based data trust framework enforces all the eight major
requirements of data trust represented by O’Hara [124]. This scheme is shown to be sufficient, practical, and
secure for trustworthy data sharing.
7.7.1 Discovery
I have used a permissioned blockchain for implementing the system. Unlike public blockchains, in permis-
sioned blockchains, only authenticated stakeholders can interact with the blockchain and access the data
recorded on the ledger. Desirability permissioned blockchains such as Hyperledger Fabric [13] provide a more
granular level of access control for participants, so users joining blockchain can have various access restric-
tions to the different components of blockchain by associating policies. Authenticated data users are able to
discover the available data assets, the properties of data sets represented as meta-data through the system
interface.
The data’s trustworthiness is also available for the data users through the trust value calculated by the
proposed method. The details of each parameter involved in trust calculation for the represented data owner
and data set are also available for potential data users. Besides, once the dataset is confirmed through a
transaction validator, they will add a review to the data set and potential data users are allowed to access
this review and discover the trustworthiness of the data set.
Most importantly, if a data user has previously studied the data set, the data user review regarding the
trustworthiness of the data set is recorded on the ledger and available for future data users. It is an essential
resource as the data users who studied and analyzed the data could bring the most accurate perspective on
the trustworthiness of the data.
7.7.2 Provenance
Once the data owners add their data sets as data assets to the system, they must attach metadata related to
the data provenance, such as the data origin, collection time, and collection method. This information can
help both transaction verifiers and data users to assess the trustworthiness of the data.
Moreover, every time a data set is modified, an associated transaction is generated to update the data
asset properties on the ledger. It helps to query data provenance and trace data evolution by identifying
actual operations that have been performed on the data sets.
7.7.3 Access control
Data owners have full control over their data assets. They are the ones who decide on who gets access to their
data, and by utilizing smart contracts, their access management is enforced automatically. Smart contracts
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also enable fine-grained access checks to verify the authenticity of submitted transactions.
As I discussed in detail in section 7.4, data owners can set default users who can have access to their
data sets or receive access requests from any data users. They inspect the request based on the purpose of
the data users, and they decide to deny or accept the request and under which circumstances. The consent
management smart contract records the consent between the data owner and data user on the ledger based
on data owner specified conditions and possible penalties in case of data user violation.
7.7.4 Access
The data sets that include personal data must be de-identified or anonymized before sharing to ensure that
individuals’ interests are not compromised by providing access to their information. Besides, Hyperledger
Fabric supports private data and private communication, which could be desirable for the data owners who
do not want to expose the metadata associated with their data to all users of the system. They can use this
feature and share their data assets info with their interested parties. We can also limit access to the data
provenance can through customized policies in the smart contracts (chaincode). For example, data users can
send requests to data owners to access reading the data set provenance.
7.7.5 Identity management
In Hyperledger Fabric as a permissioned blockchain, for every actor and user before starting interacting with
the blockchain network, a digital identity is encapsulated in an X.509 digital certificate must be issued. This
identity is essential to determine the correct permissions over resources and access to information recorded in
a blockchain network. A digital identity can include additional attributes to specify the person or organization
holding that identity. These attributes help data owners to identify those attempting to get access to their
data assets.
7.7.6 Auditing
Auditing is one of the primary purposes of introducing blockchain as an infrastructure for implementing a
data trust framework. Blockchain enables us to audit every process and interaction in the system. In the
context of data sharing, blockchain provides an immutable audit trail of data modifications, access requests,
access grants and revocations.
Data owners are able to query the history of transactions regarding access requests and modifications on
access permissions on their data assets. Data users are also able to audit data assets origin and history of
updates on the data sets. Furthermore, monitoring the immutable log of data transactions to automatically
generate an audit trail and record any data breach attempts facilitates detecting possible threats [43].
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7.7.7 Accountability
The proposed data trust framework with utilizing blockchain features increases transparency with respect
to quality, access and usage of data. Once the data owners accept access requests to their data sets, data
users become accountable for using the data under their control. The access enforcement point is an off-chain
process that provides access to data sets based on the specified access limits represented by the data owner.
The monitoring unit is responsible for tracking data users’ actions. Monitoring the immutable log of actions
generated by data users and detecting any violation or misuse can lead to penalty and recording permanently
on the history of the data user on the ledger.
7.7.8 Impact
Identifying value, use, and misuse of data requires invoking data experts, who can participate as verifier
nodes in the blockchain. The data owners can specify their data value and access conditions on their data
assets, and they can be programmed into smart contracts. The penalty calculation must also be included in
the consent management smart contract. The methods of measuring the impact of the data are out of the
scope of this paper.
7.8 Chapter summary
In this chapter, I introduced an end-to-end data trust framework using permissioned blockchain and adaptive
validation. The designed framework assesses the trustworthiness of input data using a novel trust model,
including the data owner’s reputation, endorsements and confidence in provided data. Therefore, the data
users ensure that the available data set’s trustworthiness has been adaptively examined and updated. Data
owners also can benefit from secure, transparent, and automatic access management using smart contracts.
They have full control over their data assets, and they are the only actors in the system who can regulate
access permissions without relying on third parties. By employing blockchain’s provenance and audibility,
data owners can monitor the trace of access regulations and modifications on their data assets. Moreover,
valuable logs can be queried from the ledger to provide a transparent view of the system, identify suspicious
requests, and detect protocol breaches leading to discovering possible threads. Evaluation results indicate the
system’s effectiveness in handling a large number of transactions for writing, updating, and querying trust
parameters value.
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8 Conclusion and future direction
8.1 Research contributions
8.1.1 Literature reviews
Smart contracts are the main motive to utilize blockchain in various applications. I comprehensively reviewed
the topic of smart contracts from different perspectives, including security, performance, and application
design [140].
 I systematically examined the key concepts and proposed recent studies and developments, and I
presented the method of collecting studies. I selected the related studies and provided a systematic
mapping method to present an extensive review of smart contracts in distributed ledger technology.
 I discussed the supporting platforms for smart contracts and compared them. It introduces smart
contract challenges and limitations, and the presented solutions to address those challenges are discussed
and compared.
 I discussed the existing security problems, and various potential solutions, including formal verification,
code analyzer tools, secure consensus methods, privacy-enhancing, and secure programming language.
 I investigated the performance analyzing frameworks, real-time monitoring tools and potential solutions
such as concurrent and execution of transactions.
 I investigated the state of the decentralized applications with a focus on smart contracts. I also discussed
the research gap and future direction.
Many blockchain-based decentralized applications have utilized blockchain for decentralized access control
to resolve centralized access control systems’ problems. I reviewed the blockchain-based applications focusing
on access control [144]. I declared state of the art and the challenges of blockchain-based access control systems
in this study.
First, I introduced the problems of centralized access control systems. I studied the potential and limita-
tions of blockchain technology to address these problems. Second, I presented an overview of access control
studies and blockchain-based access control platforms.
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8.1.2 Investigated and developed distributed data sharing and access control in
particular fields
 Medical data fields:
In current medical systems, patients’ data stores scattered in various unlinked systems and access to
the patient data could be time-consuming and inefficient. On the other hand, patients do not have any
control over who has access to their data and its purpose. I designed and implemented a patient-centric
system for sharing medical data using permissioned blockchain [142] as a Mitacs project.
In this application, I proposed a method to store stored medical data in a secure cloud off-chain repos-
itory and the hash of the data and access rules on a permission blockchain. By employing smart
contracts, patients are able to grant or revoke access permissions directly by submitting the respective
transaction. The presented system utilizes blockcahin’s audibility features to provide patients with ac-
cess traces, including the history of users who have been granted or revoked access to their medical data
and their permissions on patient’s data over time. Connecting the off-chain and on-chain application
is the novel part of this study and one of the first practical implementations for such an application
scenario.
 Business process management field:
Lack of trust and divided data are the two main drawbacks of centrally controlled business processes. I
have collaborated in investigating the applicability of executing a real-world untrusted business process
on the permissioned blockchain to address the integration and trust issues. [135]. This study has
remarked on the feasibility of the execution of Order Processing as a case of a real-world business
process on a permissioned blockchain.
 Physical access control field:
Most access control and authorization studies have focused on logical access control because of the
greater attention to the data’s importance in recent years. However, the physical access control system’s
functionality is not limited to the operation of hardware devices; instead, the proper operation of the
software layer and its process are significant as well.
I proposed and implemented a novel distributed application for the software layer of physical access
control systems [145] to prevent possible threads arising from centralized administrative systems. I
implemented a proof of concept of such an application using Hyperledger Composer, completed with
a simulated scenario to test the system indicating the proposed approach’s feasibility. Performance
analysis discussions on results generated by Hyperledger Caliper is also presented.
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8.1.3 Designed, developed, and analysed distributed access control
After presenting blockchain-based systems to address data sharing and access control in particular domains,
such as healthcare, business process, and physical access control, I proposed a distributed access control
system that does not bind to a particular application domain. The suggested solution is applicable for any
application with multi-stakeholder with different incentives.
My research presents a distributed ABAC system based on blockchain to provide trusted auditing of
access attempts. Blockchain records a tamper-proof history of all changes to the access policies, attributes,
and access attempts and their results. This trace could be utilized as non-repudiation and useful logging to
detect potential systems threats. Besides auditability, my research offers a level of transparency that both
access requesters and resource owners can benefit from.
I validated the proposed solution through a use case of independent digital libraries. I provided a detailed
performance analysis of the implementation. The evaluation result compares the proposed solution’s efficiency
under different consensus mechanisms, Raft and Kafka, different databases, CouchDB and GoLelelD, and
customizable network configuration. This work is conducted as a part of my internship program with the
Linux Foundation (Hyperledger) and their blockchain project.
8.1.4 Designed, developed, and analysed distributed end-to-end data trust
Utilizing my previous studies’ foundation, I presented an end-to-end framework for data trust using blockchain
technology to facilitate data sharing and trustworthiness control.
 My research presents a trust model to assess the trustworthiness of data provided by data owners that
apply adaptive validation and employ smart contracts to regulate the accesses permissions and consent
management for sharing data with data users securely.
 This framework addresses both data owners and data users’ concerns by ensuring the trustworthiness
and quality of the data at origin and ethical and secure usage of the data after sharing the data.
 The presented framework adaptively assesses the trustworthiness of input data using a novel trust
model, including the data owner’s reputation, endorsements and confidence in provided data.
 Data owners also can help with secure, transparent, and automatic access management implemented
by smart contracts. They have complete control over their data assets by presenting them as the only
actors in the system who can manage access permissions without relying on third parties.
8.2 Future work
For the future direction, I am looking toward expanding the blockchain infrastructure for implementing
data trust applications by providing interoperably between various blockchain platforms. There has been a
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significant advance in implementing various and solitude blockchain platforms to utilize blockchain capabilities
in multiple areas. However, this has led to creating numerous incompatible blockchain platforms with the
inability to connect and work interoperably with other blockchain platforms. For example, Hyperledger Indy
1 provides a robust infrastructure for digital identities based on Blockchain. At the same time, Hyperledger
Fabric is a permissioned blockchain that provides a modular and adaptable design fitting a broad range of
industry use cases. By establishing a secure and reliable connection between these two blockchain platforms,
we can leverage the capability of both of them.
Interoperability is a crucial requirement for the survivability and manageability of blockchain systems.
For blockchain systems to become predominant, system architectures should not concern about choosing
the right platform, smart contracts programming languages. Similarly, the back end of the web does not
matter to the web application designers. To meet this objective, the interoperability between multiple
blockchain platforms should be provided. There are three directions in studying the possibility of blockchain
interoperability, cryptocurrency-directed, blockchain engines and blockchain connectors [18, 26].
Cryptocurrency-directed is a category that addresses the interoperability between public blockchains that
support cryptocurrencies. Blockchain engines are frameworks that create reusable data, network, consensus,
incentive, and smart contract layers to create customized blockchains for general use-cases and heteroge-
neous systems [18]. There are two blockchain interoperability initiatives Cosmos 2 and Polkadot 3 that
implement blockchain interoperability through blockchain engines. The Blockchain Connector includes inter-
operability solutions that belong to the neither of cryptocurrency-directed nor blockchain engines. Several
other blockchain interoperability solutions such as trusted relays, blockchain agnostic protocols, blockchain
of blockchains, and blockchain migrators are studied in this category.
We have already implemented 4 a successful prototype of blockchain interoperability based on Publish/-
Subscribe architecture. Publish/Subscribe, or shortly pub/sub, is a distributed interaction pattern that
describes the flow of messages between publishers and subscribers. So, neither the publisher needs to know
anything about recipients of their data (subscribers), nor subscribers need to know the number and location
of publishers. This is referred to as loose coupling feature in pub/sub systems. Since there is no direct inter-
action between publishers and subscribers, and brokers are the entities that control the interactions between
publishers and subscribers, as shown in figure 8.1. The publish/subscribe messaging pattern is well adopted
in many application areas such as IoT, mobile environments, military systems, and peer to peer networks to
improve performance, reliability and scalability.
We proposed a solution in which a blockchain acts as a messaging broker and keeps track of all the topics
provided by other blockchain networks. Publisher blockchains can send messages to the topics, and the sub-






Figure 8.1: Publish-Subscribe architecture.
publish request. We look for connecting heterogeneous blockchain platforms with different architecture and
infrastructure through the presented solution.
The proposed platform has three main components: broker blockchain, subscriber blockchains, and pub-
lisher blockchain as it is shown in fig 8.2. Every component runs by a different blockchain platform to support
the interoperability.
Figure 8.2: Publish-Subscribe architecture for blockchain interoperability.
Although pub/sub is a decoupled model, providing a secure infrastructure to prevent illegal information
flow among connected blockchains is required as each blockchain can run by a network of nodes with different
trust levels.
Hyperledger Fabric version 2 is used for the broker and publisher and Hyperledger Besu and Hyperledger
Fabric version 1.4 as examples of subscribers for implementing the system. Figure 8.3 shows The system
throughput and average latency for various functionalities throughout time by changing the send rate. The
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Figure 8.3: The trend of system throughput and average latency for various functionalities throughout
time with the change of request send rate [63].
words publish, sub, unsub, query, and create in the plots stand for PublishToTopic, SubscribeToTopic,
UnsubscribeFromTopic, QueryTopic, and CreateTopic functions, respectively.
In the presented platform prototype, every participant can subscribe to all existing topics, and there is no
access control mechanism implemented. For the future work, the private data feature offered by Hyperledger
Fabric can be employed to establish private channels in the broker blockchain and keep data topics separate
from other organizations. Furthermore, an access control mechanism can enhance the pub/sub system’s
security and privacy to control data flow at a more granular level.
As the next step, we can regulate the current architecture for implementing a data trust application
connecting the blockchain platforms that offer necessities fitting the application, such as digital identity for
user authentication and modular structure for adaptive, efficient consensus mechanism and databases.
125
8.3 Conclusion
To conclude, this dissertation contributes to the area of decentralized access control and data trust using
blockchain technology and smart contracts to achieve transparency, data provenance, reliability and automatic
operations.
Data trust in the context of three domains including sharing healthcare data , executing and monitoring
business processes and physical access control has been investigated and implemented.
I have designed and developed a patient-centric system to manage medical data without involving third
parties efficiently. Patients have the control to share their data with any interested party. They can trans-
parently trace the access control transactions and see the list of users who currently have access to their data
and the users who had access in the past.
A case study of a real world business process has been implemented on a permissioned blockchain. Several
untrusted parties can collaborate through the business rules, sequence of logics and automatic process check-
ing embedded in smart contracts, while their sensitive information remains private from their competitors.
The result confirms that the deployed business network on the blockchain ultimately ensures the approved
transactions’ correctness and provides guaranteed access control over the network’s business data.
An access control system has been developed for the software layer of physical access control systems
using permissioned blockchain. I have implemented two access control models to provide both static and
dynamic access regulations using a role-based access control model implemented by ACL and a rule-based
access control model implemented by smart contracts. The system provides a reliable and tamper-proof
transactions’ log to query, and it could be accessible through authenticated and authorized users.
A decentralized ABAC access control model has been implemented using Hyperledger Fabric permissioned
blockchain. A policy based architecture compromising three components for managing attributes and policies
on the ledger and calculating access decisions have been implemented as smart contracts. A comprehensive
performance analysis have been conducted utilizing the modular structure of Hyperledger Fabric, comparing
the system performance based on different consensus mechanisms, different databases and various network
configurations. The experimental evaluation results shows that the presented system can effectively han-
dle a transaction throughput of 270 transactions per second, with an average latency of 0.54 seconds per
transaction.
Finally, I designed and implemented an end to end data trust framework using blockchain technology
and adaptive transaction validation. A trust model has been presented that assesses the provided data set’s
trustworthiness based on reputation, endorsement and data owner confidence. Therefore, the data users can
assess the trustworthiness of available data sets. Data owners can serve with a secure, transparent, and
automatic access management implemented by smart contracts. They have complete control over their data
assets, and they are the only actors in the system who can regulate access permissions without relying on
third parties. Moreover, important logs can be queried from the ledger to present a transparent view of the
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system, identify suspicious requests, and detect protocol breaches leading to identifying potential threats. I
have conducted a comprehensive experiment to examine the system performance and scalability. Evaluation
results show the system’s effectiveness in handling a large number of transactions for writing, updating, and
querying trust parameters value.
This dissertation’s main contribution includes developing and evaluating decentralized access control
systems based on multiple application domains and various access control methods as a critical component
of data stewardship. Consequently, developing a reliable data trust framework that addresses the trust issue
in both data owners and data users.
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[115] Alexander Mühle, Andreas Grüner, Tatiana Gayvoronskaya, and Christoph Meinel. A survey on essen-
tial components of a self-sovereign identity. Computer Science Review, 30:80–86, 2018.
[116] Marcel Müller, Nadine Ostern, and Michael Rosemann. Silver bullet for all trust issues? blockchain-
based trust patterns for collaborative business processes. In International Conference on Business
Process Management, pages 3–18. Springer, 2020.
[117] Satoshi Nakamoto. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. Technical report, Manubot, 2009.
[118] Yuta Nakamura, Yuanyu Zhang, Masahiro Sasabe, and Shoji Kasahara. Capability-based access control
for the internet of things: An ethereum blockchain-based scheme. In 2019 IEEE Global Communications
Conference (GLOBECOM), pages 1–6. IEEE, 2019.
[119] Gregory S Nelson. Practical implications of sharing data: a primer on data privacy, anonymization,
and de-identification. In SAS Global Forum Proceedings, pages 1–23, 2015.
[120] Giang-Truong Nguyen and Kyungbaek Kim. A survey about consensus algorithms used in blockchain.
Journal of Information processing systems, 14(1), 2018.
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